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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.0 Introduction
The world is changing at an ever-increasing pace around us. The rise in speed of communication
and global social connectivity (Figure 1-2); the ubiquitous personal computing through smart
phones; and human-level task performance by machines (e.g. autonomous vehicles) etc. are
creating unprecedented challenges and new opportunities for society. However, human
civilization has survived for thousands of years, relying on social and cultural adaption across
myriad periods of duress. One expects that the resiliency and robustness of human kind also will
help the species adapt to the current and future challenges.

Figure 1-1 Scales of social interaction. The emergent properties depend on the scale at which the interaction takes place
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Figure 1-2: The Impact of social media: Source givingcompass.org

Cultural Algorithms (CA) are stochastic optimization methods that are modelled after human
culture and are suited to finding the solutions to problems embedded in complex environments
(Figure 1-1). The CA belong to the class of population-based optimization algorithms but are
enhanced in that the population agents are connected by a social network and they share a
common Belief Space. Knowledge of various types reside in the Belief Space and are distributed
to the population via a Knowledge Distribution (KD) mechanism on a periodic basis. Each type of
knowledge is a metaheuristic that guides the associated population individuals through the
problem search space in a specific manner. A knowledge distribution mechanism serves as a
hyper-heuristic that solves the problem of selecting the right metaheuristic at the right time for
each population individual.
Hitherto, CA implementations have used competitive KD mechanisms – i.e. mechanisms where
knowledge types are pitted against each other and vie for the control of a population of
individuals. Such KD methods resolve to a ‘winner’ knowledge type for each individual, which then
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controls the individual in the next period. Competitive KD methods have performed well for
problems embedded in static environments. Relatively recently, CA research has evolved to
encompass dynamic problem environments – which for immediate purpose can be defined as
environments that can change over time. The degree and rate of an environment’s changes can
be referred to as its complexity.
Given increasing environmental complexity, a natural question arises as to whether the KD
mechanisms that also incorporate cooperation can perform better in such dynamic environments?
Stochastic optimization requires a balance between exploration and exploitation (Matej
Črepinšek, 2013). Among other projections, each knowledge type or metaheuristic can also be
viewed as a point on the exploration-exploitation continuum, due to the nature in which it moves
the individual through the search space. All else being equal, in CA the Knowledge Distribution
mechanism is the primary allocator of resources between exploration and exploitation. It controls
allocations both at the macro (population-level) and the micro (individual-level). Thus, the KD
mechanism, through the allocation of knowledge in the population space, is a key determiner of
optimization performance.
Game theory is a formal approach for analyzing the behaviors of goal-oriented, interacting
entities. Here the term ‘entity’ should be interpreted broadly. For example, it could refer to
software agents, individuals in a population, organizations, countries or even blocs of countries
(e.g. NATO vs. Warsaw pact countries). Game theory can inform about both competitive and
cooperative situations. For example, alliance formation as in the case of the European Union was
a cooperative undertaking whereas a market share tussle between say Ford and GM is
competitive.
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The application of Game theory for Knowledge Distribution mechanisms in Cultural Algorithms
thus seems very apropos, especially in the light of eliciting cooperation among the available
knowledge types. Game theory is an established discipline in that it is both broad and deep with
applications in myriad fields, e.g. economics, social sciences, marketing, computer science,
military strategy, to name just a few. Hence it is a rich source for ideas for game-based knowledge
distribution.
The primary question that this research tries to answer is whether cooperative games can be
an effective mechanism for Knowledge Distribution in Cultural Algorithms especially in the case
of dynamic environments and / or complex domains.

1.1 Cooperative and Completive Games
In this research, CA knowledge distribution is studied in the context of 3 types of games that
encompass both cooperation and competition:
•

Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

•

Stag-Hunt

•

Stackelberg

Prisoner’s Dilemma is a well-studied game whose analytical solution settles in favor of noncooperative actions. However, when played repeatedly cooperation can emerge. Axelrod
showed that reciprocity based stable strategies can emerge in iterated game play (e.g. tit-for-tat)
(Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981).
Stag-Hunt is a game that models situations where the default is cooperation but can lead to
defection (competition) if reward is sufficiently delayed. The “stag hunt” metaphorically is where
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a group of hunters must cooperate to hunt a stag – a more difficult task but with a larger reward.
The alternate is to hunt a rabbit which each hunter can do alone without needing cooperation
from others – but this provides lower reward. Hunters initially wait for a stag to appear but the
longer the delay in sighting a stag (which are rarer) the more tempted they are to defect and go
after a rabbit (which are plentiful). Among other situations, Stag-Hunt has been used to study
alliance formation (Boudreau, Rentschler, & Sanders, 2019) and the evolution of social structure
(Skyrms, 2004).
Stackelberg is a model of collusion/competition in Microeconomics that is closely related to
Cournot competition. Here a leader firm takes the lead in setting the production-level/price in a
market that is being targeted by the leader and a few followers. The leader can take advantage of
its first-mover position to set an advantageous production target / price. However, the leader and
followers have enough information to implicitly coordinate on prices and production for mutual
benefit, given their relative market positions. In Stackelberg, limited cooperation emerges due to
the inherent structure in the interaction arena. The Stackelberg model is often applied in product
pricing and production strategies. For example, Yu and Hong have studied supply-demand balance
in the electricity market in the context of a Stackelberg game (Yu & Hong, 2016).

1.2 CAT Software to Support Competitive / Cooperative Communication
To evaluate game-based knowledge distribution, two new CA software systems were
developed that implement several KD mechanisms. The CA default KD mechanism - Weighted
Majority (WTD) or “wisdom of the crowd” - is used as a baseline for comparison in both systems.
The two systems, described below, optimize in vastly different domains. This was done in order
to more robustly investigate the premise that – in complex and dynamic environments – games
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that span both cooperation and competition are a better method of knowledge distribution than
Weighted Majority which is akin to “wisdom of the crowd (majority voting). Majority voting is
shown to work well when the signal-to-noise ratio is weak or when the environment is relatively
static. For example, many animal cultures use a form of voting to make group decisions (Hoole,
2018). By contrast, human cultures are rich and complex where social network games play a vital
role in knowledge flow (Jiang, Chen, & Liu, 2014) and eliciting cooperation (Takano, Wada, &
Fukuda, 2016).
The first system, CATGame, solves numerical optimization problems in both static and dynamic
environments. CATGame supports a variety of game mechanics. Here the KD mechanism is
implemented in an abstract manner and serves as the framework that can be used to study
concrete game implementations by injecting them into the this mechanism. All three games
described above leverage this framework.
The second system, CATNeuro, evolves optimal deep learning models i.e. neural networks
(Goodfellow, Bengio, & Courville, 2016) – a domain very different from numerical optimization.
Each of the population individuals in CATGame contain a vector of real numbers. And those in
CATNeuro contain a directed graph - a somewhat direct encoding of a deep learning model.
CATNeuro takes many aspects from the neuro-evolution discipline (Miikkulainen, et al., 2017)
(Stanley & Miikkulainen, 2002) but adapts them to work in the Cultural Algorithms framework.
The CA knowledge sources operate accordingly in each domain, i.e. move individuals through a)
a real-valued hyperspace for numerical optimization; and b) the space of directed graph
structures for deep learning models. However, in both cases the respective knowledge sources
operate on the principles established in the Cultural Algorithms literature.
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1.3 Models of Complex Dynamic Environments in CATGame
To evaluate the performance of the various knowledge distribution mechanisms implemented
in CATGame, the Cones World test problem generator is used. Cones World is based on the DF1
generator devised by Morrison and De Jong (Morrison & De Jong, 1999); DF1 is specifically
designed to evaluate the performance of evolutionary algorithms in dynamic environments. A
sample 2D Cones World landscape is shown in Figure 1-3. The optimization goal is to find the
global maximum (highest peak) of the landscape within a specified epsilon. There may be a
thousand or so cones – i.e. local maxima – making this a relatively hard optimization problem. The
Cones World problem generator includes dynamics to periodically modify the landscapes while
the performance optimization is still underway. The level of change from landscape-to-landscape
– i.e. the dynamic complexity of the environment – is controllable by a system parameter.

Figure 1-3: Sample 2D Cones World landscape

A key characteristic to note is how quickly the system recovers from a shock. In other words,
when the proverbial rug is pulled from under, how many iterations does the system take on
average to find the new global maximum. A robust system should recover sooner. A non-robust
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system may take longer or could get stuck at a local maximum more of the time. The KD
mechanisms are tested at varying levels of dynamic complexity – from linear changes, to nonlinear, all the way to near-chaotic changes – to better understand each’s responsiveness to
different levels of dynamic complexity.
Multiple types of metrics are collected and analyzed to obtain a wholistic, multi-faceted
understanding of KD operation and performance. The primary performance metric is the number
of generations needed in order to reach solution within the specified epsilon. However, since
knowledge distribution operates in the context of a social network, several ‘social’ metrics are also
collected, such as Schelling’s segregation index (Schelling, 1971); diffusion; and information
related to the dynamics of knowledge flow in the network.

1.4 Models of Complexity in CATNeuro
The notion of complexity to test CATGame is in the form of change over time. By contrast,
CATNeuro must solve an inherently complex, multi-layered optimization problem. The top level is
that of the overall structure of the model as illustrated in Figure 1-4. At this top level, deep learning
models are directed graphs that process input to produce output – the optimization should
produce a feasible and hopefully compact top-level structures (often there is no single right
answer).
The internal nodes of the top-level graph are modules which are smaller, reusable graphs. The
system maintains several module ‘species’. Each species is evolved in a separate population so as
to protect the members from being eliminated too early and reducing overall available diversity –
a process known as speciation in biology (Howard & Berlocher, 1998). Hence, the second level
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optimization is to select the right modules for the internal nodes from the available species of
modules.
Several parameters associated with both the top-level and module individuals also need tuning.
For example, the overall learning rate (top level) and deep learning operation parameters
(module-level) e.g. number of dimensions of a dense node; activation type (ReLU, TanH), etc. This
is the third level of optimization.

Figure 1-4: Example CATNeuro evolved model - shows overall structure and the structure of selected modules

The structures produced by CATNeuro are translated into concrete deep learning models for
the chosen deep learning library (e.g. CNTK, Tensorflow, PyTorch, etc.). The concrete models are
then trained using the available training data for the problem. The error or loss obtained from the
training step is fed back to CATNeuro as the fitness signal to guide the optimization. CATNeuro is
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a general system that can be used to optimize deep learning models for any problem as long as a
suitable training dataset is available for the given problem. The training dataset for the CATNeuro
test problem is created via a Reinforcement Learning process and is explained next.

Figure 1-5: A frame from FightingICE game

The test problem selected for CATNeuro is the construction of a deep learning model driven
controller to play a fighting game called FightingICE (Intelligent Computer Entertainment lab.,
Ritsumeikan University, 2018). FightingICE is a research testbed for AI, maintained by Ritsumeikan
University, Japan. It is a version of Rumble Fish (Dimps Corp.) a 2D street fighting game (Figure
1-5).
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The FightingICE research testbed is part of an annual competition for AI-driven controllers.
Among other features, the testbed allows programmatic access to internal game state which can
be used to create controllers that play the characters in the game. Each player has 56 possible
actions to choose from (e.g. jump, hit, block, throw projectile, etc.).
Any deep learning model requires a fair amount of training data to train. To acquire the training
data for the deep learning controller model, a Reinforcement Learning (Sutton & Barto, 2018)
inspired approach was followed. The main idea is to first learn a mapping (as a table) between
game state and action distribution. In Reinforcement Learning parlance this known as a policy
table. How such a mapping is learned is described later. If however such a mapping is available,
an agent (or controller) can use it to play the game. It can look up the current game state in the
table and if there is a match, it can then sample from the found distribution and play the selected
action. Otherwise it may take a random action.
For very large game state spaces, as is the case for FightingICE, a table-based approach is not
feasible as the table will have either many gaps or will be impractically large. A better approach is
to convert the table into a neural network model which would be a compressed representation of
the table. A table is discrete mapping whereas the corresponding neural net is a continuous one.
The neural network model can be learned from the table by using the table as the training data.
The network can “fill in the blanks”, i.e. can abstract over the learnings available in the policy table.
How is the policy table learnt? For the FightingICE controller, the process is to play many games
and record each frame’s non-pixel data to obtain representative samples of states encountered
during game play. The table is initialized with uniform action distributions for each recorded state.
Then the FightingICE supplied simulator is used to play selected actions for each recorded state. If
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simulation actions produce a win, the probability of choosing the winning actions for the
corresponding states is increased and the table updated accordingly. Initially actions are selected
at random but later a mix of random and sampled actions are used. It takes a while for the policy
table to converge but eventually it does. Following this process resulted in a 1.3 million row policy
table with a disk size of about 1 gigabyte. The table thus learnt provides sufficient data to train a
deep learning model to be used as a controller.
Stag-Hunt – for which CATGame experimental results showed as performing the best – and
WTD knowledge distribution mechanisms are implemented for CATNeuro. Several deep learning
models are evolved using each of the mechanisms, with the training data obtained from the policy
table. FightingICE was played for each model and game play statistics recorded. The selected
opponents for all test games are a) “Jerry Mizuno” (Chu & Thawonmas, 2017) – an algorithmicallydriven AI used as the benchmark for comparison and b) “Thunder” (Intelligent Computer
Entertainment lab., Ritsumeikan University) the 2018 FightingICE competition champion.
In addition to game statics (e.g. hits-to-opponent; relative-score; distribution of actions taken;
etc.) several aspects of the produced model structures were noted (e.g. the number learnable
parameter weights; number of nodes; number of edges; maximum path length; etc.). The game
play statistics and model structural properties are analyzed and compared to evaluate the
performance of each knowledge distribution mechanism under CATNeuro.

1.5 Outline of the Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the
Cultural Algorithms framework which is the main subject of this research. Since knowledge
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distribution is one of the primary determiners of CA performance, the prior mechanisms and their
historical progression is detailed in Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 is a primer on Game Theory. Only the basics are covered in enough detail for one to
understand the application of games to CA knowledge distribution. Chapter 5 explores how games
can be used for knowledge distribution in CA, and details an abstract mechanism for injecting a
wide variety of games into the CA framework for study. The concepts and implementations of the
three games mentioned earlier are provided in Chapter 6.
Chapter 7 details the experimental framework used to evaluate game-based knowledge
distribution mechanisms implemented in CATGame. The Cones World based dynamic landscape
generation mechanism is explained in detail. Also detailed are the various ‘social’ metrics used for
evaluation such as Schelling’ Index of segregation; diffusion; and analytical methods based on a
Markovian view of knowledge flow across the population network. Data collected from CATGame
experiments, conducted as described in Chapter 7, are analyzed and presented in Chapter 8.
The CATNeuro system and the experimental framework to evaluate CATNeuro is explained in
Chapter 9. It details the graph operations used to evolved deep learning models and the mapping
of those operations to knowledge sources. Chapter 9 also provides a description of the FightingICE
game and the reinforcement learning inspired method used to create the training data for deep
learning, along with the training regime used to train the models. Chapter 10 presents the
performance analysis for CATNeuro knowledge distribution mechanisms from the experimental
data collected. Finally, the main conclusions of this research are summarized in Chapter 11. Future
work arising from the conducted research are also presented in the chapter.
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CHAPTER 2 CULTURAL ALGORITHMS FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW
2.0 Introduction
In the spirit of Ant Colony Optimization (Dorigo, Maniezzo, & Colorni, 1996) (ACO) and Particle
Swarm Optimization (PSO) (Kennedy & Eberhart, 1995), the Cultural Algorithm (CA) (Reynolds R.
G., 1978) is a socially motivated knowledge-driven approach that can be used to find optimal
solutions in a search landscape. Its applications exist in a diverse set of domains, e.g. numerical
optimization (Ali, Suganthan, Reynolds, & Al-Badarneh, 2016); archeology (Jayyousi & Reynolds,
2014), biology (Judeh, Jayyousi, Acharya, Reynolds, & Zhu, 2014); gesture recognition (Waris &
Reynolds, 2015), and computer vision (Waris & Reynolds, 2018); to name some. As with ACO and
PSO, the CA approach employs a socially interacting population of agents. By contrast however
CA also employs a high-level component called the Belief Space that collects and disseminates
varied types of knowledge from/to the population. The Belief Space consists of Knowledge
Sources (KS), each of which essentially represents a type of search strategy. Some KS are primarily
exploratory while others are primarily exploitative and yet others can be like stem cells that can
be explorative or exploitative depending on the context. The Cultural Algorithm is a hyperheuristic that determines what strategies to distribute to the population.
The two components (Population and Belief Space) are connected by an interface; the
communications protocol. The interface consists of an acceptance function and an influence
function. The acceptance function manages transferring experience from the Population
component to the Belief Space. In turn, the influence function is concerned with distribution of
knowledge across a social network. One of the keys to the influence function is the knowledge
distribution mechanism. This mechanism controls how the search strategies from the Belief Space
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are distributed among the population of individuals. The establishment of the right dynamic
balance between the influences of the various Knowledge Sources on the population of individuals
is a key goal of CA.
Over the years, many knowledge distribution mechanisms have been proposed and studied
(Peng, 2005) (Che, 2009) (Reynolds & Kinnaird-Heether, 2013) (Al-Tirawi & Reynolds, 2018). This
are detailed in Chapter 3. However, prior research on Cultural Algorithms has focused exclusively
on competitive KD mechanisms where each individual in the population is assigned one
Knowledge Source (the winner) that influences that individual for the next generation.
Biologically inspired computing was first given impetus by the John Holland with the
development of Genetic Algorithms (GA) (Holland, 1992). GA mimic the chromosomal processes
of mutation and inheritance that occurs in nature. The philosophical underpinnings go all the way
back to Darwin and the aphorism “survival of the fittest”. In fact, the GA structure follows nature’s
form quite closely. A population of individuals is evolved through mutation and crossover of
‘genetic material’; individuals are evaluated for fitness as candidate solutions against the problem
space under consideration; the fittest individuals receive higher chance of passing their genes on
to the next generation.

2.1 The Cultural Algorithm
CA are a computational model of cultural evolution that happens at a faster pace than
biological evolution (Perreault, 2012). Dawkins (Dawkins, 1976) proposed the idea of ‘meme’ as
carrier of cultural knowledge, analogous to genes in biology. The Belief Space in CA can function
as the storehouse of memetic information that can be transcribed on to future generations. The
basic CA is given in Figure 2-1.
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Figure 2-1: Cultural Algorithms Framework (source: CA papers)

The major components of the CA are explained next and the pseudocode for the main loop is
given in Figure 2-4:
•

Population Space – a collection of agents or individuals. Each individual contains
information that can determine its action and behaviors. The individuals may be
networked together in some topology (see Figure 2-2). Each is associated with a single
Knowledge Source (in most cases).

•

Belief Space – stores and organizes different categories of knowledge into the
aforementioned Knowledge Sources. The Knowledge Sources reside in the Belief Space
and are organized in a tree structure as shown in Figure 2-3. Knowledge is harvested from
the current population generation and stored into the Belief Space. It is then disseminated
to the next generation.

This knowledge transfer and update occurs via the

communications protocol described next.

17
•

Communication Protocol – methods for transferring knowledge between the Population
Space and the Belief Space. It consists of an Accept, Update and Influence functions. Every
generation, interesting individuals from the current generation are inducted via the Accept
function into the Belief Space. The Update function harvests knowledge from the selected
individuals and updates the stored knowledge in the Belief Space. The Update function
flows accepted individuals as per Figure 2-3. The Influence function updates the
population to create the next generation by a) first associating each individual with a
Knowledge Source using the knowledge distribution mechanism; and b) modifying the
individual via its associated KS to move it through the search space in search of better
solutions.

Figure 2-2: Population network topologies (source: CA papers)
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Figure 2-3: Knowledge Source dependency graph (source: CA papers)

Begin
t = 0;
initialize BeliefSpace; Pop
repeat
Pop <- evaluateFitness (Pop)
Selected-Indvs <- accept(Pop)
BeliefSpace <- update (BeliefSpace, Selected-Indvs)
Pop <- influence (BeliefSpace, Pop)
t <- t + 1
until (termination condition achieved)
End
Figure 2-4: Cultural Algorithms Pseudocode (source: CA papers)

Knowledge Sources can be viewed as being exploitative or explorative. Exploitative KS explore
a local region of the search space. For example, the Situational KS tracks exemplar individuals in
the population. Individuals under its influence are small variations of one of the exemplars stored
in the Belief Space. Situational knowledge is therefore considered exploitative. The Topographic
KS on the other hand maintains knowledge of diverse regions of the search space by tracking
clusters of individuals. Under its influence, individuals are likely to move to a location in or near
one of the clusters which span a larger radius than that around a single individual.
It must be noted that Knowledge Sources operate on principles harvested from the dynamics
and evolution of cultures and as such are abstract ideas. Their concrete implementation for a
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particular domain really determines where on the explorative-exploitative scale they fall. For
example, Normative KS as interpreted for numerical problems is considered explorative whereas
it is considered exploitative in CATNeuro because it does not alter the structure of the graph and
instead only changes the parameters of the graph nodes.
The CA can be configured with either homogenous (fixed) or heterogenous network topologies
(Figure 2-5). Reynolds, et al (Reynolds, Gawasmeh, & Salaymeh, 2015 ) found that homogenous
topologies were more efficient in low entropy problems but a variation of heterogenous
topologies performed more predictably in higher complexity problems. Below (Figure 2-5) are
examples of completely connected graphs. Disjoint graphs can be represented in a co-evolution
fashion as multiple populations are may communicate via the Belief Space.

Figure 2-5: Homogenous and Heterogenous topologies (source: CA papers)

The CA has been applied in a vast variety of problem domains. In addition to the applications
noted in 1.0, to solve scheduling problems in cloud workflows (Mojab, Ebrahimi, Reynolds, & Lu,
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2019); implement security policies (Bhuyan, Lu, Reynolds, Zhang, & Ahmed, 2019); and multiobjective optimization (Stanley S. D., 2020), among others. Several books by Reynolds covers
additional applications (Reynolds R. G., 2020), (Reynolds R. G., 2019).

2.2 Knowledge Sources
The CA framework allows for different types of Knowledge Sources to be combined in a
synergistic manner. The schematic in Figure 2-6 depicts the flow of knowledge from the Belief
Space to the population space.
The number and types of Knowledge Sources is not fixed. However, the CA is typically
configured with a default set, namely Situational, History, Domain, Topographical and Normative
knowledge. These are described in some detail in Table 2-1. KS usage is selective and new
knowledge types can be integrated into the Belief Space, if required by the problem domain. Colon
(Colon, 2012) for example, augmented CA with a ‘Contextual’ rule-based knowledge
representation to determine optimal plans for pediatric nursing care. The reader is referred to
other CA papers for the detailed explanation of the commonly used Knowledge Source
metaheuristic types (Reynolds & Saleem, 2005) (Ali M. , 2008) (Che, 2009).
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on
chosen
knowledge distribution
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assignments
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in the search space

Performance of the individuals
with respect to the search
landscape

Figure 2-6: CA Knowledge distribution flow (source: CA papers)

Conceptually, each KS represents some process in cultural evolution. These abstract concepts
are translated into concrete implementations based on the problem domain. In general, for
numerical optimization problems, the KS operate on numerical vectors. Each vector is a point in
the problem hyperspace and represents a candidate solution. Each KS modifies the vector
elements, in its own way, to guide the associated individual to optimality in the search space. The
The CATGame system is meant for numerical optimization and thus operates on numerical
vectors as described above. CATNeuro by contrast operates on directed graphs and hence the KS
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need to modify graphs. This is done with the help of graph operations derived from NEAT (Stanley
& Miikkulainen, 2002), namely:
•

Toggle Connection

•

Add Connection

•

Add Node

•

Crossover

•

Mutate Parameter

These operations are described in detail in section 9.1. Here the mapping of these operations
to the various KS is described in Table 2-1.
Table 2-1:Default Knowledge Source Types

Knowledge Source &
Description
Situational
Situational knowledge was first
introduced by Chung (Chung,
1997). It consists of a set of
exemplar individuals along with
their parameter values and the
fitness value. These individuals
represent
‘event-based’
memories observed within some
species. They also serve as
examples for other individuals to
follow.

Acceptance

Influence

Best performing individuals
are added to the list of
exemplars maintained by
Situational KS. The new list is
ranked by fitness and
truncated to the configured
maximum length.

Numeric: The parameter values of
an individual under the influence
of this KS are mutated in the
direction of the corresponding
parameter values of the exemplars
or evolved from their current
values. The probability between
the two actions depends on a
configure probability with bias
towards parameter evolution.
Neuro: Graph of a randomly
selected exemplar is evolved via an
operation sampled from the
probability
distribution
over
operations
associated
with
Situational (see Figure 2-7). The
updated graph is then assigned to
the influenced individual.
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Normative
In cultural terms this knowledge
represents the accepted norms
of behaviors in a society.
Normative knowledge was also
introduced by Chung (Chung,
1997). It is a set of intervals for
each of the parameters of the
problem. The intervals are
considered promising range of
values for the corresponding
parameters.

The
interval
ranges
maintained by Normative KS
are updated from the
parameter values associated
with
best
performing
individuals.

Topographic
In cultural terms, this KS
represents the knowledge of the
landscape or the terrain. The
version of Topographic KS used
for CATGame and CATNeuro is
based on the Brainstorm
optimization algorithm (Shi,
2011). The individuals are
grouped into clusters (using an
algorithm such as K-means). The
clustering mechanism by its
nature
divides
the
top
performers into diverse groups
each of which marks a promising
region of the search space.

The
top
performing
individuals are added to the
list of individuals maintained
by Topographic. The new list is
ranked by fitness and
truncated to a configured
maximum. The updated list is
clustered with K-means where
each list individual is binned to
a fixed number of clusters.

Numeric: The parameter values of
the population individuals are
mutated in accordance with the
intervals. If a parameter value falls
outside the range, a value is
randomly assigned from the range
interval. Otherwise the value is
mutated around its current value.
Neuro: The parameters of the
influenced individuals’ graph are
evolved by sampling from kernel
density estimates (Cosma Shalizi
CMU, 2009) maintained by
Normative KS.
Numeric: The parameter values of
the influenced individual are
derived by evolving those of the
centroid individual of a randomly
selected cluster.

Neuro: Graph of a randomly
selected centroid is evolved via an
operation sampled from the
probability
distribution
over
operations
associated
with
Note that to perform K-means Topographic (see Figure 2-7). The
clustering some measure of probability distribution is heavily
distance is required between biased towards the crossover
two individuals. This is usually operation. The updated graph is
the Euclidean distance in the then assigned to the influenced
case of numeric optimization. individual.
Note: Earlier versions of this KS For CATNeuro a measure of
use multi-dimensional trees. Jin distance is defined based on
(Jin
&
Reynolds,
1999) graph similarity (see Chapter
introduced topographic or 9).
regional knowledge. The search
space is divided into cells. A list
of best cells is maintained.
Overtime the cells may be
divided into finer grained cells to
provide better resolution for
optimization.
Domain
Accept the current generation Numeric:
The
influenced
Domain
knowledge
was of top performers
individuals parameter values are
introduced by Saleem (Saleem,
mutated in the direction of the
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2001). The idea is to leverage
knowledge specific to the
problem domain – such as by
consulting an expert in that
domain.
For numerical problems, Domain
guides the individuals in a
direction determined from local
gradients.
David Colon (Colon, 2012) used
business rules as the basis of
Domain knowledge.
For Domain, CATNeuro is the
primary KS for adding new nodes
to a graph. CATNeuro encodes
knowledge of graph structures
to evolve structurally sound
graphs for deep learning models
however this applies for all KS
except Normative (which does
not modify structure).
Historical
Add new best, if any, to the
History knowledge was also history list. Truncate the list to
introduced by Saleem (Saleem, a configured maximum
2001). In cultural terms it
represents ‘episodic’ memories.
History maintains the trail of
best performers over time. This
allows for backtracking or
branching from a prior best –
helpful if the optimization is
stuck in local optima.

gradient to achieve better
performance (for high dimensional
problems, the determination of
local gradients may be expensive
so CATGame also implements an
alternate, Differential Evolution
(Storn & Price, 1997) based version
of Domain KS).
Neuro: The influenced individuals’
graph is updated either by evolving
its own current graph or that of a
top performer of the current
generation. Neuro evolution is
elitist (Stanley & Miikkulainen,
2002). With configured probability,
a top performer’s graph is chosen
over the individuals own. Graph
evolution is strongly biased
towards addition of a new node to
the graph.

Numeric: If the influenced
individual’s fitness is worse than
that of a randomly selected best
from the history list, the influenced
individual is assigned mutated
parameters of the selected history
individual.
Otherwise
the
influenced individual’s parameters
are evolved around their current
values.
Neuro: Here the mechanism used
is similar to the one used for
numeric problems except that the
mutation applied is a graph
operation which is sampled from
the distribution given in Figure 2-7.
For History, equal weight is given
to mutate parameter, toggle
connection and add connection
operations.
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To enable better exploration and to prevent premature convergence, the Knowledge Sources
are not deterministically mapped to graph operations in the CATNeuro system. Rather the KS are
associated via probability distributions. When a KS influences a popluation indvidual, it samples
from the associated distribution and selects a graph operation to apply. A high level view of this
mapping is in Figure 2-7 and more details are given in Chapter 9. In Figure 2-7, each row visually
depicts the probabilty of selecting a graph operation for the corresponding KS. Each ‘block’ of each
row corresponds to a graph operation. The graph operations are shown on the x-axis. The color
of the block represents probability. The color key on the right side provides a mapping from color
to proability value. As an examle Topographic is biased to select the Crossover operation but can
select Add Connection or Add Node operations with some probability. If a KS is under represnted
in the population then, under a determinsitic mapping, the corresponding graph operation could
be under applied. The randomized association helps maintain diversity of graph operations in the
population.
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Figure 2-7: Knowledge Source to graph operation heat map - colors represent probability; row probabilities sums to 1
(source: CA papers)

2.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter provided an overview of Cultural Algorithms in terms of its architecture, major
components and operation, namely the Belief Space and the contained Knowledge Sources; the
Population Space and its network configuration; Accept, Update and Influence functions and the
influence of KS on population individuals depending upon the problem domain (e.g. numerical
optimization or graph evolution).
The role of knowledge distribution was briefly mentioned but since KD mechanisms are central
to the research question, the entire next chapter is dedicated to describing the history of the CA
distribution mechanisms and their detailed operation.
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CHAPTER 3 FROM COMPETITION

TO

COOPERATION : A PERSPECTIVE

ON

CA KNOWLEDGE

FLOW MECHANISMS
3.0 Introduction
The Influence function is the main driver of knowledge distribution in Cultural Algorithms. It
has two major roles a) to associate a Knowledge Source with each population individual – i.e.
distribute knowledge; and b) to update the parameters of each population individual by letting
the associated Knowledge Source operate on the said individual. The pseudocode of the Influence
function is given Figure 3-1. First the direct influence for the individual is determined. The exact
determination is performed by the underlying distribution mechanism. It could be as simple as
taking the currently assigned KS. Or it may be a more involved calculation. Then the network
neighbors of the individual are collected. And finally, a new KS assignment is arrived upon by
utilizing the direct influence; state of the individual & its neighbors; and possibly other relevant
information identified as “System State” in the referenced pseudocode. The newly determined KS
is then used to influence the individual to obtain the offspring for the next generation. The new
KS is associated with the offspring.
import Population, Network, DirectInfluence, DetermineKS, SystemState
init NewPopulation
Begin
For individual in Population
ksDirect <- DirectInfluence(individual)
neighbors <- Network(individual)
ksNew = DetermineKS(ksDirect, individual, neighbors, SystemState)
offspring <- ksNew.Influence(individual)
offspring.KnowledgeSource <- ksNew
NewPopulation[individual.Id] <- offspring
End For
Return NewPopulation
End
Figure 3-1: Pseudocode for the Influence function (source: CA papers)
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Knowledge distribution emerged as a focused area of research over the evolution of the CA.
Knowledge distribution generally does not affect how the Knowledge Sources modify the
associated individuals. It is primarily concerned with the association of knowledge to individuals.
Knowledge distribution mechanism is another heuristic (Figure 3-2). It is the primary allocator of
compute resources to search strategies (metaheuristics) and is therefore an important operation
in CA. The CA thus is a ‘hyperheuristic’ algorithm.

t+1

t

Re-distribution of
knowledge via heuristic

Knowledge assignments of population
individuals at generation t

Figure 3-2: Knowledge distribution operation

Over the years, many distribution mechanisms have been studied. Figure 3-3 displays the
various distribution mechanisms relative to the fidelity of the environmental signal available in the
optimization problem at hand. The left end corresponds to a completely noisy signal. As one
moves to the right, the fidelity of the signal gets stronger and less noisy. Majority win is a good
strategy when there is a signal but some background noise. The voting process filters out much of
the noise. As the signal gets stronger particular knowledge sources may be better at tracking it
and therefore can begin to carry more weight. Once the signal is strong enough that it is visible to
most then an auction or bidding mechanism becomes useful to identify the individuals most
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attracted to the signal. When the signal takes a more precise value the fixed price solution is
possible. Now the agents have a precise set of moves, they can pay the price or not. At the far
right, agents can make specific moves to support cooperation and competition or both.

Weighted
Random

Majority

Majority

Auction

Game

Increasing fidelity (signal/noise)

Figure 3-3: Spectrum of Knowledge Distribution mechanisms (source: CA papers)

The following few sections describe the commonly used mechanisms for knowledge distribution.

3.1 Random Selection
The earliest CA knowledge distribution was random, i.e. individuals were randomly assigned a
KS with equal probability. Reynolds and Saleem (Reynolds & Saleem, 2005) introduced Random
knowledge distribution in 2005. Later mechanisms took account of individual and aggregate KS
fitness, the social network structure, and other relevant factors. Peng (Peng, 2005) devised
Knowledge Source assignment proportional to KS performance (see Figure 3-4) based on
Charnov’s Marginal Value Theorem for predator/prey dynamic (Charnov, 1976). Ali (Ali M. , 2008)
extended Peng’s work with the idea of a social fabric and flow of knowledge between connected
individuals and introduced the Majority Win Knowledge Distribution mechanism. Che (Che, 2009)
introduced a variety of homogeneous network topologies taken from the Particle Swarm
literature and introduced the Weighted Majority win distribution mechanism.
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Roulette Wheel Selection

KS1

KS2

KS3

KS4

KS5

Figure 3-4: KS selection roulette wheel (source: CA papers)

Figure 3-5: Simple Majority Knowledge Distribution (source: CA papers)

3.2 Majority Win
The difference between (simple) Majority and Weighted Majority is shown in Figure 3-5 and
Figure 3-6, respectively. The diagrams show the KS assignment process for a single individual going
from time t to t + 1. The surrounding circles represent neighbors which are coded with color and
letter to represent their assigned KS (H=History, S-Situational, etc.). Each of these nodes has its
own direct knowledge source. First the direct influence for the center node is arrived at. Then the
Knowledge Sources of the neighboring nodes are considered. In the case of Simple Majority, the
center individual gets the KS that is most frequent considering the direct influence and
neighboring KS (with supplementary mechanisms to handle ties).
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Direct influence
N

Figure 3-6: Weighted Majority Knowledge Distribution (source: CA papers)

Since Weighted Majority is the most commonly used mechanism and used as the benchmark for
knowledge distribution, it is described more formally next using mathematical notation. 𝐾 =
{𝐻, 𝑆, 𝑁, 𝑇, 𝐷 } 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐾𝑆. Let 𝑖 index population members. 𝑊𝑘 ∈𝐾 =
∑

1
𝑖 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖

∑𝑖 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖 | 𝑘𝑖 = 𝑘

is the relative weight of each KS in the population, where 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖 is the fitness (assuming
maximization objective) and 𝑘𝑖 is the KS of 𝑖 and ∑𝑘 𝑊𝑘 = 1. Let 𝑗 index 𝑖′𝑠 network neighbors
then 𝑘𝑖1 , 𝑘𝑖2 , … , 𝑘𝑖𝑗 , … be their KS. Also, 𝑘𝑖𝑔 ∈ 𝐾 be a randomly selected KS with selection
probability 𝑊𝑘 – i.e. the direct influence. The KS assigned to 𝑖 in the next generation is 𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑤 ,
given in Eq 3-1.

𝒌𝒊 𝒏𝒆𝒘 =

𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝑾
(∑ 𝒘𝒌𝒊𝒋 | 𝒌𝒊𝒋 = 𝒌) + { 𝒌𝒊𝒈
𝒌
𝟎
𝒋

𝒌𝒊𝒈 = 𝒌

Eq 3-1

𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆

Weighted majority denotes “wisdom of the crowd” and is a form of voting. Voting is also
exhibited by animal cultures (Hoole, 2018). When the signal-to-noise ratio is relatively a simpler
voting mechanism is often is as effective any alterative.

3.3 Auctions
More recent developments in CA’s have started to explore auctions for Knowledge Distribution
(Reynolds & Kinnaird-Heether, 2019), (Al-Tirawi & Reynolds, 2019), (Al-Tirawi & Reynolds, 2018)
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(Reynolds & Kinnaird-Heether, 2013) . In the Auction KD mechanism devised by Reynolds and
Kinnaird-Heether, ‘bidding wheels’ are first constructed for each KS. A pie or slice of the wheel
proportionately represents the fitness of one of the individuals that the KS had influenced in some
specified number of past generations. Each slice is a token for bidding with value proportional to
its thickness. A mechanism solicits bids from the relevant KS for a contender individual. The KS
cast bids with probability proportional to the value of the tokens they hold. The bidding
mechanism determines a winner and the winning KS is assigned to the contender. The winning KS
then removes the winning token so that it is no longer available for subsequent bids (see Figure
3-7)

Figure 3-7: Auction mechanism, [source: (Reynolds & Kinnaird-Heether, 2013)]

3.4 Chapter Summary
Knowledge distribution is a critical part of CA. It’s the primary allocator of compute resources
and currently an active area of research in Cultural Algorithms. This chapter summarizes the prior
work and currently active research in distribution mechanisms – from random, all the way to
auction mechanisms. While auctions are a kind of a game, they are still a competitive mechanism.
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Departing from prior tradition, this research focuses on mechanisms that span both cooperation
and competition. The new mechanisms are sourced from classical and evolutionary game theory.
The next chapter is a brief primer on game theory designed to re-acquaint the reader with
some terms and concepts that will be used later. Then in Chapter 5, an abstract framework for
injecting arbitrary games for knowledge distribution is described. The three specific game-based
KD mechanisms, introduced earlier, are described in detail in Chapter 6. These are concrete
instantiations of the abstract mechanism described in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 4 A PRIMER ON GAME THEORY
4.0 Introduction
Game theory is a well-studied discipline that is both broad and deep. Any extensive treatise of
Game Theory is beyond the scope of this document but the curious reader is pointed to the
comprehensive online book “Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical
Foundations” by Shoham et al. (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009). This section describes some
relevant terms and ideas – just enough to support the approach presented here.

4.1 Basic Game Formulation
A game can be represented in what is known as ‘normal’ form as a 3 tuple:
𝜙 = (𝑁, 𝐴, 𝑢)
N = Set of Actors (players)
A = Set of actions available to actors – usually discrete choices but may be continuous (Veelen & Spreij,
2009)
u = Set of utility functions (u1, u2, …, un) corresponding to each player.

The utility function determines the payout for the corresponding player given the actions taken
by all players in the game. Often two-player games are represented in matrix form. An example
of the well-studied, Prisoner’s Dilemma game is presented below:
N = {1, 2}
A = {Cooperate, Defect}
u = Utilities as shown in Table 4-1

Table 4-1: Prisoner's Dilemma Payout

Player 1: Cooperate
Player 1: Defect

Player 2: Cooperate
1, 1
2, -1

Player 2: Defect
-1, 2
0, 0
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As an example, if player 1 Cooperates and player 2 Defects then player 1 gets utility -1 and
player 2 gets utility 2. Game theorists are often concerned with ‘solving’ a posed game, i.e.
determining the actions (or mix of actions) that players should play, if they are rational. Each
player is expected to maximize its utility with a view that other players will do the same. In the
Prisoners Dilemma game, rational players are expected to Defect. If either player Cooperates then
the other player can maximize its payoff by Defecting (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981) (Holland, 1992).

4.2 Competitive and Cooperative Games
There are several possible taxonomies for games in Game Theory however from the
perspective of application to Cultural Algorithms dividing games into Competitive and Cooperative
categories is useful (see Figure 4-1). Cooperative games are also referred to as Coalitional games
and Competitive games are also referred to as Non-cooperative games in the literature.

Competitive
Games
Cooperative

Figure 4-1: Competitive and Cooperative games – a useful categorization of games for the application of games to Cultural
Algorithms

Broadly speaking, in Competitive games each agent or player is trying to maximize its own
utility, i.e. the agents behave in a selfish manner. In Cooperative games, agents may form teams
or coalitions and work together to maximize the utility of the team. In the extreme case, all agents
may form a single team (the so called ‘Grand Coalition’) and maximize the overall utility.
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From the perspective of Cultural Algorithms, the various Knowledge Sources can be seen as
agents in a game that can influence a particular population individual. If the game is formulated
as a competitive game, the agents will compete against each other but there may be only one
‘winner’ that acquires the individual and affects its parameters via the Influence function. Recall
that population individuals exist in a (social) fabric or network, and that each individual is currently
under the ‘influence’ of a Knowledge Source. An interplay between Knowledge Sources can
develop via this network.
Alternatively, the interplay between Knowledge Sources can be posited as a Cooperative game.
The Knowledge Sources involved can form a single team or multiple competing teams. If multiple
teams are formed then these teams can compete with one another to win the opportunity to
influence of the current population individual. This interaction would be similar to what happens
in a competitive game. The difference is that the winning team (or the grand coalition) would have
multiple members that can collectively influence the population individual.
The CA knowledge distribution mechanisms applied up until now associate a single KS with a
population individual at each time step. From a Cooperative game perspective, this stipulation can
be relaxed to allow multiple Knowledge Sources to influence a single individual at each time step.
In Cooperative games, there are two additional problems to solve (when compared with
Competitive games); 1) how stable coalitions or teams can form from the individual agents and 2)
how to divide the total utility gained by a team among its members, at the end of the game.
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4.3 Some Common Competitive Games
There are several well-known classes of games that have been given names (sometimes
multiple names). A new game situation may be analyzed more quickly by mapping to an existing
scenario, thereby harnessing the existing knowledge, solution strategies, etc. and applying them
to the new game situation. This section describes some common classes of games. Most of the
information in this section is sourced from the book Shoham et al. (Shoham & Leyton-Brown,
2009).
Zero-Sum or Constant-Sum Games
In such games the total payoff is a constant regardless of the strategies chosen by the players.
One player’s gain is another player’s loss. Such games were studied very early on in GT
development by van Neumann and Morgenstern (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). The
minmax theorem was first published in 1928 by von Neumann that proved that the best strategy
for each player is independent of the strategies of other players. A sample payoff matrix is given
in Table 4-2. Zero sum games can be solved more easily using minmax strategies and are Pareto
optimal. From a computational efficiency perspective it might be desirable to model a knowledge
distribution mechanism as a zero-sum game.

Table 4-2: Zero-sum Payoff Matrix Conducive to Minmax Solutions

Left
Right

Left
1, -1
-1,1

Right
1,-1
0, 0
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Battle of the Sexes
This is a game of both coordination and competition. Both players lose if they choose different
actions. Both are better off if they chose the same action but the utility of the action differs for
each player.
This game is often posed as a husband and wife deciding on what movie to go to. Each has a
preference for a different movie but above all they both want to be together. A possible payoff
matrix is show in Table 4-3.
Table 4-3: Battle of the Sexes Payoff Table

Left
Right

Left
2,1
0,0

Right
0,0
1,2

In studying climate change negotiations DeCanio et al show the applicability of games similar
in structure to the Battle of the Sexes (DeCanio & Fremstad, 2011).
The fact that this game models both coordination and competition makes it interesting for
Cultural Algorithms where a coordinated outcome may be desired for KS selection.
Matching Pennies
This is a zero-sum game where one player wins by matching the action of another player
whereas the other player wins by picking something different. In the canonical version of the game
each player chooses either heads or tails from a coin with the payoff matrix shown in Table 4-4.
Table 4-4: Matching Pennies Payoff Matrix

Head
Tail

Head
1,-1
-1,1

Tail
-1,1
1,-1
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This game is important in the study of behavior over repeated play. For example, an innovative
company such as Apple can do well by trying to define new products and markets. Established
players such as Microsoft can do well by matching the innovations of its competitor.
Hawk – Dove
In this game, the players may adopt two types of actions predatory (Hawks) or peaceful (Doves)
when competing over the same resource. This game was first described by Maynard Smith (who
is well known for biological games) and Price (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973) and has been used
to model aspects of animal behavior in many species. A possible payoff matrix is as follows in Table
4-5.
Table 4-5: Hawk-Dove Payoff Matrix

Hawk
Dove

Hawk
-2, -2
0,6

Dove
6,0
3,3

Many competitive business situations can be modeled as a Hawk-Dove game, for example a
competitor entering a market currently dominated by an existing player. The existing player can
chose to fight by lowering prices or other marketing spending or acquiesce some market share to
the new player. Anderton (Anderton, 2003) has studied competitive behavior in developing
economies using Hawk-Dove models.

4.4 Repeated Games
The taxonomy of games is extensive. One important categorization is that between one-shot
and repeated games. In repeated games, players remember the history of interaction and respond
accordingly. For example, in the iterated version of Prisoners’ Dilemma, a strategy that often
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emerges is tit-for-tat where a player will defect if the opponent defected in the past otherwise
cooperate. Unlike the one-shot version, the Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma can lead the players to
cooperation, resulting in higher utility for both (Holland, 1992). The notion of repeated games
with possibly continuous actions is utilized as the basis for Knowledge Distribution in CA and is
discussed in the next section.
Repeated games are an important subclass of Competitive games that can prove useful in
modeling many real-world phenomenon (Harrington & Zhao, 2012). Repeated games pose a
challenge because the strategy space can be very large or even infinite. At any game stage, the
players know the history of the game thus far; i.e. the actions all players have taken to get to the
current stage. Thus, the actions taken at the current stage can depend on the history of the game
that can become intractably large very quickly.
An approach to solving repeated games is based on average or payoff. The Folk 1 Theorem
(Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009) is useful for determining an equilibrium based on feasible and
enforceable payoff profiles. The basic idea is that in an infinitely repeated game the average payoff
attainable in an equilibrium is the same as the Nash equilibrium in a single stage game. The
constraint is that each player must obtain at least the minmax payoff.
Formally,
let 𝐺 = (𝑁, 𝐴, 𝑢) be a normal form game and 𝑟 = (𝑟1 , 𝑟2 , … , 𝑟𝑛 ) be any payoff profile.
𝑣𝑖 = min max 𝑢𝑖 (𝑠 −𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖 ) is the player 𝑖′𝑠 minmax value, i.e. the payoff 𝑖 receives when other players play
minmax strategies against 𝑖
𝑟 is feasible i.e. it can be constructed from the individual payoffs in the game
𝑟 is enforceable 𝑟𝑖 ≥ 𝑣𝑖 ∀ 𝑖

1

The Folk Theorem is named as such because like a folk song it has been generally known for a long time but no one
knows who originally authored it. Nonetheless, it is widely accepted in the game theory community, see (Shoham &
Leyton-Brown, 2009).
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By the Folk Theorem1 r is the payoff profile for some Nash equilibrium of the infinitely repeated
game G with average payoffs.
Consider the knowledge distribution game, one can take the position that the same game will
be played repeatedly between the same network individuals, over many generations, so one can
analyze the game as an infinitely repeated game to find a solution or an equilibrium.

4.5 Continuous Action Games
The vast majority of games in Game Theory are restricted to discrete action choices, as they
are easier to analyze, however, game actions can also be continuous real values. Veelen and Spreij
have analyzed games in the continuous action space (Veelen & Spreij, 2009).
To study a wide variety of possible game-based knowledge distribution mechanisms, it was
deemed necessary to support both discrete as well as continuous action spaces. For example, a
game may be structured such an individual could choose an action from a discrete set, e.g.
Cooperate or Defect. Whereas in a different game, the chosen action can be continuous, e.g. the
fitness of the player. The same general mechanism can be used for both discrete and continuous
action games.

4.6 Chapter Summary
Game Theory is a vast and deep subject area. The core ideas of this research are inspired by
games in classical and evolutionary game theory. This chapter provided a brief overview of Game
Theory with enough terminology and formalism to understand the abstract game framework
presented in the next chapter. This framework is the basis of the games implemented and tested
for knowledge distribution.
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CHAPTER 5 GAMES AS MECHANISMS FOR KNOWLEDGE FLOW IN CULTURAL ALGORITHMS
5.0 Introduction
The CATGame system was developed with a general mechanism for injecting arbitrary games
for knowledge distribution. The general mechanism is abstract and requires a concrete game to
be operational.
Recall that each Knowledge Source is a certain type of search strategy (Chapter 2) and that the
Cultural Algorithm functions as a hyper-heuristic in order to select the appropriate metaheuristic
in each context. At the macro level, a desirable property of the KD mechanism is to achieve a
dynamic balance between the various KS, as the CA proceeds in exploring the problem landscape.
One notion of balance is that the mix or proportion of KS in the population can be varied in order
to best facilitate search space exploration and exploitation at a given phase of the problem-solving
process. Another assumption is that all of the KS maintain at least some presence in the population
and is not crowded out completely by a dominant KS.
Games are a convenient way to balance the conflicting demands of exploration and
exploitation at the macro and micro levels. The general premise here is that individuals in the
population have the ability to either cooperate or compete for knowledge. The next section
describes the abstract mechanism for injecting games for knowledge distribution. The structure
defined here is leveraged in Chapter 6 that defines the mechanisms of the concrete games studied
for this research.
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5.1 Abstract Game Mechanism
The minimal terminology given in the previous section is leveraged now to describe the
abstract structure of the game theoretic KD mechanism. This mechanism is structured in terms
of the following components: Actor; Play; Action; Payoff; Payout; and Outcome:
Actor

Population individual linked to other players via network. (terms
‘individual’, ‘agent’, ‘player’ and ‘actor’ are used interchangeably in
this document).

Play function

A function that produces the Action or ‘hand’ that a player plays
against its neighbors. This function may take utilize the current and
historic states of all players in addition to other available
environmental information.

Payoff function

A function that produces the Payout structure – which represents
the utility to a player – given its own Action and those of its neighbors
in the game.

Outcome function

Given the population’s collective Actions and Payouts, this
function produces the updated population where each individual is
assigned a KS based on the results of the collective game play.

The general mechanism abstracts out the common steps in game play. Specific game types can
be injected into the mechanism by supplying a game instance which is a record of three functions:
Play, Payoff and Outcome. In other words, a concrete game can be injected if mutually compatible
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implementations of these three functions are defined and grouped into a record structure. Such
a record can be accepted by the general game mechanism. Mutual compatibility means that the
data structures produced and consumed by these functions are consistent. For example, the Play
function produces a list of Actions that are consumed by the Payoff function. The general game
does not care about the details of the Action data structure as long as the Payoff function can
accept it. The Action and Payout data structures produced and consumed by these functions are
defined by the concrete game. The general game mechanism abstracts over these details and
operates at a higher level and is depicted schematically in Figure 5-1.

Figure 5-1: Abstract game interface

The high-level flow of the mechanism is described next and the corresponding pseudocode is
given in Listing 5-1. There are two distinct phases. In the first phase, the Play function, supplied by
the concrete game, is used to play games between an individual and its network neighbors. The
neighbors for each individual are obtained by using the Network function configured in the current
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instantiation of the CA. This phase produces a list of Actions for each player; each Action in this
list is directed towards a neighbor. The first phase where an agent plays its hands against each of
its neighbors is pictorially depicted in Figure 5-2.

Figure 5-2: In the 1st phase each network individual

Figure 5-3: In the 2nd phase, actions played by an

plays actions against its neighbors, utilizing current and

individual’s neighbors are collected to determine payout

historic information

In the second phase, all Actions are aligned so that all Actions pertaining to a single individual
are grouped together. These are the Actions the individual played against each of its neighbors
and the Actions the neighbors played only against the said individual (Figure 5-3). From each such
group the Payout for each individual is determined by using the Payoff function given by the
concrete game. The general game mechanism then takes the Payouts for all individuals and passes
them to the Outcome function (also supplied by the concrete game). The Outcome function
produces a new population of individuals, each with a KS assignment determined by the
associated Payout.
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game = {Play, Payoff, Outcome}
GameKD (Pop, Network, game)
Actions  Empty
Payouts  Empty
“1st phase – determine and play actions against each neighbor”
FOR p in Pop DO
neighbors  Network(p)
Actions[p]  game.Play (p, neighbors)
END FOR
“2nd phase – determine payout based on actions neighbors played against
indidvidual in 1st phase”
FOR p in Pop DO
neighbors  Network(p)
neighborActions  [FOR j in ns → Actions[j]]
Payouts[p]  game.Payoff(p, pAction, neighborActions)
END FOR
Pop  game.Outcome(Pop, Payouts, Actions)
Return Pop
Listing 5-1 Pseudocode for a general game mechanism for Knowledge Distribution

To enable a truly abstract mechanism, the data types of the Action and Payout structures are
also determined by the injected game. This is achieved via generic programming capability of the
implementation language F# (Microsoft Corporation). The abstract mechanism is able to deal with
any data structures that the injected game chooses to use. For example, the Actions produced by
Play may be single values (e.g. fitness of the individual) or may be tuples (e.g. fitness with some
other score). The general game mechanism is unaffected as long the corresponding Playoff
function can accept the same structure. The main rationale for using generic programming is to
allow for a wide variety of games to be studied under the general mechanism. This is the strength
of this approach. The alternative would be to specify a more rigid (and less abstract) mechanism.
Such a mechanism could be easier to use but it will not allow an expansive set of games to be
studied.
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The pseudocode in Listing 5-1 is now elaborated with a simple game for knowledge distribution.
The game is posed as follows. Each individual plays the action 0 or 1 against its neighbors based
on whether the individual’s fitness improved since the previous generation or not. Each individual
looks at its neighbors and adopts the KS that is the most frequent among neighbors who played
1. If no such neighbors exist, the individual retains its current KS. Ties are broken with random
selection. Listing 5-2 is the pseudocode for injecting this game into the generic mechanism. The
central idea is to define the Play, Payoff and Outcome functions and then package them up into a
game record for injection.
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Listing 5-2: Pseudocode for a sample game

//definition: supporting function definition needed by Play
//returns 1 if fitness improved from the previous generation, 0 otherwise
fitnessImproved : Indivdual -> {0,1}
//defintion: return the most frequent entry in the list
//if there are multiple entries with the same count
//then a random selection from the top most frequent is returned
//if the list is empty, null is returned
mostFrequent : (KS list) -> KS
//define Play function
def Play (indivdual, neighbors) =
action <- fitnessImproved (indvidual)
//decide which action to take
actions <- []
//play action against each neighbor (each item is 4-tuple)
For n In neighbors Do
actions <- actions :: (individual.Id, n.Id, action, indivdiual.KS)
End For
Return actions
//Action structure is 4-tuple list
//define Payoff function
def Payoff (indvidual, indvidualAction, neighborActions) =
ksSelected <- []
For (id,nId,action,KS) In neighborActions Do
if action = 1 then
oneActions <- oneActions :: KS
//collect KS for action=1
End For
maxKS <- mostFrequent (ksSelected)
newKS <- if maxKS = null then individual.KS else maxKS
Return (individual.Id,newKS)
//Payout is tuple of id and KS
//define Outcome function
def Outcome(pop,payouts) =
pop’ <- []
For p in pop do
(id,newKS) <- payouts[p.Id]
p.KS <- newKS
pop’[id] <- p’
End For
Return pop’
game = {Play, Payoff, Outcome}

//game is a record of 3 functions
//ready to be injected into the
//generic mechanism in Listing 5-1
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Note the generic mechanism is flexible because instead of accepting just a data structure (e.g.
a payoff table) the mechanism can accept both code plus data structures. This makes it versatile
and able to handle a diverse set of scenarios.
Much of game theory is concerned with finding a solution to a posed game as the strategy
adopted by each player. The collective set of player strategies is the solution of the game.
Assuming rational players, the action played by an agent should be the best response to the best
responses of its peers, determined jointly, i.e. the Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950). For many games,
finding a solution is a computationally hard, especially for more than 2 players. In the proposed
framework, each agent is concurrently participating in many games, with usually more than 2
players per game. To clarify, each agent is playing a game against its neighbors that are in turn
playing different games with their neighbors. The final result is a set of interlinked games. There
are no known (computationally tractable) analytical methods for solving such a complex set of
interlinked games. To address this situation, one takes the view that each agent unilaterally
decides to take action based on its and its neighbors’ current and prior states, without regard to
the actions that other agents make take in the current round (i.e. take a hedonic approach). Here
the interest is in the emergent properties of the system given bounded rationality decisions of the
agents.

5.2 Chapter Summary
This brief chapter explained the abstract game framework that can be used to inject arbitrary
games for knowledge distribution. It provides the background to understand the concrete games
that use this framework and are described in the next chapter. The mechanism described is
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general and more-or-less can handle any arbitrary game for knowledge distribution. As such, it
serves as way of facilitating future research on this topic.
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CHAPTER 6 CATGAME

–

COOPERATIVE/COMPETITIVE

GAMES

FOR

KNOWLEDGE

DISTRIBUTION

6.0 Introduction
The abstract game mechanism presented in Chapter 5 is exercised with 3 specific games,
namely:
•

N-Player Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

•

Stag-Hunt

•

Stackelberg

Each of these games is described in this chapter. For each, the historical background and
perspective is given first followed by the implementation in relation to the abstract game
mechanism described in Chapter 5.
The definition of ‘player’ is required for any game. In CATGame, two perspective can be taken:
a) the player is a population individual who plays against its neighbors as determined by the
network topology; or b) the player is a Knowledge Source in the Belief Space playing against other
Knowledge Sources. Both perspectives are covered by the three studied games here. Competitive
knowledge distribution is relatively easy to grasp – viz. a ‘winner’ Knowledge Source gets to
influence the population individual. But what does it mean to cooperate in this context? The
notion of cooperation is not as clear but is developed and clarified for the 3 games, in the
respective sections.
All of the tested game mechanisms implement a concept from simulated annealing where the
influence level (temperature or ‘explorativeness’) of the “stem cell” knowledge – Domain – is
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reduced the longer an individual retains Domain from generation to generation up to a configured
minimum. The influence level is reset whenever an individual is assigned Domain to replace a nonDomain knowledge.

6.1 Iterated Prisoners Dilemma – cooperation emerges over repeated interaction
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game is probably the most studied game of the three as its can be
applied in a number of scenarios (see 4.1) in the social sciences, military strategy, business and
economics. The analytical solution for a single-shot (not repeated) Prisoner’s Dilemma is to Defect
(Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). However, cooperation can emerge if the game is played repeatedly.
Evidence that Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) leads to cooperation comes from the fact that the
winning strategy in Axelrod’s famous tournament was tit-for-tat. Essentially the tit-for-tat strategy
is: cooperate in the current round if the opponent cooperated in the prior round, defect
otherwise. Glossing over the many nuances uncovered by years of research on this subject, one
can justify IPD as a viable game for knowledge distribution when both cooperation and
competition are desired.
IPD is usually analyzed as a two-player game but here the multiplayer version – n-player
Prisoner’s Dilemma (NPD) – is required as the number of players is more than two for any realistic
knowledge distribution scenario in CA. A version of NPD is the well-known “Tragedy of the
Commons” (Chappelow, 2019) that is often used to explain the depletion of common resources.
The payoff matrix for an NPD game is shown in Table 6-1 (Yao & Darwen, 1994) where the top
row is number of cooperating players starting. The 2nd and 3rd rows are rewards for cooperation
and defection, respectively. Both depend on the number of cooperating players in the game.
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Table 6-1: Payoff Matrix for n-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma

No. of

0

…

1

…

x

N-1

Cooperators
Cooperate

𝐶0

𝐶1

…

𝐶𝑥

…

𝐶𝑛−1

Defect

𝐷0

𝐷1

…

𝐷𝑥

…

𝐷𝑛−1

The matrix is the same for every player (i.e. the game is symmetric). N is the total number of
players in the game and so N-1 is the number of players other than the player whose perspective
is represented by the matrix, denoted as 𝑃𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟 . Each of the N players play their hand: Cooperate
or Defect. If x other players cooperate (where x is between 0 & N-1) then the payoff for 𝑃𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟 will
be 𝐶𝑥 if 𝑃𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟 decides to cooperate and 𝐷𝑥 otherwise. The following conditions need to hold for
the game to be considered NPD:
•

𝐷𝑥 > 𝐶𝑥 (defection provides a higher reward than cooperation)

•

𝐷𝑥+1 > 𝐷𝑥 (the more cooperators there are the higher the reward for defecting)

•

𝐶𝑥+1 > 𝐶𝑥 (same applies for cooperators)

•

𝐶𝑛−1 > 𝐷0 (if everyone cooperates, the reward is higher for each than if everyone defects)

To summarize, the reward for both cooperators and defectors increases with the number of
cooperators but for any individual player the reward for defection is always higher. And total
cooperation is more rewarding than total defection.
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While such a payoff matrix may be constructed for any given scenario, usually the matrix is
compressed into a payoff function by making some simplifying assumptions. The key
consideration is that depending on how 𝐶𝑥 and 𝐷𝑥 are determined, there may be 𝑥, 𝑦 (𝑥 < 𝑦)
where 𝐶𝑥 > 𝐷0 and 𝐷𝑦 < 𝐶𝑛−1 which implies that the number of cooperators are between x and
y for such a scenario.
The scheme for IPD based knowledge distribution is adapted from the NPD game. However, to
use IPD for knowledge distribution, further details are required such as who are the players in the
game; how should the players choose their actions; what happens when cooperating or defecting
players receive their payoff (i.e. what should the knowledge distribution outcome be); etc. These
are provided in the next section.
6.1.1 IPD Adaption for CATGame Knowledge Distribution
The IPD game for knowledge distribution is structured as follows:
•

Players: Population individual and its immediate (1-hop) network neighbors

•

Action: Cooperate if player’s fitness was worse from prior generation, defect otherwise

•

Outcome: Player choose defection for knowledge distribution if average defection reward
is above a certain threshold, cooperation otherwise.

Note that in the case of CA population network, each player is playing a different game with its
neighbors. As well, each player is participating in as many different games as there are neighbors
(i.e. the degree of the regular network). In other words, there does not exist complete symmetry
and reciprocity.
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Figure 6-1: In n-player Iterated Prisoners Dilemma each individual chooses to either Cooperate (C) or Defect (D) against all its
network neighbors

Recall the phases of game play outlined in Chapter 5. In the first phase, a population individual
chooses to play D (for defect) if its fitness improved since prior generation, C (for cooperate)
otherwise. A player can choose only one of the two actions. D implies that an individual will want
retain a Knowledge Source as it is improving – there is no incentive to cooperate. Otherwise the
player will want to cooperate but the final outcome for the player is determined by the player’s
action and those of its neighbors. This is where the payoff matrix in Table 6-1 comes into play.
How many of the neighbors also want to cooperate? The detail decision process is described later
in Listing 6-2 but in general if enough neighbors are cooperative, the player will be classified as
cooperator. Otherwise it will be classified as a defector. Knowledge assignment (i.e. the outcome)
depends on this classification (i.e. the payout). As an illustration, Figure 6-1 depicts an individual
playing the C (cooperate) action against its neighbors. In the second phase, the actions played by
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an individual’s neighbors (C or D) (Figure 6-2) are collected to make the final determination about
the payoff and the its implication for knowledge distribution.
If the individual is classified as a defector, it retains its current knowledge assignment. If is
classified as cooperator then it gets an assignment based on its ‘social rank’ among its peers. If the
player is performing relatively well in terms of fitness as compared to its peers (neighbors), it will
be assigned a relatively exploitative KS otherwise a relatively exploratory one. All knowledge
sources are ordered on the explorative-exploitative scale. The ‘social rank’ of the player (relative
to its neighbors) determines which KS is chosen from the ordered set of KS. Thus, cooperation in
the context of IPD means behaving according to “your rank in society”. If the individual is not doing
well (relative to its neighbors) then it should try harder by adopting a relatively exploratory
strategy. If the individual is doing well relatively then it should adopt a more exploitative strategy.
Under cooperation the individual does not make a unilateral (egoistic) decision. It looks at the
(bounded) context and decides on what is the best for the collective as a whole.
To utilize the generic mechanism defined in Listing 5-1, a concrete game needs to be supplied
that is a tuple (or record) of three functions – Play, Payoff and Outcome. These functions are
formally defined using mathematical notation in this section. Listing 6-1 is a set of supporting
definitions for specifying the game functions that are also referenced in later sections.
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Figure 6-2: The payout for the individual is jointly determined by the individual and neighbors' actions. The payout
determines whether the individual will adopt cooperative or comptetitive behavior for knowledge distribution with respect
to its neighbors

Listing 6-1: Definitions to support game-based knowledge distribution

𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒 = (𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦, 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓, 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)

𝐾 = {𝐻, 𝑆, 𝑁, 𝑇, 𝐷}
𝑃𝑜𝑝 = {(𝑘, 𝑓, 𝑗) | 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, 𝑓 ∈ ℝ, 𝑗 ∈ ℤ +}
𝑃𝑜𝑝′ = 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑜𝑝

𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑡 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → ℝ

𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑁𝑏𝑟𝑠,

𝑁𝑏𝑟𝑠 ⊆ 𝑃𝑜𝑝′

𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 → 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠

From Listing 5-1 a game is a triple of 3
functions
Set of Knowledge sources
Population is a triple of k=Knoweldge
Source, f=fitness and j=number of
generations the indivudal had the same
k. Assume the triple has a unique
identity not shown here
Function that provides the fitness in
the prior generation of a population
individual (its implementation is
context dependent)
Network function definition
Play function defintion. The function
takes a population indivdual and the
network function to produce a set of
actions played by the individual
against its neighbors
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𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 → 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠′ → 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡

Payoff function definition - computes
the payout for a population indvidual
given its own action and those of its
neighbors towards the individual

𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝′ → 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 ′ → 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ′ → 𝑃𝑜𝑝′

Outcome function definition - takes
the population the payouts and actions
for all individuals and returns an
updated popultation with new KS
assignements

𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = < 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐 >
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ′ = 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 = < 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐 >
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 ′ = 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡

The Actions are Payout structures for
each game is definded by each game
individually. Here they are defined
generically to complete the type
signatures required for injected
games.

Given the supporting definitions in Listing 6-1, the implementation of the IPD knowledge
distribution is in Listing 6-2.
Listing 6-2: IPD game definition

𝐴 = {𝐶, 𝐷}
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = {(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑎) | 𝑝1 ∈ 𝑃𝑜𝑝, 𝑝2 ∈ 𝑃𝑜𝑝, 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴)}
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠′ = 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠

𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = {𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡}
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 = {(𝑝, 𝑑 ) | 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑜𝑝, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛}
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 ′ = 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡

𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦 (𝑝)(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘) =
𝐷 : 𝑝. 𝑓 > 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑡(𝑝)
𝑎 ←{
𝐶 : 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑠 ← 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘(𝑝)
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ← {(𝑝, 𝑛, 𝑎) | 𝑛 ∈ 𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑠 }
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 (𝑝) (𝑎) (𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) =
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ← {𝑎} ∪ 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠

The set of actions
players play in the 1st
phase
IPD Actions is a triple
of values representing
the action played by an
individual against its
neighbor
Payout structure is a
set of tuples that maps
to a decision taken by
each indivdual in the 2nd
phase, after all games
have been played and all
actions known
Play implementation for
IPD
p.f is short hand for
the fitness value of a
population individual
triple
Payoff implemetnation
for IDP
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𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ← {𝑑 | 𝑑 ∈ 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑 = 𝐷}
|𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠| ∗ 𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐻𝐴
𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ←
|𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠|
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
: 𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 > 1.0
𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 ← {
𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 : 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛

𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 (𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 ) (𝑝𝑜𝑝) (𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠) (𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) =
𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑜𝑝 ← {𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑝) (𝐷𝑠𝑐𝑛(𝑝) (𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠)), 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘(𝑝)) | 𝑝 ∈ 𝑝𝑜𝑝}
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑜𝑝
𝐷𝑠𝑐𝑛 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 ′ → 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛

𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 → 𝑁𝑏𝑟𝑠 → 𝑃𝑜𝑝

𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 (𝑝)(𝑑 )(𝑛ℎ𝑏𝑟𝑠) =
(𝑘, 𝑓, 𝑗) ← 𝑝
𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 (𝑝) (𝑛ℎ𝑏𝑟𝑠) : 𝑑 = 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾 = {
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑝) (𝑛ℎ𝑏𝑟𝑠) : 𝑑 = 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
𝑗 + 1 : 𝑘 = 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾
𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐽 = {
0
: 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃 = (𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾, 𝑓, 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐽)
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃
𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑁𝑏𝑟𝑠 → ℤ

𝐾𝑆𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 ∶ ℤ → 𝐾

ALPHA = 1.5
If enough neighbors are
defecting (i.e have
played action D) then
defect otherwise
cooperate.
By using ALPHA > 1 the
game is biased towards
defection
Outcome function
implementation. It
relies on supporting
functions Dist and Dscn
that are given below
Function definition to
return a decision
(cooperate or defect)
made by population
individual given the
decisions (payouts) for
all individuals
Function definition for
returning an updated
population individual
given its decision (to
cooperate or not) and
its neighbors
Dist function
implementation. It
relies on several
functions that are
defined and described
below
Given a population
indivdual and its
neighbors this funtion
returns the rank of the
indivdual among its
neighbors based on
relative fitness
Given an integer rank
from the SocialRank
function, this function
returns a Knoweldge
Source. The Knowledge
sources are ordered from
explorative to
exploitative. A low rank
is associated with
(relatively) explorative
KS and high rank with
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𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 ∘ 𝐾𝑆𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘

𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑁𝑏𝑟𝑠 → 𝐾

𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒 = (𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦, 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑓𝑓, 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∘ 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘)

exploitative. The
premise is that if an
individual is performing
comparatively well, it
should continue to
exploit the local region
it is in. This is a
configurable value to
enable the provision of
different rankigns of KS
for different problem
types.
Cooperative
distribution: Function
composed of SocialRank
and KSForRank determines
K when individal decides
to be Cooperative
Competitive
distribution: Function
that determines K when
individual decides to be
Competitive. Here the
locally dominant
Knowledge Source is
returned using weighted
average fitness to rank
the Knowledge Sources of
individual and its
neighbors.
The game tuple for IPD
game injection. Note
that to match the
required definition for
the Outcome function for
game injection, the
Outcome function defined
above is composed with
the Network function so
the type signatures
match.

In summary, IPD knowledge distribution is an adaption of the n-player IPD. In the 1st phase,
players unilaterally play defect (A=D) if their current fitness is better than prior fitness. In the 2nd
phase, if enough players did defect in a player’s neighborhood, the outcome for the player is the
Defect decision, otherwise its Cooperate. If the final decision is to Cooperate, the Knowledge
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Source assigned is based on the ‘social rank’ of the agent and the exploitative-to-explorative
ordering of the Knowledge Sources. For Defect, the agent just keeps the current assignment.
Reusing some of the definitions in Listing 6-1, the Stag-Hunt game is defined next.

6.2 Stag-Hunt – Cooperation by default
Stag-Hunt can be considered an extension of IPD with an explicit notion of time involved. The
players by default cooperate to hunt a stag but as time goes by and no stag is sighted, the players
become impatient and can defect to hunt a rabbit. Stag-Hunt comes from evolutionary game
theory (Weibull, 1995) whereas IPD is well studied in both classical and evolutionary game theory.
Contemporary evolutionary game research is usually performed with computer simulation (Dong,
Xu, & Fan, 2019) (Wang, Luo, Ding, & Wang, 2018) because the dynamics can be complex and not
always capturable analytically, as is possible for classical games. A payoff matrix type formulation
thus is not very instructive for n-player evolutionary games.
While IPD is a series of single-shot games, Stag-Hunt is a game that is played over some units
of time. The useful notion of time in CA is generations (i.e. when a new population is generated).
For CA knowledge distribution, the Stag-Hunt game is played continuously across generations till
the optimization run is terminated. For CA knowledge distribution, there is a configured number
of cooperative generations followed by an evaluative one. This is pictorially depicted in Figure 6-3;
here there are 3 cooperative generations followed by one evaluative one.
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Figure 6-3: In Stag-Hunt individuals cooperate for a fixed number of generations and then evaluate – a pattern that is
repeated till max number of generations is reached

During the cooperative phase, all individuals cooperate – where the notion of cooperation is
very similar to the altruistic one used in IPD (section 6.1) i.e. one based on ‘social rank’. Note that
Stag-Hunt is cooperative by default. All individuals are cooperating in the cooperative generations
whereas in IPD the decision to cooperate or defect is made individually by each player at each
generation.
In an evaluative generation, each individual evaluates whether to continue cooperation or to
defect. If the individual’s fitness is improved since the last evaluative generation (or the initial
fitness), it defects by keeping its current knowledge assignment. Otherwise it cooperates but
instead of choosing a KS based on social rank, it chooses the locally dominant KS. Here “locally
dominant” means the KS that has the highest weighed average fitness among the individual’s
current KS (direct influence) and those of its neighbors.
Under Stag-Hunt there are two types of cooperation. First is based on social rank and is similar
to the one in IPD. This type is used by all individuals in a cooperative generation. Second is based
on adopting a strategy that is performing the best overall in the local neighborhood (bounded
context). It is used in an evaluative generation under the decision to cooperate. The structure of
the Stag-Hunt is given next followed by its detailed formulation using mathematical notation.
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6.2.1 Stag-Hunt Adaptation for CATGame
The Stag-Hunt game is structured as follows:
•

Players: The population individual and its immediate (1-hop) network neighbors

•

Action: The players play their fitness value as the (continuous) action in the 1 st phase,
regardless of cooperative or evaluative generation. The actions are used later in the 2nd
phase to determine how knowledge is distributed.

•

Outcome: In a cooperative generation, a cooperative strategy is used for every player
where the KS assigned is determined from the player’s social rank (similar to IPD), as
depicted in Figure 6-4. Each player receives the fitness values of the neighbors as the
actions taken by the neighbors. It then determines its social rank by comparing its own
fitness with those of the neighbors’. Based on the rank it adopts a KS from an ordered set.
If the rank is relatively low it will adopt a relatively exploratory KS and vice-a-versa. In an
evaluative generation a player defects by keeping its current KS, if the player’s fitness
improved since prior evaluation otherwise the player accepts the locally dominant KS
(Figure 6-5). As explained earlier, the locally dominant KS is the one with the highest
weighted average fitness in the neighborhood. This is still a type of cooperation but one
that is done in the evaluative generation.

64

Figure 6-4: In a cooperative generation, the individual is ranked between the fitness of its highest and lowest fit neighbors on
a continuous scale. Based on its rank, the individual is assigned the best matched KS from a ranked list

Figure 6-5: In an evaluative generation, individual is assigned a KS that has the best weighted fitness among individual and
neighbors, if the individuals fitness has not improved

A formal definition of the Stag-Hunt game for CA knowledge distribution is given in Listing 6-3.
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Listing 6-3: Stag-Hunt game definition

𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = {(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑎) | 𝑝1 ∈ 𝑃𝑜𝑝, 𝑝2 ∈ 𝑃𝑜𝑝, 𝑎 ∈ ℝ)}
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠′ = 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠

Stag-Hunt Actions
structure is a triple of
values representing the
action played by an
individual against its
neighbor. Here the 1st
phase action is the
fitness value (which is
continuous)

𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 ′ = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠′

The payout structure is
the same as the Actions
structure in Stag-Hunt
game.

𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦 (𝑝) (𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘) =

Play implementation for
Stag-Hunt

𝑎 ← 𝑝. 𝑓
𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑠 ← 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘(𝑝)
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ← {(𝑝, 𝑛, 𝑎) | 𝑛 ∈ 𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑠 }

p.f is short hand for
the fitness value of a
population individual
triple

𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 (𝑝)(𝑎)(𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) =
𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 ← {𝑎} ∪ 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡

𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 (𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 ) (𝑝𝑜𝑝) (𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠) (𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) =
𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑜𝑝 ← {𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 (𝑝)(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑣𝑝 (𝑝)(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠))(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 )| 𝑝 ∈ 𝑝𝑜𝑝}
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑜𝑝

𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑣𝑃 → 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 ′ → 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡

Payoff function in StagHunt passes the
collected actions for
each individual as the
Payout structure to be
used in the outcome
function. These are
actions that the
individual played
against each of its
neighbors and those that
the neighbors played
against just this
individual. It
represents all the
actions pertaining to a
single individual
Outcome function
implementation. It
relies on supporting
functions Dist and
IndvPayouts that are
given below
Function definition to
return the Payout for
the given individual
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from the Payouts
collected for all users.
The generic game
mechanism (Chapter 5)
packages all payouts
into a single collection
for all users. This
function seperates out
the ones for the supplie
d user as that is
required in the Outcome
function
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 → 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 → 𝑃𝑜𝑝

𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 (𝑝)(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 )(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 ) =
(𝑘, 𝑓, 𝑗) ← 𝑝
𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑝)(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡)(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘) : 𝐼𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝐺𝑒𝑛( )
𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾 = {
𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑝)(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡)(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 ) : 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝑗 + 1 : 𝑘 = 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾
𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐽 = {
0
: 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃 = (𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾, 𝑓, 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐽)

Function definition for
returning an updated
population individual
given its Payout
structure
Stag-Hunt Dist function
implementation. It
relies on several
functions that are
defined and described
below

𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃
𝐼𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝐺𝑒𝑛 ∶ {𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒}

Supporting function that
returns true if the
current generation is
cooperative, false
otherwise (i.e.
evaluative)

𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑁𝑏𝑟𝑠 → 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 → ℤ

Stag-Hunt version of
social rank Given a
population indivdual and
its neighbors and the
payout, this funtion
returns the rank of the
indivdual among its
neighbors based on
relative fitness (see
Figure 6-4)

𝐾𝑆𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 ∶ ℤ → 𝐾

Given an integer rank
from the SocialRank
function, this function
returns a Knoweldge
Source. The Knowledge
sources are ordered from
explorative to
exploitative. A low rank
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is associated with
(relatively) explorative
KS and high rank with
exploitative. The
premise is that if an
individual is performing
comparatively well, it
should continue to
exploit the local region
it is in. This is a
configurable value to
enable the provision of
different rankigns of KS
for different problem
types.
𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 → 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 → 𝐾

Cooperative distribution
function defintion for
Stag-Hunt. Implmentation
given next

𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 (𝑝)(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡)(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 ) =
𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑠 ← 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘(𝑝)
𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾 ← (𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 ∘ 𝐾𝑆𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 )(𝑝)(𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑠)(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡)
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾

Implementation of the
cooperative distribution
function defined above

𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 → 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 → 𝐾

Evaluative distribution:
Function that determines
K in an evalutive
generation

𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 (𝑝)(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡)(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 ) =
𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑠 ← 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘(𝑝)
(𝑘, 𝑓, 𝑗) ← 𝑝
𝑘
: 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑡(𝑝) < 𝑓
𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾 ← {
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝐾(𝑝𝑜𝑝)(𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑠)(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡) : 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝐾 → 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑁𝑏𝑟𝑠 − 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 → 𝐾

𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒 = (𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦, 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑓𝑓, 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∘ 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘)

Evaluative distribution
function implementation

Function defintion to
return the locally
dominant K given the
indviduals, it neighbors
and Payout (see Figure
6-5)
The game tuple for StagHunt game injection.
Note that to match the
required definition for
the Outcome function for
game injection, the
Outcome function defined
above is composed with
the Network function so
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that the type signatures
match.

Stag-Hunt can be considered a version of IPD where the element of time is explicitly considered.
Unlike IPD where cooperation emerges over repeated interaction, Stag-Hunt is cooperative by
default. Individuals periodically check to see if they want to defect or not but generally cooperate.
In terms of knowledge distribution, cooperative behavior is very similar to that for IPD’s in that an
individual will obtain a new KS as a function of its social rank among peers.

6.3 Stackelberg – A structured model for cooperation
The structure of this game is modeled after Stackelberg pricing model in microeconomics
(Evans, 2014). Stackelberg, Cournot, and Bertrand are related models of oligopoly market
competition. Unlike perfect competition (where participants have no control over prices) or
monopoly (where there exists complete pricing power), in oligopoly, the firms have a degree of
pricing power, determined by their “strategic complementarities” (Julien, 2011). But importantly
for CA knowledge distribution, the market interaction can give rise to implicit cooperation as
production (and pricing) decisions emerge from the inherent market structure.
In the classic Stackelberg model (Julien, 2011) there are two firms – a leader (or first-mover)
and a follower. The leader firm moves first to set production and target price by taking into
account the reaction of the follower firm. It knows how the follower will react and so it sets
production and price that is at the expected equilibrium between the two firms. The leader has
the first-mover advantage and will be able to command a higher price as a result, especially if the
cost of entry is high (Annen, 2019).
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Unlike the previously discussed two games (IPD and Stag-Hunt), the Stackelberg game is played
between the Knowledge Sources that reside in the Belief Space. The adaption of Stackelberg for
CA knowledge distribution is described next.
6.3.1 Stackelberg Adaptation for CATGame
The application of the Stackelberg concept for CA knowledge distribution is as follows:
•

Players: Knowledge Sources in the Belief Space

•

Action: Knowledge Source play their strength in terms of their current weighted average
fitness represented in the population

•

Outcome: The strongest Knowledge Source moves first and acquires the top n/k players in
the population where n is the number of population individuals and k is the number of
Knowledge Sources. The next KS takes the next strongest n/k player and so on

Here the Knowledge Sources act as firms in the Stackelberg model. The first-mover is the
Knowledge Source that is the strongest in the current generation; it acquires the best performing
individuals. Other Knowledge Sources take turns in order of their strength and acquire remaining
individuals in a step-by-step manner. The overall population is equally divided among the available
Knowledge Sources. This process is conceptually represented in Listing 6-4 and schematically in
Figure 6-6.
Listing 6-4 Knowledge Sources assignments under Stackelberg

𝑃 = < 𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , … , 𝑝𝑖 , … , 𝑝𝑛 >

is ranked list of population indviduals by
fitness

𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖

is the fitness of the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ individual

𝐾 = {𝐻, 𝑆, 𝑁, 𝑇, 𝐷}

is the set of KS used
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𝑞 = |𝐾|

𝑊𝑘 ∈𝐾 =

is the number of KS in the 𝐾 set (5 in most
cases)
1
∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖 | 𝑘𝑖 = 𝑘
∑𝑖 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖
𝑖

is the relative weight of each KS in the
population

∑ 𝑊𝑘 = 1

the total weight for all KS sums to 1

𝑅 =< 𝑘1 , 𝑘2 , … , 𝑘𝑞 > , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾

is a ranking of KS by weight; strongest KS first

𝑆 = < 𝑃1 , 𝑃2 , … , 𝑃𝑞 >

is a partitioning of the population into q
portions. Each partition is of size 1/𝑞 [or

𝑘

1

𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟 (𝑞) to be exact] except for the last one that
consists of the remaining individuals after 𝑞 − 1
partitions have been taken, respecting the
ranking in P
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑝 𝑖𝑛 𝑃1 → 𝑝. 𝐾𝑆 ← 𝑅1
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑝 𝑖𝑛 𝑃2 → 𝑝. 𝐾𝑆 ← 𝑅2
…
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑝 𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑞 → 𝑝. 𝐾𝑆 ← 𝑅𝑞

The top performing indviduals get the top KS and
so forth for each partition

Figure 6-6: In Stackelberg the fittest KS takes the top 1/kth of the population and so on, where k is the number of configured
KS

While the true players are Knowledge Sources in the Stackelberg game, the game still has to be
structured in a manner to be injectable into the generic game described in Chapter 5. The formal
specification for Stackelberg follows a model similar to the specifications of other games described
earlier. The formal specification for the Stackelberg game is given in Listing 6-5.
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Listing 6-5: Stackelberg game specification

𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = {(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑎) | 𝑝1 ∈ 𝑃𝑜𝑝, 𝑝2 ∈ 𝑃𝑜𝑝, 𝑎 ∈ ℝ)}
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠′ = 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠

Stackelberg Actions
structure is a triple of
values representing the
action played by an
individual against its
neighbor. Here the 1st
phase action is the
fitness value (which is
continuous). Eventually
these will be funneled
into calculating the
weighted fitness for
Knowledge Sources. The
game framework requries
information to come from
population individuals,
which this structure
contains.

𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 ′ = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠′

The payout structure is
the same as the Actions
structure in
Stackelberg.

𝐼𝑠𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐺𝑒𝑛: {𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒}

In Stackleberg,
knowledge distribution
is performed after a
configured number of
generations. This
utility function
provides whether the
current generation is
for distribution
Play implementation for
Stackelberg

𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦 (𝑝)(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘) =
𝑎 ← 𝑝. 𝑓
𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑠 ← 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘(𝑝)
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠 ← {(𝑝, 𝑛, 𝑎) | 𝑛 ∈ 𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑠 }
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠 : 𝐼𝑠𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐺𝑒𝑛()
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ← {
{}
: 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠

𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 (𝑝) (𝑎) (𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) =
𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑡 ← {𝑎} ∪ 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑡 : 𝐼𝑠𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐺𝑒𝑛()
𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 ← {
{}
: 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡

p.f is short hand for
the fitness value of a
population individual
triple. Actions are only
collected during a
distributive generation
Payoff function in
Stackelberg returns an
empty set if its not a
distributive generation.
Othewise it passes the
collected actions for
the given individual as
the Payout structure (to
be used in the outcome
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function). These are
actions that the
individual played
against each of its
neighbors and those that
the neighbors played
against just this
individual. It
represents all the
actions pertaining to a
single individual
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 (𝑝𝑜𝑝) (𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠) (𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) =
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑝𝑜𝑝, 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠) : 𝐼𝑠𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐺𝑒𝑛( )
𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑜𝑝 ← {
𝑝𝑜𝑝
: 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑜𝑝
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝′ → 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡′ → 𝑃𝑜𝑝′

Outcome function
implementation. It
relies on the Dist
supporting function
given below
Fuction definition to
return an updated
population (with new
Knowledge Source
assignments) given
current population and
all the payouts from the
game

𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐾𝑆 ∶ 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 ′ → < 𝑘 | 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 >

Function definition to
provide an ordered set
of Knowledge Sources –
denoted with <…> - given
the Payouts from all
individuals in the
population. The
Knowledge Sources are
ranked by the sum of the
fitness values of the
indivduals they control

𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑃𝑜𝑝: 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝐾𝑠 → 𝑃𝑜𝑝′ → < 𝑠𝑝 | 𝑠𝑝 ⊆ 𝑃𝑜𝑝′ >

Function definition to
return ordered set of
subsets (chunks) of the
population. The number
of chunks is the number
of KS in the system. The
first chunk contains the
most fit individuals and
so on

𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐾𝑆: 𝑃𝑜𝑝′ → 𝐾 → 𝑃𝑜𝑝′
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐾𝑆(𝑝𝑜𝑝, 𝑘) = 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 {𝑆𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆 (𝑝) (𝑘) | 𝑝 ∈ 𝑝𝑜𝑝}

Function definition and
implementation to assign
new Knowledge Source to
a population chunk
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𝑆𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆: 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝐾 → 𝑃𝑜𝑝
𝑆𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆(𝑝)(𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾) =
(𝑘, 𝑓, 𝑗) ← 𝑝
𝑗 + 1 : 𝑘 = 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾
𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑗 ← {
0
: 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 (𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾, 𝑓, 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐽)
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 (𝑝𝑜𝑝)(payouts) =
rankedKs ← RankKS(payouts)
rankedChnks ← RankPop(|𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑𝐾𝑠|, pop)
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑𝐾𝑠 = < 𝑘1, 𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑖, … | 𝑖 = 1 . . |𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑𝐾𝑠| >
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑛𝑘𝑠 = < 𝑐1, 𝑐2, … , 𝑐𝑖, … | 𝑖 = 𝑖 . . |𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑𝐾𝑠| >
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑛𝑘𝑠 ← < 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐾𝑆(𝑐𝑖 )(𝑘𝑖) | i = 1. . |rankedKs| >

Function definition and
implementation to assign
a new Knowledge Source
to a population
individual

Stag-Hunt Dist function
implementation. It
relies on several
functions that are
defined and described
below

pop2 ← ⋃ 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑛𝑘𝑠
𝑝𝑜𝑝2 : 𝐼𝑠𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐺𝑒𝑛( )
𝑝𝑜𝑝 : 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
return newPop
newPop ← {

𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒 = (𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦, 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑓𝑓, 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)

The game tuple for
Stackelberg game
injection.

6.4 Chapter Summary
The three game-based knowledge distribution mechanisms that are implemented and tested
in this research were described in detail in this section. These mechanisms are inspired by the
following: Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma from classical Game Theory; Stag-Hunt from evolutionary
Game Theory; and Stackelberg from microeconomics. All use the game framework defined in
Chapter 5. Stackelberg is a model where implicit cooperation emerges as a property of the market
structure. The Stackelberg inspired game for CA knowledge distribution has Knowledge Sources
taking turns to claim the best performing individuals in order or their strength. When compared
to IPD and Stag-Hunt, Stackelberg is more structured in that the population individuals are
generally evenly divided among the Knowledge Sources. It can be likened to a more centrally
planned economy where resource allocation decisions are made at a higher level. By contrast in
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IPD and Stag-Hunt, the decisions are made locally by each individual based on the individual’s
social rank among its peers. From an economic perspective, IPD and Stag-Hunt – in the context of
CA knowledge distribution – behave more like a free market system.
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CHAPTER 7 EXPERIMENTAL FRAMEWORK

FOR

UNDERSTANDING SYSTEM LEARNING

IN

DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTS
7.0 Introduction
CA is meant for knowledge-driven problem solving in complex environments. An example of
such is the multi-objective systems modelling of prehistoric environments (Stanley S. D., 2020).
For the numerical optimization system CATGame, the Cones World dynamic environment
generator is used. Cones World is an adaptation of the DF1 generator (Morrison & De Jong, 1999)
for use in Cultural Algorithms. The landscapes generated by Cones World are periodically modified
with a sequence generator based on the logistic equation (Eq 7-2). This serves as a mechanism to
create dynamic environments. The complexity is controlled by the ‘a’ multiplier (henceforth
referred to as A or A value) of the logistic equation. This process is explained in greater detail in
section 7.1.
The testbed allows the performance landscaped to be replaced with a new one while the
optimization is underway. This is akin to pulling the proverbial rug from under the system. The A
values control how hard the rug is pulled (on a periodic basis). A robust system should be able
adapt quickly to changing environmental conditions. A resilient system should be able to
withstand even large shocks without leading to system collapse (Figure 7-1). The testbed system
is run with varying degrees of shocks applied to understand the behavior of the knowledge
distribution mechanisms under different levels of dynamic complexity. The metric that captures
the overall system performance is the number of generations to find optimum after each
landscape change. Section 7.2 explains this performance metric and the core experimental setup.
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Operation of the Knowledge Sources – i.e. how they guide the population individual through
the search landscape is constant across the different distribution mechanisms tested. Since the
performance difference is only due to how knowledge is distributed via the network, several
metrics related to characteristics of the ‘social’ network are collected. These include diffusion
(section 7.3); Schelling’s segregation index (section 7.4); and others related to capturing the flow
of knowledge in a graph e.g. Page-Rank (Wills, 2006)(section 7.5). The social metrics are intended
to shed a brighter light into the emergent patterns of knowledge flow with respect to complexity
changes.

Figure 7-1: Resilience and robustness of complex systems

The main question that this research addresses is whether the hitherto unapplied cooperative
approach to CA knowledge distribution is effective for certain categories of complex problems. As
noted earlier there are two notions of complexity being addressed – dynamic complexity for
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numerical optimization problems and hierarchical complexity for deep learning models; the
former is addressed by CATGame and later by the CATNeuro system. As this chapter relates to
numerical problems, the hypotheses arising from the primary question for numerical problems
are posed in this chapter. A labeling scheme is defined to refer to hypotheses with the pattern ‘Hy
Chapter-#’. To start, hypothesis Hy 7-1 reflects the primary research question with respect to
dynamically complexity for numerical problems.
Cooperative knowledge distribution is effective for problem solving in

Hy 7-1

dynamically complex environments

The following sections describe the experimental testbed and the metrics collected in more
detail. Several other hypotheses are posited in the following sections in proximity with the
description of the said metrics. The analysis and interpretation of the experimental data collected
with the testbed, are presented in Chapter 8.

7.1 Cones World with Dynamic Landscapes
The Cones World test problem generator is a relatively simple method of constructing realvalued optimization problems of arbitrary complexity for benchmarking purposes. Complexity is
controlled via the various parameters of the Cones World such as number of cones; the ranges of
their heights; range of the radii; and the number of dimensions. A sample 2-D Cones World
landscape is presented in Figure 7-2.
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Figure 7-2: Cones World sample (source: CA papers)

The Cones World landscape consists of a set of superimposed cones. The height of the
landscape is the value of the fitness function; it is given by Eq 7-1. The input to the fitness function
is an n-dimensional point location in the problem hyperspace. Thus, the number input parameters
is equal to the number of dimensions chosen for the Cones World testbed. All testing was done
with 2D landscapes that are easier to visualize and therefore analyze than higher dimensional
ones. The problem can always be made sufficiently complex by choosing appropriate values of
other parameters such as the number of cones (i.e. the number of local maxima).
Cones World surface
height at the given
location:

Eq 7-1

n
2

f(〈x1 ,x2 ,…,xn 〉)= max (Hj -R j ∙√∑(xi -Cj,i ) )
j=1,k

i=1

where 𝑓 returns the height of the landscape surface at
the given coordinates 𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … , 𝑥𝑛 ; 𝑘 is the number of
cones; 𝑛 is the dimensionality; 𝐻𝑗 is the height of the
cone 𝑗; 𝑅𝑗 is the radius of cone 𝑗; and 𝐶𝑖𝑗 is the
coordinate of cone 𝑗 in dimension 𝑖.
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To create a sequence of landscapes needed for the testbed, the Cones World uses a sequence
generator based on the logistic equation (Eq 7-2) (Langton, 1990). The logistic equation is a
recursive function.
Logistic equation:

𝒙𝒊 = 𝑨 ∗ 𝒙𝒊−𝟏 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝒙𝒊−𝟏 )

Eq 7-2

Figure 7-3 shows the sequence of values generated from the logistic equation. To get the next
value in the sequence, the previous value is fed back into the equation. The change between the
two values is controlled by the A multiplier (also known as the ‘r’ multiplier). In Figure 7-3, the xaxis is the sequence number, y-axis is the value of the output at that position and each ribbon
corresponds to a different ‘r’ or A values. Values of A between 1 and 3, produce almost flat ribbons
– i.e. there is linear change between successive values. As r increases the change between
successive values becomes larger and more unpredictable. The system switches to non-linear at
A=3.1 and becomes chaotic at A=3.9 (not shown).
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Figure 7-3: Logistic function behavior by A-Value (source: CA papers)

The values generated from the logistic sequence generator are used to modify the heights of
the cones in the Cones World landscape to produce a new landscape for the testbed when
required. For a particular run, the A value is kept fixed for landscape generation. To test with
different levels of complexity – i.e. shocks to the system – the experimental runs are conducted
with four different A values namely 1.0, 3.1, 3.6, and 3.9.

7.2 Generations-to-Solution the Basic Performance Metric
Using the dynamic landscape generation system described earlier, the basic metric to measure
the response of the system to change or shock is the number of generations to solution. Say the
system is in some state. Now change is introduced. The peak point (optimum) shifts to some
unknown position. The CA system scrambles to locate the new peak. How long does it take? The
number of generations to solution or G2S is the primary measure of performance used to compare
the performance of the tested knowledge distribution mechanism vis-à-vis the dynamic
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complexity factors. Cooperative mechanisms are expected to show better resilience than
competitive mechanisms (Hy 7-2).
Cooperative knowledge distribution exhibits better robustness than

Hy 7-2

competitive distribution

In general, the shorter the average G2S value the more robust the system. However, it could
be more instructive to plot the G2S values obtained from a sequence of landscape changes, to
better understand performance over time.

Example G2S Curves
7
6

Generatios to solution

KD1
5

KD2

4

KD3

3
2
1
0
1

2

3

4

5

6

Landscape sequence

Figure 7-4: Generations-to-solution curve depicting possible responses to system change

Figure 7-4 shows the possible responses of three different hypothetical knowledge distribution
mechanisms to illustrate the performance patterns that may emerge. The KD1 system starts out
well but is unable to track the changes thrown at it and its performance (in terms of G2S) becomes
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worse over the progression of landscape changes (i.e. it takes increasingly longer to find the
solution). Such a mechanism may be well suited to problem solving in static environments. The
KD2 mechanism seems to adapt quickly and tracks the changes well. By contrast KD3 is a slow
learner; its performance gradually becomes better over the progression.
The way a mechanism responds to change over time is a useful characteristic as it can provide
guidance for where best the mechanism may be applicable.

7.3 Social Stress or Diffusion
Social Stress or Diffusion, as the name implies, is a social metric. It is an attempt to measure
the duress in the system. In all knowledge distribution mechanisms, the immediate neighbors
have a bearing on each other and hence the distance between them in search space is of interest.
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Figure 7-5: Social tension is reflected by how far apart are network neighbors in parameter space

Diffusion is measured as the Euclidean distance between two neighbors averaged over the
population. Pictorially, distance is represented in Figure 7-5 and the distance equation is Eq 7-3.
Euclidean distance
in search space:

Eq 7-3
𝒅(𝒑𝟏, 𝒑𝟐) = √𝟏/𝒏 (∑ (𝒑𝟏𝒊 − 𝒑𝟐𝒊 )𝟐 )
𝒊

Where:
p1 and p2 are the parameters of two population individuals
i = 0,1, 2, … (n-1) indexes the parameter array, n is the number
of dimensions

As with G2S (previous section) the Diffusion metric for each run is plotted over the progression
of landscape sequences to obtain a temporal view of diffusion. We can expect diffusion to be
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higher for more complex environments – i.e. landscape sequences generated with higher A values
(Hy 7-3). The maximum parameter distance is 2 [range of landscape location in each dimension is
(-1, +1) and n=2] and therefore the maximum value is 2.0 for two neighbors by Eq 7-3. However,
the observed average Diffusion values for the population are in the 0.5-1.0 range.
Diffusion is higher for more dynamically complex environments

Hy 7-3

7.4 Segregation Index
In a seminal work, Thomas Schelling (Schelling, 1971) showed that the racial segregation in
large cities (like Chicago) could be explained by slight biases in peoples preferences about what
type of neighborhood, in terms of racial mix, they would prefer to reside in. Computer simulations
conducted by Schelling showed that even slight biases in racial preferences lead to stark
segregation at the city level.
Following Schelling’s work, a test knowledge distribution was constructed to see if such
segregation could be observed in the CA population space. The test knowledge distribution run
results are shown Figure 7-6. Under this mechanism, each individual has a slight bias to be
surrounded by individuals that have the same KS as the individual does. This results in a highly
segregated population overall. Figure 7-6 is a view of the population arranged in a regular hexagon
topology. Each individual thus has six neighbors and the topology is toroidal (i.e. it wraps around
to form a sphere). Each circle is an individual where the color represents the Knowledge Source
acquired via the Schelling-like rule. The key at the bottom of the figure provides a mapping from
color to KS. This side experiment provides visual evidence that segregation as studied by Schelling
for real-life social systems can also emerges in artificial social systems like the one CA has.
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Figure 7-6: Stark segregation of Knowledge in population due to application of Schelling-like rule

The core idea behind Segregation Index is measuring the imbalance in proportions of
subgroups in a local neighborhood with respect to proportions in the population at large. For
example, say US population can be divided into two subgroups 𝑅 and 𝐷 where the overall
proportion is 0.50/0.50. Divide US into smaller regions geographically. For each region can test
how far the proportions of 𝑅 and 𝐷 are from the ideal 0.50/0.50. This will be the measure of
segregation in that region. Table 7-1 shows the calculation of Schelling’s Segregation Index for
different regional proportions. 𝑅, 𝐷 are population proportions and 𝑅𝑛 , 𝐷𝑛 represent regional
proportions.
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Table 7-1: Calculation of Regional Segregation with Different Subgroup Proportions

Neighborhood

Segregation

Comment

proportions 𝑹𝒏 and 𝑫𝒏
𝑹𝒏

𝑫𝒏

0.50

0.50

|𝑹 − 𝑹𝒏 | + |𝑫 − 𝑫𝒏 |
|.5 – .5| + |.5 – .5| = 0

The neighborhood
proportion is ideal

0.0

1.0

|.5 – 0.0 | + |.5 – 1.0| = 2.0

.70

.30

|.5 - .7| + |.5 - .3| = 0.4

Max value is 2

The first example has the 𝑅𝑛 /𝐷𝑛 at 0.5/0.5 same as for the overall population and segregation
index works out to be zero. The second example represents extreme segregation where 𝑅𝑛 /𝐷𝑛 is
0.0/1.0 and that produces a value of 2.0. Thus, the Segregation Index ranges from 0.0 to 2.0. The
third example with a 0.7/0.3 split produces an intermediate value of 0.4. The calculation of
Segregation Index for a CA population configuration is given in Eq 7-4.
CA Population
segregation:

𝐏𝐨𝐩 𝐒𝐞𝐠 =

𝟏
∑ ∑ |𝒑𝒓𝒊 − 𝑷𝒊 |
𝒏
𝒊
𝒓

Where:
𝒊 indexes the Knowledge Source
𝒓 indexes the population individual
𝑷𝒊 is the proportion of the 𝒊𝒕𝒉 Knowledge Source in the CA run
(usually its 1/5 as there are 5 KS)
𝒑𝒓𝒊 is the proportion of the 𝒊𝒕𝒉 Knowledge Source in 𝒓′𝒔
neighborhood
𝒏 is the number of population individuals

Eq 7-4
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Figure 7-7: An example of low segregation network

Figure 7-8: An example of a high segregated network

Also, Figure 7-7 (low segregation population) and Figure 7-8 (high segregation population) are
examples of segregation index represented visually over a population of 36 individuals. The inner
circle represents the population individual and its color the Knowledge Source. The outer ring
corresponds to the segregation index for that individual’s neighborhood. “Seg. Scale” is the key
for decoding Segregation Index color. As expected, low segregation population individuals are
surrounded by a greater variety of Knowledge Sources, in contrast with high segregation
individuals.
It is difficult to judge a-priori the levels of segregation manifested by the tested knowledge
distribution mechanisms with respect to the complexity factors. However, expect that the
segregation level will be higher for higher complexity environments due to the greater level of
stress placed on the individuals to solve a more complex problem (Hy 7-4).
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Segregation is higher for higher complexity environments

Hy 7-4

Also, in general it is expected that Stag-Hunt and IPD mechanisms will produce higher
segregation than WTD (Hy 7-5). This comes down to the mechanics of these mechanisms. The
WTD mechanism requires compensation for lost Knowledge Sources that evens out the
knowledge assignments somewhat. If this is not done, some Knowledge Sources entirely could be
removed from the population, never to be regained. The WTD mechanism injects back Knowledge
Sources that have been driven out after each distribution. Twenty percent of randomly selected
individuals (from the total population) receive Knowledge Sources that were excluded in the
natural assignment step. There are no such compensating mechanisms for IPD or Stag-Hunt –
assignments are all due to the natural process followed. Both mechanisms allow Knowledge
Sources to be regained even if they are driven out in some generation. As a result, the segregation
will likely be higher as some Knowledge Sources may be absent in some generations.
Stag-Hunt and IPD distributions will produce higher segregation than

Hy 7-5

WTD distributions

Following similar reasoning, it is expected Stackelberg should produce the lowest segregation
of all (Hy 7-6). Stackelberg – for CA knowledge distribution – is a somewhat structured approach
where each Knowledge Source takes turns to acquire a piece of the evenly divided population pie
and so, as a result, all Knowledge Sources are expected to be present in every generation. Note
that even if all Knowledge Sources are represented in a population, segregation could still be high
if they are clustered together into local groups.
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Stackelberg produces lowest segregation among the mechanisms tested

Hy 7-6

Both Diffusion and Segregation are metrics that pertain to entire populations – i.e. are
aggregate metrics. While these are analyzed with respect to time in Chapter 8, information could
be lost due to aggregation at each timestep. To understand the mechanism of knowledge
distribution at a finer grained level, an approach is required that captures the dynamics of
knowledge flow over time. The next section explains some methods derived from network analysis
that should provide further insight into the inner workings of the knowledge distribution
mechanisms.

7.5 Understanding the Dynamics of Communal Knowledge Flow
The CA population exists in the context of a social network (or fabric) of some topology (usually
regular). The knowledge distribution mechanisms leverage the social connections for distributing
knowledge. The flow of knowledge over the network, driven by the workings of the knowledge
distribution mechanisms, is thus of high interest. Patterns of knowledge flow should highlight the
differences between how the mechanisms operate.
The tools used for analyzing knowledge flow come from a variety of disciplines. First off is the
Frequent Pattern Growth algorithm (Agrawal, Imieliński, & Swami, 1993). It is used to find
communities of Knowledge Sources in a population. Its formulation and use are explained in
section 7.5.1 . Then, a method related to visualizing weighted graphs is discussed in 7.5.2 . Finally,
the famous Page Rank (Wills, 2006) algorithm from Google is discussed in 7.5.3 ; and its use for CA
knowledge distribution analysis clarified.
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7.5.1 Frequent Pattern Growth - A mechanism for Community Detection in Social Networks
There are many community detection methods in graphical networks (Lancichinetti &
Fortunato, 2009), however a simple and effective approach is to use market basket type analysis
to detect local communities in the network. Kumar, et al from IBM (Kumar, Raghavan,
Rajagopalan, & Tomkins, 1999) first described the use of such methods for mining communities in
cyber space. For CA community detection, a method is required that can find clusters for
Knowledge Sources. This is based on the type of the node rather than the link strength between
nodes – the premise for most other community detection methods.
There are two primary algorithms for market basket analysis – apriori (Wu, et al., 2007) and
frequent pattern growth (FPG). FPG is faster than apriori as it first constructs a tree and then mines
it for frequent items.
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Figure 7-9: Combination of History (Dark Blue) and Situational (Red) Knowledge forms the dominant community type is this
network as indicated by the colored outer ring

The idea of using FPG for community detection is to find what Knowledge Sources are present
in a local neighborhood – i.e. around a population individual. For the population, count all the
instances of the unique patterns that occur around each individual and take the top n patterns as
the strongest communities.
FPG is an efficient way of counting such the patterns (called frequent itemsets). Figure 7-9 is
an example of the application of this method for community detection in graphs. Here only the
top community detected, comprised of History and Situational Knowledge Sources, is marked with
a light blue outer ring. Note that this method does not preclude an individual to be part of several
communities at the same time. For example, in Figure 7-9 another dominant pattern is pairing of
Domain and Situational KS. Many individuals who are in History-Situational communities are also
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in Domain-Situational. One example of an individual who is part of both communities is 3rd from
the left in the top row.
Also, community size (number of unique Knowledge Sources in the community) may be
between 1 to the number of Knowledge Sources in the system. For example, if all individuals have
the same Knowledge Source then there is only one community comprising of the single Knowledge
Source. The possible number of distinct communities is 32 for 5 Knowledge Sources.

Figure 7-10: Timeline of community memberships of a single pop. Individual

The emergence of communities, especially if communities persist over time, is an insight into
how a knowledge distribution mechanism is functioning for a given level of complexity. However,
community analysis can be taken a step further by tracking change over time. It is very likely that
an individual is part of several communities in one generation, several others in the generation
after, and so forth. This pattern is pictorially represented in Figure 7-10. The letter pattern
“D_H_T” represents a combination of Domain-History-Topographical community. Other letter
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patterns can be similarly deciphered. Figure 7-10 is a view from the point of view of single
individual over time. It shows the community-to-community transitions for that individual.

Figure 7-11 - Community membership transitions for a single individual over n generations can be folded into a weighted
graph where the arc weights represent the number of corresponding transitions observed in the run

The sequence of community-to-community transitions for an individual can be folded into a
single weighted graph (Figure 7-11). The nodes represent communities and arcs the transitions.
The weight of the arcs is the number of times that transition occurred in the sequence of
generations for a particular run. The graph is a compact view of the entire dynamic process of
knowledge flow for a single individual. This construction is really a stepping stone towards the
construction of a population-wide weighted graph and is not very useful by itself. All such graphs,
each corresponding to a population individual, can be merged together to form a single view. This
is described further in the next section.
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7.5.2 Crystalizing Knowledge Flow Dynamics as a Weighted Graph
If one merges the community-to-community transition graphs across all individuals, one can
obtain a weighted graph that is a compact, emergent view of a knowledge distribution
mechanism’s operation.

Figure 7-12: A weighted graph of community-to-community transitions aggregated across entire population presented as a
‘chord’ diagram. Such a diagram captures the dynamics of communal knowledge flow in a single view

Figure 7-12 is a representation of a weighted graph as a ‘chord’ diagram (Jalali, 2016). This
particular view was generated from the Microsoft Power BI (Microsoft, 2019) tool using the Chord
diagram extension from the chart gallery. The color scheme is selected by the tool itself and is
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based on the ordering of the labels (communities in this case) arranged in order of importance in
a counter-clockwise manner, starting from the top. If two similar charts have slightly different
node orderings, the colors selected for the two charts will be very different. Thus, the node colors
are way of differentiating charts quickly.
The community labeling scheme for the chord diagrams, and others explained later, is as
follows:
•

‘D’ = Domain

•

‘H’ = History

•

‘N’ = Normative

•

‘S’ = Situational

•

‘T’ = Topographic

•

Composite communities are labeled with the letter assignments joined by underscores
(‘_’), e.g. ‘D_N_T’ = combination of Domain, Normative and Topographic

•

For composite communities, alphabet ordering is maintained so ‘D_N_T’ will always
appear as such and not as ‘T_D_N’, for example.

In the chord diagram, the graph nodes are the segments around the circumference. The greater
the importance of the node, the longer the length of the corresponding segment. The arcs are
represented as the ‘chords’ between the nodes. The thickness of the arc represents its combined
weight (i.e. both ways). The color of arc matches (is closer to the color of) the node with the higher
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inflow. Self-loops are represented as stubby arcs. The arcs connected to a node (segment) are
ordered in a counter-clockwise manner relative to the outgoing weight.
In Power BI the chord diagrams are interactive. Charts allow for interactive filtering that can
be used to remove infrequent transitions. This feature can considerably reduce visual clutter. Also
hovering the mouse over different parts of the chart provides more detail.
The weighted community transition graph, represented by the chord diagram, can be
considered to be the signature of a distribution mechanism. As such one can expect the diagrams
to appear to be quite different for each of the distribution mechanisms tested (Hy 7-7). While it is
hard to hypothesize about any particular feature of the graphs as these are emergent
phenomenon, it can be argued that if the mechanisms were to operate more or less in the same
way, their graph signatures would also be similar.
The community transition weighted graphs for the tested knowledge

Hy 7-7

distribution mechanisms are visibly distinguishable from each other

This reasoning can be extended to the reaction of the distribution mechanism when it is
subjected do environments of varying complexity – as controlled by the A value. For different
levels of complexity one can expect the mechanism to respond differently with discernable
manifestations in the corresponding weighted transition graphs (Hy 7-8).
The community transition weighted graphs for a tested knowledge
distribution mechanism are appreciably different for different A values

Hy 7-8
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Weighed transition graphs, as visualized by chord diagrams, may be useful but still a weak
differentiator of knowledge distribution mechanisms as one is asked to rely on somewhat
subjective visual judgement. Using additional methods, the case for signature-based
differentiation can be made stronger. This is discussed in the next section.
7.5.3 Page Rank for measuring Community Influence in Knowledge Flow Graphs
Community-to-community transition graphs, presented in the previous section, are seen as a
means of providing a unique signature for each of the tested distribution mechanisms. However
apart from visual differentiation, these views do not provide much useful information.

Figure 7-13: The importance of communities in a communal knowledge-flow graph can be extracted via Google’s Page-Rank
algorithm. Here, example results are presented in a ‘tree’ chart

A further refinement of the weighted graph approach helps to extract more useful information
for comparative analysis. The arc weights in the prior weighted graphs are transition counts. These
weights can be normalized so that they represent transition probabilities. This means that the
weights for all outgoing arcs for any node sum to 1.0. Such a graph can be treated as a Markov
chain and as such is amenable to analysis via the Page Rank (Wills, 2006) (Wu, et al., 2007)
algorithm.
Page Rank is an iterative method of computing the stationary distribution of a Markov Chain.
The significant outcome, however, is that the graph nodes are ranked in terms of importance.
Google devised Page Rank to rank pages in search results. Since then, the algorithm has been
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widely used in many areas where the problem involves graph analysis, e.g. biology (Gong, et al.,
2014); natural language processing (Pershina, He, & Grishman, 2015); and sociology (Lu, Wang,
Gao, & Liu, 2015).
Applying Page Rank to a normalized community transition graph nets the ranked list of
communities. Such a list can be visualized as a ‘tree’ chart as shown in Figure 7-13. The
communities are ordered by importance. Here importance means the proportion of time the
individuals in a population are found to be in such a community. The area of the box representing
a community in the tree diagram is proportional to the importance weight calculated by Page
Rank. The color of the box represents the exploratory factor of the community. Red hues
represent communities comprised of exploratory knowledge sources and Green hues represent
exploitative ones.
The Page Rank derived tree chart provides a clearer view of the signature of a distribution
mechanism than the chord diagram. First the communities are clearly ranked in order and it
should be easy to spot the differences between diagrams of different mechanisms, if such
differences exist. Second, the information contained in the tree charts for a given mechanism, for
different A values can be stacked together into another useful view. Figure 7-14 is an example of
such a view. It is a ‘parallel chords’ diagram. It shows the rank of each community with respect to
each A value. Horizontal lines connect each community across the A value vertical lines. As such it
allows one to easily spot changes in community rank ordering with respect to environmental
complexity.
Apart from providing a visual signature for the distribution mechanisms, the tree diagram also
allows one to assess the explorative-exploitative nature of the distribution mechanisms. Features
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from such views can be extracted and related to the G2S performances of different distribution
mechanisms, to provide further insight. This graph can be used to measure whether the
community rankings for the tested distribution mechanisms are different from each other,
reflecting their different internal mechanisms (Hy 7-9).
Community importance weights for the tested distribution mechanisms
are different from each other, reflecting their different operational
characteristics

Hy 7-9
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Figure 7-14: Changes in community rank with respect to change in A-value (complexity) - presented as a ‘parallel coordinates’
chart.

Further, the tested distribution mechanisms should respond differently to varying levels of
environmental complexity. This should be reflected in the community rankings across the tested
A values for each mechanism (Hy 7-10).
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Community importance rankings for the tested distribution mechanisms

Hy 7-10

vary by environmental complexity

Another view of responsiveness to varying complexity can be created based on changes in the
explorative-exploitative balance of each mechanism with respect to changes in A values. Here the
32 possible communities are collapsed into 3 categories, Explorative, Neutral and Exploitative. The
method used is as follows:
•

Assign each Knowledge Source a numerical rank based on where it falls on the explorativeexploitative scale

•

Average the ranks for Knowledge Sources within a community to obtain the community
rank

•

Bin each community into 1 of 3 categories based on the calculated rank and set thresholds
for Explorative, Neutral and Exploitative categories.
Listing 7-1 : Community categorization

𝑇 = 5,

𝑁 = 4,
𝐷 = 3,
∗= 0

𝐻 = 2,

D_H_T = (3 + 2 + 5) / 3 = 3.33

𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦(𝑟) = { 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒

𝑆 = 1,

Rank assigned to each Knowledge Source
based on where it places on the
explorative-exploitative continuum.
‘*’ represents the no community found
case (very rare)
Example calculation of exploratoryexploitative ranking for a community
comprimising of 3 Knowledge Sources

𝑟>3
𝑟=3
𝑟<3

Function to categorize a commnity as
Explorative, Neutral or Exploitative
based on its calculated rank
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Listing 7-1 shows the supporting calculations for the method of ranking and categorization
described above. With just 3 categories to work with, it is easier to perform meaningful statistical
tests for the response of a distribution mechanism in the face of environmental complexity – a
process that is explained next.
The underlying community-to-community transition counts are aggregated into category-tocategory transitions (Figure 7-15). For a particular A value then there are only three nodes in the
network namely, Explorative, Neutral, and Exploitative. An arc between say Explorative → Neutral
represents the transitions from all explorative communities to Domain (which is the only neutral
category); and so forth for the other arcs.

Exploitative
Explorative

Neutral

Figure 7-15: Category-to-category transition graph constructed by aggregating community-to-community transition counts

The counts underpinning an arc are collected from several sample runs. Hence, for each arc,
the mean and standard deviation are available. Consider the arc Explorative → Neutral for some
distribution mechanism when A = 1. Now consider the corresponding arc for the transition graph
when A = 3.1 – the next level up for A. The means and standard deviations are available for both.
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Are the means significantly different for the Explorative → Neutral arcs when A = 1 and when A =
3.1? This is an answerable question; the data are available.
Two-sample t-tests are performed to test for statistical differences between corresponding
arcs, for successive A values – 1 → 3.1; 3.1 → 3.6; and 3.6→3.9. These are significant transitions
in complexity. The 1 → 3.1 transition is from linear changes to non-linear changes; 3.1 → 3.6 is
from non-linear to highly non-linear; and 3.6→3.9 is from highly non-linear to near chaotic
changes. Such tests can answer the question whether or not the distribution mechanisms are
responsive to varying levels complexity, with statistical rigor.
The information from a) statistical significance testing and b) changes in arc transition weights
can be combined into a single, compact view with the help of a ‘Sankey’ diagram - see Figure 7-16.
Admittedly, this chart is a little confusing at first glance, so detailed explanation is provided next.

Figure 7-16: Changes in communal explorative-exploitative balance driven by complexity changes viewed as a 'Sankey'
diagram
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First a quick word about Sankey diagrams (Riehmann, Hanfler, & Froehlich, 2005). These are
generally used to visualize flow but really are a way of visualizing multiple linked graphs
simultaneously. Figure 7-16 has 3 distinct sections separated by vertical ‘posts’ (gray bars). The
left most set of posts are for A=1 and from left-to-right the posts are for A=3.1, A=3.6 and finally
A=3.9. There are 3 posts in each set; these are for the three types of nodes Explorative, Neutral
and Exploitative. The posts are labeled, e.g. “Explorative 1.0”, “Neutral 3.1”, etc. The first part of
the name is the node type and second part the A value.
The links between vertical posts represent the change in the transition rates between
corresponding arcs for adjacent A values. For example, consider the arc from “Explorative 1.0” to
“Neutral 3.1”. It represents the change in the Explorative→Neutral arc weight between A=1.0
graph and A=3.1 graph. If the change is positive, the arc is Blue otherwise its Red. The width of the
arc represents the amount of change. Finally, if the change is not statistically significant, the arc is
drawn as a thin line.
The Sankey chart as conceived for this analysis is information rich. It is a compact way of
capturing a distribution mechanism’s response to environmental complexity. The Sankey chart,
while informative for a single distribution mechanism, is not suitable for comparing multiple
mechanisms together. One issue with the chart is that the scale is relative to the chart so different
charts are not comparable. However, a Sankey chart is still useful for judging whether or not a
mechanism is responsive to changes in environmental complexity (Hy 7-11 & Hy 7-12 below). For
example, if most of the arcs are thin lines (i.e. the changes are not statistically significant) the
conclusion can be drawn that the associated mechanism is not responsive to changes in
environmental complexity.
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The tested distribution mechanisms are responsive to changes in

Hy 7-11

environmental complexity

Cooperative distribution mechanisms are more responsive to changes in

Hy 7-12

environmental complexity than competitive mechanism

The Sankey chart depicts the significant changes in exploration/exploitation balance via arc
thickness however it is difficult to determine the exact magnitude of the change – especially net
effects. And because of relative scale, it is difficult compare the different mechanisms together.
Nevertheless, the information contained by the Sankey chart is transformable into a shape that
makes the goal comparing distribution mechanisms achievable.
From the information developed for the Sankey chart, the net changes in the explorativeexploitative balance can be tracked. Consider for example the Explorative category and the change
1.0 → 3.1 in A. The net change to Explorative is calculated by summing the significant flows in and
out of Explorative category as shown in Listing 7-2. Generalizing, the net flows for all categories,
for all adjacent A value can thus be calculated.
Listing 7-2: Example - net changes to Explorative A: 1.0 → 3.1

𝐸 = {𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒, 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 }
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑎1→𝑎2 =△ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑎1→𝑎2 −△ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑎1→𝑎2
= ∑ 𝑒𝑎1 → 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑎2 − ∑ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑎1 → 𝑒𝑎2
𝑒 ∈𝐸

𝑎1 = 1.0,

𝑎2 = 3.1,

( → ) = 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤

𝑒∈𝐸
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Net changes are simpler quantities, easier to visualize and compare. A sample visualization is
provided in Figure 7-17.

Example Chart showing Net Flow Changes for Adjacent A
values
5
4
3
2
1
0

-1

1.0 -> 3.1

3.1 -> 3.6

3.6 - 3.9

-2
-3
KD1

KD2

Figure 7-17: An example of Net flow changes by adjacent A values for a hypothetical distribution mechanisms

The tracking of net flows (Figure 7-17) is one way to relate the performance of distribution
mechanisms to how these mechanisms respond to changes in environmental complexity. For
example, a mechanism that responds by consistently increasing resources to explorative
communities as A is increased can expected to perform better (Hy 7-13).
Better performing distribution mechanisms will exhibit consistent

Hy 7-13

responses to changes in environmental complexity

Net flow thus is one of the analytical tools, along with other tools discussed in this chapter, to
peer into the workings of the distribution mechanisms and draw insights that might be useful for
improving the mechanism in future. Thus far this chapter has focused on analytical methods to
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drive the design of experiments at the conceptual level. The detail setup of experiments, the
configurations used and the data collected is described next.

7.6 Experimental Setup
The primary goal of the thesis is to understand the performance of knowledge distribution
mechanisms that encompass cooperation with those that are purely competitive. The inspiration
for cooperative mechanisms comes from classical and evolutionary Game theory. The purely
competitive mechanism selected is Weighted Majority, which is the default for Cultural
Algorithms.
Table 7-2 provides the detail settings of the experimental parameters employed to test the
hypotheses given above.
Table 7-2: Parameter Settings for Experimental Runs

Parameter
Knowledge
Mechanisms

Distribution

Value

Comment

Stag-Hunt (SHS)

In the experimental

Iterated

Prisoner

Dilemma

(IPD)
Stackelberg (STK)

analysis section, the KD
mechanisms
referenced

are
via

the

abbreviations used here
Weighted Majority (WTD)
A – values

1.0, 3.1, 3.6, 3.9

Population size

36
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Network topology

Hexagonal

Cones World number of

1000

cones per landscape

All KD mechanisms
were tested on the exact
same

landscapes

generated

in

the

sequence, to make the
performance differences
more meaningful
Number of generations per

2500

landscape

The

system

was

allowed to run for a fix
number of generations
per landscape.

Number of landscapes in

50

sequence per run

Number

generations per run =
50*2500 = 125000

Number of runs (sample

200 per KD-A combination

size)
Threshold
solution

distance

of

for

0.001
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Cone parameters modified

Height

for landscape sequence

Modifying height is
equivalent to relocation
cones as the peak can
move

Detailed data was collected for each generation into a log file. The format of the log file is in
Table 7-3. Over 1 Terabyte of log data was collected and analyzed.
Table 7-3: CATGame Log File Format

Column

Description

Sample

Sample number, 1, 2, …, 200

KD

Distribution mechanism WTD, SHS, IPD, STK

EnvSnsty

Not used

LandscapeNum

The sequence number of the landscape in the sequence, 1, 2, …, 50

A

1.0, 3.1, 3.6, 3.9

GenCount

Population generation counter resets after landscape change, 1,2, …, 2500

Best

Height of the best cone found thus far

Max

Ground truth best for the landscape

Seg

Average segregation index of the population at the end of the current
generation
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Dffsn

Average Diffusion for the population at the end of the current generation

Net

Network topology (Hexagon)

IndvSeg

Segregation index of each population individual, delimited by ‘|’

IndvDffsn

Diffusion of each population individual, delimited by ‘|’

IndvKS

Knowledge source for each population individual, delimited by ‘|’

All experimental runs were performed on the Wayne State’s grid computing environment.
Details of the configuration used are provided Table 7-4.
Table 7-4: Wayne State Grid Computing Environment Particulars

Category

Value

Environment

Wayne State grid computing environment

Number of jobs (that can run in parallel)

1600 = num KD * num A * num samples
= 4 * 4 * 200

Hardware requirements for grid resource

4 cores with 500MB RAM

Size of log data collected

1.04 Terabyte

Experiments were conducted in line with the experimental framework presented in this section
and the required data recorded in log files. The analysis of the log file results is presented in the
next chapter.
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7.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter described the experimental framework used to test and compare the three game
distribution mechanisms vs. the stalwart Weighted Majority, for the CATGame system. The core
idea is to observe the performance and the ‘social’ behavior of the CATGame system when
configured with each of the four mechanisms. The testbed is a dynamic environment generator
created by hybridizing the Cones World system with the logistic equation (Eq 7-2). The logistic
equation is used as a sequence generator to modify the height of the cones periodically to
generate new landscapes, while the performance optimization is still underway. The main
performance metric is the average number of generations to reach solution for each change in
the landscape.
CA has a social aspect due to the networked population. The social network is leveraged by the
KD mechanisms. The ‘social’ response of the system to varying levels of dynamic complexity can
be studied with the help of social metrics. Diffusion and Segregation capture static aspects of the
network. To understand dynamic aspects, Markovian methods that track patterns of communal
knowledge flow over time, are also described. The next chapter analyzes the data collected under
the experimental framework described in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 8 CATGAME EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS FOR CONES WORLD BENCHMARK
8.0 Introduction
Following the experiment designs detailed in Chapter 7, experiments were conducted on the
Wayne State’s grid computing environment. A total of 1600 jobs were run and over a terabyte of
log data collected for analysis. Log data analysis results are presented in the sections of this
chapter. In the charts presented the tested KD mechanisms are referred to by short names. The
mapping is a follows: WTD → Weighted Majority; IPD → Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma; SHS → StagHunt; and STD → Stackelberg.
Section 8.1 contains the results of basic performance analysis – mean generations-to-solution
(G2S) – for each distribution mechanism, by A value and by landscape sequence number. Note:
the sample size is 200 – i.e. each combination of A value and distribution mechanism is run 200
times to obtain statistically significant results. For each A value, first a chart is presented that
compares the mean G2S over the 50-landscape sequence. And then a table that gives detailed
values by landscape and also provides the two-sample t-test results for the hypotheses that IPD,
SHS and STK mean G2S are less that WTD mean G2S, respectively. Section 8.2 presents analysis
for the Diffusion statistic for each A value-KD combination. The diffusion statistics are also
obtained from log results. Section 8.3 looks at the Segregation patterns obtained from the log data
for A value-KD combinations. Representative samples of high and low Segregation population
snapshots are also provided for qualitative assessment. Charts showing overall trends of
Segregation by landscape are presented. The aggregate view of Segregation for A value-KD
combinations is presented as the final chart of this section. Section 8.4 focuses on the dynamic
view of knowledge flow resulting from the distribution strategy used by each of the KD

113
mechanisms and in response to changes in environmental complexity. Here an analysis of the
community-to-community transition graphs is presented. Several types of visualizations are
discussed:
•

Chord diagram views of weighed graphs

•

Tree diagrams for Page Rank results

•

Parallel-chords diagrams for tracing rank changes with respect to A values

•

Sankey charts for statistically significant changes in knowledge flow in response to
environmental complexity

•

Net flow changes in explorative-exploitative balance by A values

Finally, section 8.5 presents the summary of the analytical results and draws conclusions about
the hypotheses posed in Chapter 7.

8.1 Performance Analysis
The base performance results are presented for each of the A-value-KD combinations in this
section. The results are organized by A value so the performance of the distribution mechanisms
can be directly compared for a given level of environmental complexity.
Trend charts for each A value are presented in Figure 8-1, Figure 8-2, Figure 8-3 and Figure 8-4.
All charts are drawn to same scale for easier comparative analysis. Detailed numerical data for
each A value is provided in Table 8-1, Table 8-2, Table 8-3 and Table 8-4. The tables include twosample T-Test results performed for each landscape in the sequence (1 … 50). As mentioned
before, the sample size for each T-Test is 200. The hypotheses are that the mean G2S for each of
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the game KDs is less than that of WTD – i.e. one-tail. In other words, the performance of game KD
is expected to be better than WTD for every landscape in the sequence. The T-Test columns in
the table show the outcomes based on p<=0.05 (95% confidence) for the tests. If T-Test p <= 0.05
the column contains +1 otherwise it contains -1. These column values are converted to ‘check
mark’ and ‘cross’ icons (using Excel’s conditional formatting option) to visually highlight the
results.
Analysis by landscape sequence is more interesting and informative as the performance of the
mechanisms varies over the progression of the sequences. For A = 1, the environment’s dynamic
complexity is very low. The change is gradual. The trend lines in Figure 8-1 show that WTD settles
down to competitive performance after about 10 landscapes. WTD’s G2S value equals that for IPD
after 10 landscapes. STK on the other starts out well but then steadily its performance worsens –
i.e. STK is not tracking environmental changes well. SHS (Stag-Hunt) starts well and then performs
best all the way through.
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Figure 8-1: Mean generations to solution A=1

The data underlying the chart in Figure 8-1 is listed in Table 8-1. As can be expected from
inspecting the chart, IPD performs significantly better in early landscapes but then is on par with
WTD. This is borne out by the T-Test results for IPD vs WTD. STK is statistically significantly better
than WTD in the first 2 generations but then the one-tail T-Test is not significant. And in fact, the
performance is much worse than WTD as depicted in the corresponding chart. SHS is statistically
better than WTD for all landscapes except for landscape #16. The corresponding chart also shows
a minor up tick at #16 for SHS.
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Table 8-1: A=1, Two Sample T-Tests (P<0.05), Mean G2S: {IPD,SHS,STK} < WTD, by Landscape Sequence #

Landscape WTD Mean WTD Stdv. IPD Mean IPD Stdv.
1
766.915 809.699 175.380 353.271
2
311.985 587.532
96.130 277.886
3
237.930 508.694
94.685 234.787
4
168.480 394.045
53.795
97.606
5
168.320 454.257
57.310
83.744
6
151.880 405.286
67.180 158.407
7
94.400 219.313
57.985 159.700
8
92.975 242.981
60.195 120.779
9
95.585 261.194
61.195 186.537
10
77.645 222.615
61.325 198.225
11
62.150 109.071
53.545 101.937
12
81.850 239.262
47.620
77.715
13
65.135 151.502
57.685 132.556
14
57.510
99.048
52.365 105.558
15
56.565
94.609
67.760 164.902
16
68.255 195.146
66.735 194.164
17
73.015 214.724
44.735
67.405
18
54.155
95.076
48.665 100.362
19
73.515 206.798
40.900
54.909
20
54.595
92.785
39.035
54.829
21
59.445 122.924
42.720
80.201
22
48.065
87.186
44.635
85.559
23
67.695 210.112
43.730
76.334
24
63.110 153.568
50.590 113.320
25
61.825 181.462
42.130
58.530
26
54.865 131.300
49.635 118.743
27
61.175 193.732
44.640
64.723
28
51.260
96.820
42.400
57.954
29
55.780 184.012
51.110 107.175
30
56.850 188.138
51.005
86.323
31
39.645
56.592
44.675
66.962
32
54.805 187.584
52.100 107.935
33
46.670
81.155
40.930
73.247
34
42.555
63.685
37.035
47.971
35
49.650 142.008
41.435
76.443
36
42.175
94.815
48.745
85.739
37
50.325 180.067
42.640
74.990
38
48.830
97.362
46.545
85.299
39
54.005 138.554
42.680
62.202
40
40.335
66.468
46.980
75.602
41
35.815
53.205
43.045
82.252
42
37.520
63.592
39.100
80.622
43
46.445 114.691
48.595 125.638
44
48.500 145.577
55.315 118.305
45
48.725 115.337
46.805
78.842
46
44.400
70.695
43.885
93.234
47
33.210
51.469
43.565
82.566
48
49.800 127.121
60.550 189.036
49
42.195
63.700
38.755
68.907
50
41.580
59.575
43.120
75.250

TTest
TTest
TTest
IPD <
SHS <
STK <
WTD SHS Mean SHS Stdv. WTD STK Mean STK Stdv. WTD
1 117.235 269.411
1 250.085 394.635
1
1
35.590 218.089
1 192.425 494.579
1
1
27.250 196.698
1 195.955 478.257
-1
1
20.500 103.186
1 251.495 560.880
-1
1
11.860
60.101
1 274.315 638.700
-1
1
10.700
58.607
1 304.785 681.366
-1
1
12.605
52.419
1 290.540 665.886
-1
1
14.315
53.889
1 324.040 679.655
-1
-1
16.290
76.520
1 250.010 607.030
-1
-1
15.555
78.984
1 314.220 703.343
-1
-1
12.000
56.169
1 308.000 689.352
-1
1
11.815
91.045
1 335.430 726.295
-1
-1
10.275
36.392
1 348.850 755.467
-1
-1
7.075
50.772
1 356.295 739.290
-1
-1
7.810
44.638
1 389.800 788.860
-1
-1
36.850 209.586
-1 333.425 723.865
-1
1
9.230
50.401
1 399.040 794.970
-1
-1
14.120
58.049
1 400.135 799.080
-1
1
10.650
45.635
1 427.960 821.356
-1
1
7.125
29.240
1 388.375 778.656
-1
-1
6.770
25.162
1 418.800 829.890
-1
-1
20.415 111.899
1 432.670 827.644
-1
-1
5.050
22.180
1 423.580 819.541
-1
-1
12.170
76.801
1 429.130 822.740
-1
-1
7.590
38.211
1 400.265 788.196
-1
-1
8.930
49.148
1 425.455 835.117
-1
-1
7.830
46.940
1 416.540 833.842
-1
-1
14.530
93.808
1 442.715 836.251
-1
-1
10.895
80.185
1 443.605 853.336
-1
-1
10.165
44.853
1 487.470 887.364
-1
-1
7.535
37.571
1 407.220 793.622
-1
-1
8.020
56.719
1 409.035 809.620
-1
-1
10.935
56.621
1 409.100 827.707
-1
-1
10.110
57.554
1 449.255 831.573
-1
-1
2.415
10.846
1 463.365 848.689
-1
-1
14.065 107.412
1 458.950 854.459
-1
-1
8.585
51.533
1 440.250 828.141
-1
-1
4.250
15.639
1 451.650 851.897
-1
-1
5.700
30.381
1 485.135 883.463
-1
-1
10.020
50.878
1 446.300 856.528
-1
-1
3.790
13.968
1 455.805 858.635
-1
-1
15.275 123.612
1 506.525 907.526
-1
-1
9.695
48.977
1 477.570 877.761
-1
-1
5.910
22.290
1 476.375 886.260
-1
-1
5.085
22.909
1 466.600 877.711
-1
-1
6.795
31.698
1 502.450 906.193
-1
-1
7.980
36.514
1 468.965 883.215
-1
-1
2.065
8.790
1 472.620 874.147
-1
-1
4.550
23.560
1 443.865 819.473
-1
-1
14.615 122.639
1 440.055 853.218
-1
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Figure 8-2: Mean generations to solution A=3.1

For A=3.1 the corresponding chart and table are in Figure 8-2 and Table 8-2. At A=3.1 a simple
cycle is introduced. Here again WTD settles down to stable performance but it takes longer –
landscape 20 (in contrast to 10 for the previous A value). Also, the settled G2S value is higher than
for A=1.
At A = 3.1, IPD separates itself from WTD. As shown in Table 8-2, the T-Test results for IPD are
all positive except for a single landscape - #18. Although IPD is biased towards defection,
cooperation can emerge over repeated interactions. The fruits of limited cooperation become
apparent when environmental change is moderately complex.
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Table 8-2: A=3.1, Two Sample T-Tests (P<0.05), Mean G2S: {IPD,SHS,STK} < WTD, by Landscape Sequence #

Landscape WTD MeanWTD Stdv. IPD Mean
1 634.640 753.930 198.815
2 906.265 919.400 237.005
3 669.555 865.619 179.920
4 494.730 689.906 243.295
5 390.150 585.016 188.510
6 336.685 511.467 172.520
7 316.385 494.257 200.165
8 333.235 473.662 194.675
9 280.735 417.607 158.660
10 287.480 436.747 195.440
11 312.550 382.584 167.085
12 245.170 328.444 168.605
13 318.970 438.738 180.805
14 261.585 394.754 198.670
15 240.635 338.770 165.185
16 298.365 408.174 189.860
17 259.615 355.368 145.315
18 257.780 313.938 216.045
19 261.330 267.105 174.920
20 288.005 358.051 194.745
21 256.540 328.159 156.505
22 230.010 294.379 156.485
23 288.375 372.178 145.010
24 284.210 379.634 185.455
25 229.200 307.376 173.825
26 270.995 333.403 167.200
27 260.125 337.739 161.385
28 290.840 378.233 216.130
29 255.415 299.437 126.885
30 285.845 363.202 213.520
31 263.360 341.957 149.130
32 316.450 404.714 229.550
33 253.415 339.655 187.690
34 274.080 361.972 153.825
35 213.850 274.986 121.690
36 247.105 325.090 174.490
37 228.960 284.929 122.420
38 250.200 276.726 164.080
39 238.390 308.158 157.650
40 308.155 367.380 224.705
41 276.150 371.125 140.755
42 307.670 413.476 222.065
43 261.770 367.902 165.005
44 266.070 320.002 137.500
45 282.525 327.201 116.605
46 306.870 405.512 179.355
47 281.740 368.820 157.645
48 266.390 297.291 145.355
49 236.920 297.533 137.930
50 278.635 360.957 188.345

TTest
IPD <
IPD Stdv. WTD
358.242
283.683
343.975
430.012
331.550
307.199
381.172
359.921
230.399
348.006
250.802
309.381
317.272
338.686
261.520
333.687
290.919
395.194
293.128
380.384
310.191
263.583
199.659
286.977
300.785
265.443
344.419
316.582
267.769
373.054
299.261
419.036
389.285
307.644
230.028
239.626
241.249
278.756
286.012
443.522
200.309
418.457
352.106
253.560
217.012
336.770
318.990
214.023
219.518
327.316

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

SHS Mean
136.905
152.055
153.360
128.800
127.955
137.245
143.165
191.235
111.010
124.605
126.385
132.865
125.415
115.880
93.055
118.965
121.610
140.485
98.520
134.355
107.205
103.915
108.710
121.085
108.525
149.105
90.695
149.745
85.575
184.945
80.195
125.450
127.250
112.425
103.945
94.815
71.680
142.800
95.860
166.000
103.250
129.280
96.870
95.450
105.165
123.585
99.840
116.885
71.525
90.145

TTest
SHS <
SHS Stdv. WTD
315.152
347.956
345.446
243.500
283.396
312.991
328.881
410.370
195.150
278.760
253.439
298.523
312.027
273.901
200.881
315.876
300.744
341.639
216.401
295.908
303.285
232.261
262.208
251.163
218.248
375.619
244.261
386.325
178.614
423.834
195.042
267.915
344.475
303.851
275.889
199.958
108.891
354.376
153.230
436.341
255.636
313.803
225.662
169.421
253.010
311.118
223.751
284.526
130.835
166.059

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

STK Mean
206.245
539.820
512.210
665.680
622.845
714.145
714.660
782.630
833.985
851.115
817.960
881.270
870.005
859.420
900.260
892.520
880.500
930.925
881.575
922.680
946.325
976.625
936.410
1016.125
988.855
978.450
976.850
1020.145
978.540
980.095
978.195
1030.410
1001.610
984.125
1087.690
1071.925
1076.190
1083.085
1050.255
1143.940
1072.080
1088.015
1055.780
1062.575
1090.665
1151.260
1081.025
1133.885
1087.180
1132.210

TTest
STK <
STK Stdv. WTD
314.660
783.832
804.292
926.064
935.369
974.085
976.989
1009.315
1045.860
1041.465
1029.492
1061.412
1064.697
1045.630
1076.293
1061.965
1070.456
1058.405
1089.975
1089.942
1095.166
1115.042
1117.774
1109.854
1090.862
1109.479
1134.055
1113.572
1112.065
1110.086
1120.450
1127.200
1137.683
1129.468
1158.428
1144.100
1142.302
1149.561
1149.602
1147.126
1135.136
1133.865
1121.037
1152.055
1134.082
1163.228
1147.262
1134.958
1142.061
1140.896

1
1
1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
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Figure 8-3: Mean generations to solution A=3.6

For A=3.1 the corresponding chart and table are in Figure 8-2 and Table 8-2. At A=3.1 a simple
cycle is introduced. Here again WTD settles down to stable performance but it takes longer –
landscape 20 (in contrast to 10 for the previous A value). Also, the settled G2S value is higher than
for A=1.
At A = 3.1 when the signal becomes non-linear, IPD separates itself from WTD. As shown in
Table 8-2, the T-Test results for IPD are all positive except the for the 18th landscape in the
sequence. Although IPD is biased towards defection, cooperation can emerge over repeated
interactions. The fruits of limited cooperation become apparent when environmental change is
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moderately complex. SHS still performs the best at A=3.1, without any caveats. Also, all
distribution mechanisms settle at a higher G2S as expected due to higher level of dynamic
complexity at A=3.1 vs. A=1.0.
The general trend, seen with A=1 and A=3.1 continues, with A=3.6 (Figure 8-3 & Table 8-3). At
A=3.6 the change is nonlinear and thus the environmental dynamic complexity is much higher
than with A=3.1. IPD clearly performs better than WTD but the difference seems to be a little less
than with A=3.1. In A=3.6, IPD is not significantly better than WTD in 3 out of 50 landscapes (#31,
#44 & #46). Whereas, with A=3.1, IPD was significantly better than WTD in all but 1 landscape.
SHS is significantly better across the board. STK is better for the first landscape and then
progressively its performance deteriorates. As well, due to greater environmental complexity,
WTD’s downward adjustment is a little slower than with A=3.1.
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Table 8-3: A=3.6, Two Sample T-Tests (P<0.05), Mean G2S: {IPD,SHS,STK} < WTD, by Landscape Sequence #

Landscape WTD MeanWTD Stdv. IPD Mean
1 678.355 806.743 226.205
2 703.350 781.262 272.985
3 587.275 767.052 193.685
4 512.735 714.996 179.980
5 506.420 700.092 191.200
6 416.230 567.251 204.725
7 352.415 513.681 202.275
8 303.515 432.498 185.925
9 295.675 403.588 175.635
10 302.820 440.483 194.080
11 254.050 359.478 173.585
12 311.440 418.643 175.825
13 291.435 421.853 155.245
14 284.130 399.136 160.580
15 296.345 398.085 170.640
16 285.925 370.783 220.230
17 264.370 357.814 142.815
18 315.440 459.060 204.245
19 303.905 390.982 197.725
20 309.225 377.867 201.330
21 283.635 384.917 127.525
22 282.675 360.463 149.510
23 267.210 326.100 141.190
24 225.360 285.573 158.550
25 285.830 375.117 179.035
26 259.550 307.056 190.360
27 249.730 329.600 184.705
28 310.700 430.214 154.845
29 284.815 359.878 170.175
30 268.275 334.069 187.245
31 231.540 293.565 182.805
32 271.400 343.463 180.565
33 324.445 355.557 140.840
34 270.765 383.771 194.760
35 307.525 385.738 184.925
36 261.755 356.352 170.130
37 294.745 399.426 142.475
38 311.000 404.321 143.375
39 289.030 390.274 178.905
40 265.245 364.760 185.985
41 216.425 279.654 135.590
42 295.485 390.751 181.745
43 292.635 355.951 144.755
44 270.245 330.704 219.555
45 287.020 372.742 134.385
46 262.460 317.709 215.275
47 270.810 366.029 152.710
48 347.495 474.985 206.270
49 245.190 292.021 130.855
50 321.775 376.985 164.925

TTest
IPD <
IPD Stdv. WTD
443.161
420.238
349.120
276.945
316.653
367.145
366.366
318.015
325.565
347.544
295.989
241.652
262.907
257.073
300.263
358.542
199.473
352.107
341.859
295.030
179.687
207.418
291.094
237.865
306.953
341.653
308.088
177.569
295.158
338.320
300.537
336.429
248.271
297.568
324.526
286.679
258.205
228.957
376.293
286.676
211.719
322.566
242.122
389.882
174.694
417.042
238.173
374.717
253.260
265.311

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-1
1
-1
1
1
1
1

SHS Mean
163.535
94.875
141.070
139.545
149.040
124.205
170.265
153.735
158.250
131.720
129.085
138.790
128.940
118.770
130.595
113.245
115.165
133.645
110.270
150.195
122.810
116.670
109.745
107.630
119.315
123.645
137.030
158.740
117.895
126.335
114.995
100.270
93.585
124.620
86.495
110.450
97.725
109.140
98.230
101.380
124.835
94.755
96.305
158.765
94.205
132.375
119.710
118.890
101.625
102.145

TTest
SHS <
SHS Stdv. WTD
414.050
135.917
303.592
277.266
318.002
201.621
352.338
341.717
378.039
287.249
299.050
215.337
283.490
235.150
359.534
280.344
278.183
285.919
206.846
329.300
299.968
238.737
262.474
252.929
229.931
306.516
321.605
351.032
259.020
279.549
271.305
257.214
244.944
343.534
145.250
290.062
254.225
170.767
232.736
235.880
389.038
218.543
202.990
346.930
213.422
258.831
287.569
259.253
183.823
209.826

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

STK Mean
252.820
616.600
631.115
799.085
766.490
843.140
832.755
811.630
906.250
899.990
863.675
966.600
899.915
958.110
913.245
1001.805
982.515
1008.450
1022.515
1020.780
1005.320
1052.775
1109.990
1001.910
1040.365
1124.675
1062.240
1135.610
1162.385
1149.165
1124.195
1160.180
1086.490
1174.625
1148.200
1156.165
1202.240
1159.020
1213.340
1154.605
1116.180
1242.485
1138.920
1159.085
1153.400
1166.145
1182.225
1211.020
1187.960
1187.890

TTest
STK <
STK Stdv. WTD
408.300
857.887
885.759
980.432
969.206
1031.689
1019.471
1034.849
1065.279
1070.563
1071.202
1089.462
1063.163
1078.424
1091.829
1095.050
1105.724
1100.266
1100.841
1110.377
1110.695
1112.949
1145.379
1131.247
1135.070
1142.822
1133.042
1134.730
1159.136
1148.168
1148.748
1148.057
1134.842
1158.750
1146.618
1154.519
1162.205
1159.761
1173.599
1148.657
1136.277
1150.237
1149.368
1142.769
1152.112
1156.556
1159.406
1156.954
1163.997
1168.143

1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
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Figure 8-4: Mean generations to solution =3.9

At A = 3.9 the environment’s dynamic complexity is on the edge of chaos. The trends
established with lower values of A continue with A=3.9 (Figure 8-4., Table 8-4). Statistical tests in
Table 8-4 show that IPD mostly performs better than WTD at A=3.9. STK performs statistically
better than WTD very early on then its performance progressively worsens. SHS consistently
performs better. WTD settles down at about the same rate with A=3.9 as with A=3.6.
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Table 8-4: A=3.9, Two Sample T-Tests (P<0.05), Mean G2S: {IPD,SHS,STK} < WTD, by Landscape Sequence #

Landscape WTD MeanWTD Stdv. IPD Mean
1 658.125 738.335 232.470
2 778.990 852.226 164.525
3 622.170 750.684 152.090
4 495.915 685.381 198.140
5 478.155 661.925 176.405
6 429.610 612.780 205.630
7 360.280 478.720 153.150
8 393.185 574.334 146.210
9 345.265 512.110 198.655
10 319.010 431.579 142.550
11 278.080 415.575 133.185
12 269.840 384.726 236.990
13 263.475 314.551 151.560
14 268.400 372.968 214.550
15 302.710 410.775 161.150
16 287.490 353.976 170.605
17 239.310 356.938 215.390
18 276.985 352.255 170.040
19 264.955 337.042 143.350
20 247.170 285.171 167.810
21 274.505 366.359 201.155
22 238.035 301.154 153.995
23 278.875 338.613 156.360
24 260.810 344.514 111.085
25 276.235 341.515 132.690
26 295.100 372.720 157.620
27 276.600 381.810 134.570
28 306.950 379.238 166.965
29 284.425 353.618 141.015
30 302.830 385.269 131.905
31 254.365 328.916 118.810
32 287.945 335.622 178.445
33 287.270 420.029 156.395
34 260.505 339.803 160.980
35 348.905 489.428 150.080
36 290.055 373.703 161.900
37 244.125 264.003 149.480
38 245.295 342.091 171.650
39 259.855 315.545 134.090
40 288.695 374.682 159.515
41 319.800 466.599 153.255
42 277.655 347.013 137.935
43 288.045 440.326 141.895
44 253.755 310.214 138.020
45 276.335 345.992 179.095
46 282.660 351.702 205.875
47 248.065 317.842 125.925
48 293.170 386.899 149.055
49 274.050 292.353 130.600
50 303.725 435.204 135.605

TTest
IPD <
IPD Stdv. WTD
469.185
224.830
202.376
365.820
279.389
363.744
221.530
229.752
378.997
268.464
181.987
379.933
221.917
396.312
310.784
322.213
424.734
309.080
209.021
274.940
428.644
271.352
241.431
214.082
223.165
281.807
180.922
274.936
226.911
235.492
166.633
306.456
320.850
297.446
295.892
237.958
315.497
267.471
188.440
253.543
321.555
184.991
223.071
226.154
321.316
380.063
186.678
251.481
192.523
252.836

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-1
1
-1
1
1
-1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

SHS Mean
172.670
123.285
111.360
207.895
105.860
115.675
99.090
139.885
94.750
109.780
127.500
185.945
115.795
143.785
140.335
114.315
147.170
83.860
97.005
111.780
91.120
111.480
117.555
104.805
69.845
97.385
108.955
89.615
89.280
120.450
71.730
111.310
106.940
100.945
90.230
113.165
65.775
101.475
100.305
103.190
129.180
108.430
89.155
113.710
124.640
107.465
101.925
94.430
78.605
97.180

TTest
SHS <
SHS Stdv. WTD
395.331
280.323
200.598
480.219
233.076
244.865
145.590
360.769
183.120
273.393
303.290
423.787
260.736
378.652
378.433
262.136
349.422
127.849
213.145
237.390
260.109
282.977
230.563
284.772
112.674
182.604
294.696
202.504
138.102
277.559
161.467
263.640
170.897
247.726
230.574
262.112
91.103
254.092
251.171
265.159
330.752
296.037
232.627
325.007
313.564
252.657
288.568
244.561
91.004
237.694

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

STK Mean
264.490
541.000
641.685
715.150
714.845
738.905
729.710
817.100
803.995
837.310
809.780
892.145
803.750
888.950
873.145
876.180
932.710
890.005
962.115
934.825
888.800
948.195
906.185
929.700
941.165
983.525
979.830
977.950
1060.655
1021.735
1040.530
1061.255
1045.715
1065.185
1072.615
1041.025
1079.160
1098.910
1078.815
1088.695
1058.355
1133.150
1118.665
1132.665
1117.275
1127.210
1151.380
1130.625
1139.400
1103.525

TTest
STK <
STK Stdv. WTD
457.034
809.937
882.553
942.862
955.912
982.533
979.655
1022.064
1046.507
1052.451
1031.316
1056.615
1036.633
1078.127
1053.503
1064.710
1071.828
1067.872
1096.631
1084.664
1092.058
1094.160
1077.485
1088.808
1091.861
1110.013
1099.626
1113.934
1130.608
1119.163
1144.690
1106.323
1136.995
1136.721
1147.182
1145.788
1145.213
1142.119
1150.752
1135.440
1155.785
1154.890
1144.351
1141.417
1139.332
1133.731
1158.025
1152.795
1150.857
1144.508

1
1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
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In summary, game-based distribution mechanisms that encompass cooperation, generally
perform better than WTD – the purely competitive mechanism – however, the game-based
mechanisms don’t get a blanket pass. STK cannot seem to be able to track changes well in a
dynamic environment, even if its initial performance is always better than WTD. The WTD
mechanism takes some time to learn to respond to environmental changes. Its initial performance
is quite off the mark but it settles down into a steady rhythm in later stages. However, from the
observed data the best mechanism SHS is statistically better than WTD in almost all cases. SHS
finds the solution in about 100 less generations than WTD does, for A>=3.1. Subsequent sections
in this chapter analyze the properties of the distribution mechanisms from different perspectives
to try to develop insights into the observed performance characteristics.

8.2 Social Stress / Diffusion Analysis
In section 8.1, the focus was on performance characteristics of the distribution mechanisms
which are analyzed qualitatively and with statistical rigor. The rest of the sections are focused on
the emergent properties manifested by the distribution mechanisms, reflecting their inner
workings in some way. Qualitative & quantitative analysis and a variety of visualization techniques
are leveraged to try to derive useful insights in these mechanisms.
The charts presented in Figure 8-5, Figure 8-6, Figure 8-7, and Figure 8-8 are Diffusion trends
for A = 1, 3.1, 3.6 and 3.9, respectively. Each chart contrasts the values of Diffusion for each
distribution mechanism, over the landscape sequence. From the charts, it is clear that each
mechanism operates within a set range. STK has the lowest diffusion, followed by WTD, SHS and
then IPD. These patterns persist for all tested A values. Statistical tests for the difference in means
between WTD and the rest of the KDs are given in Appendix II. The data are consistent with the
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charts. The mean value of WTD for each A and each landscape in the sequence is statistically
different from the corresponding means of the other mechanisms, for almost all landscapes. Some
exceptions are seen for the first few landscapes in each sequence. While statistical tests are not
performed for the pairwise difference between two mechanisms, for all possible pairs, the sample
size is large enough at 200 to impart confidence in the mean values. This is because the standard
deviations are fairly low compared to the means, in the tables presented in Appendix II.

Figure 8-5: Diffusion A=1.0
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Figure 8-6: Diffusion A=3.1

Figure 8-7: Diffusion A=3.6
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Figure 8-8: Diffusion A=3.9

One can infer a weak relationship between Diffusion and performance characteristics of the
distribution mechanisms. STK seems to stress its population individuals the least and it also
performs the worst in terms of G2S as discussed in the previous section. The better performing
mechanisms IPD and SHS place the highest stress on individuals. However, there may be an
optimal level of stress as IPD places greater stress than SHS but still performs worse in terms of
G2S than SHS.
The charts in Figure 8-9, Figure 8-10, Figure 8-11 and Figure 8-12 are Diffusion values grouped
by distribution mechanism to allow comparison of Diffusion for the same mechanism at different
A. Diffusion is not appreciably different for the different A values for the same mechanism. For
each mechanism, two-sample t-tests in general are not significant for the difference in means
between successive A values, e.g. 1→3.1; 3.1→3.6; and 3.6→3.9. One exception is for WTD
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(Figure 8-9). Here the Diffusion for A = 1 is statistically than for A=3.1 for 18 out of 50 landscapes
(see Appendix III.V). Another observation is that for WTD the Diffusion starts low and settles to a
steady level at about landscape 10. This corresponds to the initial learning by WTD as seen in the
G2S charts presented in the previous section.

Figure 8-9: WTD diffusion by complexity
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Figure 8-10: IPD diffusion by complexity

Figure 8-11: Stag-Hunt diffusion by complexity
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Figure 8-12: Stackelberg diffusion by complexity

For SHS, there is a marked cycle in the Diffusion values over the landscapes. The cycle
corresponds to the existence of cooperative and evaluative generations in the SHS mechanism’s
repertoire (see 6.2).
Diffusion for STK is not only the lowest among all tested distribution mechanisms, there is also
a slight downtrend in Diffusion across all A. Otherwise, there is no appreciable difference between
Diffusion for the different A values.
To summarize, the Diffusion values for the game mechanisms are statistically different from
those for WTD (with minor exceptions – see Appendix II). For each mechanism, Diffusion is not
statistically different between successive A changes (for almost all landscapes). The exception is
for WTD for A=1→A-3.1 (linear to non-linear transition) where statistical difference exists for
18/50 landscapes (see Appendix II.e). As Diffusion is a measure of stress in the system, these
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results show that each mechanism places a different level of stress but that level does not vary
much by changes in environmental complexity.

8.3 Segregation Analysis
Diffusion is a measure of the spatial diversity of a node’s neighbors. In contrast Segregation
Index (also referred to as segregation in this document) is a measure of clustering or grouping of
Knowledge Sources among neighbors (7.4). The next four charts – Figure 8-13, Figure 8-14, Figure
8-15 and Figure 8-16 – show segregation by the tested A values, allowing one to compare the
distribution mechanisms together for each A. Statistical testing shows that the segregation values
for the game mechanisms are statistically different from WTD’s for the majority of the landscapes,
across the tested A values (Appendix III).
The general pattern followed by the distribution mechanisms for each A value is about the
same for segregation. On average, WTD shows the lowest segregation. STK shows a steady
increase from very low segregation to high of about 0.8 (range is 0.0-2.0, Table 7-1). SHS reaches
highest segregation levels and shows a pronounced cycle due to periodicity of cooperative and
evaluative distributions (section 6.2). The SHS peaks correspond to evaluative generations when
some individuals may defect to keep their current knowledge assignments causing higher
segregation. In cooperative generations the knowledge assignments are more varied due to the
‘social rank’ based allocation, leading to comparatively lower segregation. IPD shows steady
segregation around 0.7 with a slight upward trend for A > 1.0. WTD is purely competitive and gives
a rather flat line across all A values. In contrast, the cooperative mechanisms show higher
segregation. Although not evident here, the analysis of social dynamics presented in the next
section shows that IPD and SHS tend to favor exploration and STK favors exploitation. The higher
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segregation shown by the game mechanisms is due the aforementioned biases as these result in
preponderance of certain types of KS over others.

Figure 8-13: Segregation A=1
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Figure 8-14: Segregation A=3.1

Figure 8-15: Segregation A=3.6
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Figure 8-16: Segregation A=3.9

Given that the range is between 0.0 and 2.0 for Segregation, at the aggregate level (i.e.
averaged over 200 samples) Segregation stays below 0.9 for all distribution mechanisms. This
shows that all mechanisms maintain a healthy diversity of knowledge in local neighborhoods.
Segregation close to 0.0 means all Knowledge Sources are evenly distributed in the population.
Whereas a value close to 2.0 means that only one or two Knowledge Sources cover the entire
population.
The fact that SHS performs the best in terms of G2S, implies that a segregation level towards
0.8 may be ideal. In addition, however, maintaining a steady level of segregation may not be best
as WTD does that and still does not perform as well (in terms of G2S) as IPD or SHS. It may well be
that segregation that modulates between a range is required for best performance.
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The next set of charts are organized by distribution mechanism. Segregation trend for each
distribution mechanism by A shows each mechanism’s response to A in terms of the level of
segregation. Also provided for each distribution mechanism are representative samples of
population snapshots of low and high segregation, by A. These are provided for qualitative
assessment and to show some examples of the mechanisms at work. The snapshots are randomly
selected from population sets that are +/- 1 standard deviations away from the mean segregation
of the mechanism.
As a baseline, WTD (Figure 8-17) shows a steady level of segregation around 0.65 that does not
seem to vary much as A increases. Statistical testing for the difference in segregation levels
between successive A values (e.g. A=1 → A=3.1, etc.) shows that for almost all landscapes there
is no statistical difference. WTD’s low segregation and unresponsiveness to A is likely because the
Knowledge Sources that have been driven out by the voting mechanism are added back in to 20%
of the population, at random (section 7.4). Samples of population snapshots showing low and high
Segregation are given in Figure 8-17 and Figure 8-18.
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Figure 8-17: WTD segregation by complexity and landscape sequence

Figure 8-18: WTD high segregation landscape examples
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Figure 8-19: WTD low segregation landscape examples

Figure 8-20 show the Segregation Index trends as A increases for IPD. Unlike WTD, here there
is a clear separation between segregation at A = 1 and A > 1. It shows that IPD is responsive when
environmental complexity changes from linear (A=1) to non-linear (A =3.1). This difference is
statistically significant (see Appendix III.e) for almost all landscapes. Changes in segregation levels
for other transitions (i.e. A=3.1→3.6; A=3.6→3.9) are not statically significant (by landscape)
except for a few landscapes (Appendix III.e). Also, for non-linear environmental complexity IPD
shows a slight positive slope in the trend lines.
High and low segregation snapshots given in Figure 8-21 and Figure 8-22, respective, show a
dominance of Topographic knowledge. By contrast, equivalent figures for WTD (Figure 8-18,
Figure 8-19) show dominance of Domain knowledge that can be exploratory or exploitative based
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on the context (like stem cells in Biology). These show that IPD allocates more resources to
exploration because Topographic is an explorative Knowledge Source.

Figure 8-20: IPD segregation by complexity and landscape sequence
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Figure 8-21: IPD high segregation landscape examples

Figure 8-22: IPD low segregation landscape examples
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Segregation trends for SHS (Figure 8-23) shows that segregation levels for all A values is are
close. Statistical testing showed no difference for segregation levels between successive A, per
landscape, except for a few landscapes. High and low Segregation snapshot examples (Figure 8-24,
Figure 8-25) show dominance of Topographic and Domain knowledge in the population. This
shows neutral to exploratory bias for SHS resource allocation.

Figure 8-23: Stag-Hunt segregation by complexity and landscape sequence
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Figure 8-24: Stag-Hunt high segregation landscape examples

Figure 8-25: Stag-Hunt low segregation landscape examples
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STK (Figure 8-26) starts with very low Segregation Index at 0.45 and then steadily rises to 0.8.
Segregation is seen as plateauing at 0.8 as the slopes of the trend lines are flatting out towards
the end of the landscape sequence. This is no discernable difference in segregation levels by
landscape for the different A values. Statistical testing also validates this visual assessment. For
STK no landscapes were found where segregation is significantly different between successive A
values. This shows that STK is not responsive to changes in environmental complexity. From the
population snapshots (Figure 8-27, Figure 8-28) for STK, it can be seen that STK is allocating much
resources to exploitation in high segregation cases as compared to WTD (Figure 8-18).

Figure 8-26: Stackelberg segregation by complexity and landscape sequence
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Figure 8-27: Stackelberg high segregation landscape examples
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Figure 8-28: Stackelberg low segregation landscape examples

Thus far the analysis was focused on Segregation Index trends by landscape sequence. It was
found that cooperative mechanisms have higher segregation in general on a per landscape basis.
Also, in general, except for the IPD A=1 → 3.1 case, none of the mechanisms show statistically
significant changes in segregation levels for successive A transitions, on a per landscape basis. The
trend lines still provide useful insights such as the cyclic nature of segregation in SHS (Figure 8-23),
flat and low segregation for WTD (Figure 8-17) and the increase in segregation levels by landscape
for STK (Figure 8-26).
Now the analysis is focused on overall segregation by KD-A ignoring the landscape sequence,
i.e. the aggregate segregation levels for each KD-A combination. The sample size for each mean
value (segregation by KD-A) is very large. Each mean is based on close to a billion data points
(number of runs * population size * number of generations per landscape * number of landscapes
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in sequence = 200 * 36 * 2500 * 50 = 900M). And therefore, difference between any two mean
values is statistically significant. The mean segregation values are shown in Table 8-5 and t-tests
for significance between successive A for each KD in Table 8-6. Figure 8-29 shows average
segregation with +/- 1 standard deviation bands for each KD-A combination.
Table 8-5: Average Segregation by KD and A

KD
WTD
WTD
WTD
WTD
STK
STK
STK
STK
SHS
SHS
SHS
SHS
IPD
IPD
IPD
IPD

A
3.9
3.6
3.1
1
3.9
3.6
3.1
1
3.9
3.6
3.1
1
3.9
3.6
3.1
1

Mean
0.63804
0.637074
0.637499
0.635276
0.698276
0.703175
0.707844
0.706842
0.727804
0.71921
0.719512
0.702398
0.740624
0.726136
0.731641
0.676802

Std. Deviation
0.136789738
0.136375862
0.136509734
0.135036359
0.161027065
0.158131383
0.157221999
0.157270233
0.155380488
0.154454508
0.154879267
0.150377916
0.131153711
0.131002041
0.132611557
0.127004235

Table 8-6: T-Tests for Difference in Segregation between Successive A values by KD

KD

From A

To A

WTD
WTD
WTD
STK
STK
STK
SHS
SHS

1
3.1
3.6
1
3.1
3.6
1
3.1

3.1
3.6
3.9
3.1
3.6
3.9
3.1
3.6

p value, t-test for
difference in means
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.051
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SHS
IPD
IPD
IPD

3.6
1
3.1
3.6

3.9
3.1
3.6
3.9

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Figure 8-29: Schelling index summary for each KD and A value combination

Due to the large sample size, all means are close to true means and any differences are
significant statistically. As per Table 8-5 all mechanisms show a slight decrease in segregation for
the transition A=3.1 to A=3.6. The is likely due to the underlying harmonics of the data generating
process. Since segregation is an emergent property the exact reason for this anomaly cannot be
fully understood. Apart from this anomaly, there are some clear trends.

147
WTD shows a very slight but overall positive increase in segregation levels as A increases. As do
IPD and SHS. IPD shows the most difference, followed by SHS. STK on the other hand shows an
overall negative relationship with A. The data shows that better performing mechanisms (in terms
of G2S) are responsive to changes in A by increasing segregation levels in the population for the
distribution of knowledge. In contrast, the worst performer STK decreases segregation in response
to increase in environmental complexity. However, the aggregate level data masks other useful
features such as the modulation in segregation levels by the best performing mechanism SHS,
which is apparent in the landscape-sequence view of the data. One can surmise that under
conditions of stress (high environmental complexity), increased segregation is the valid response.
This is borne out by the analysis performed in the next section.

8.4 Communal Knowledge Flow Analysis
In this section the focus is on the dynamics of knowledge flow, as outlined in section 7.5. This
section starts with the chord diagrams for the weighted graphs representing community-tocommunity transitions. Then Page Rank based charts are presented – tree and parallel chords
charts by A. After that are presented Sankey charts that show statistically significant changes or
deltas in knowledge flow due to A. Finally, a summary of view of knowledge flow deltas captures
useful insights relating knowledge flow to performance characteristics.
Note that the analysis presented here has a natural progression; data underlying chord
diagrams represents raw transition counts. For Page Rank and community rank this data is
normalized to a Markov Chain. For the Sanky charts, the raw count data is converted to mean and
standard deviation of change in transitions over the 200 samples collected for each KD-A
combination.
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For the chord diagrams, the transition weights are the count of transitions across all 200
samples with 50 landscapes each. The total number of transitions for a KD-A combination is in the
order 1 billion: 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = 200 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠 ∗ 50 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑠 ∗ 2500 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ∗ 36 𝑝𝑜𝑝. ≅
1𝐵. Note that an individual may be part of several communities at the same time (Figure 7-10).
The transitions are counted from community-to-community. So multiple transitions may be
generated from one individual depending on the before and after communities the individual is
part of. To make the charts more readable, only links with transition weights over 100K are shown.
The labeling scheme described in section 7.5 is used but as an example, ‘D_T’ is a community
composed of Domain and Topographic Knowledge Sources. The WTD chord diagrams for
community-to-community transitions are shown in Figure 8 30, Figure 8 31, Figure 8 32, and Figure
8 33. Each chart is for a specific A value. The charts are in order of decreasing community
importance, in a counter-clockwise arrangement. For WTD, the strongest community is ‘D’ (for
Domain), then ‘D_T’, ‘D_N’ and so on. These three combined all represent the emphasis on
exploration.
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Figure 8-30: WTD A=1 communal knowledge flow graph

All the charts for WTD show more-or-less the same pattern of community dominance. The ‘D’
community has a large self-loop that indicates that individuals tend to retain ‘D’ across
generations. The self-loops of the other major communities (‘D_T’, ‘D_N’, ‘D_H’, etc.) are much
smaller that tells that individuals in these tend to switch to other communities in the next
generation, relatively speaking. The top 5 transitions (arcs) all involve Domain knowledge, ‘D’. This
indicates that WTD allocates considerable resources to Domain. Domain is placed in the middle of
the exploratory-exploitative scale and can function on both sides of the divide. However, excessive
reliance on Domain may be one of the reasons that WTD does not perform as well as IPD or SHS.
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Figure 8-31: WTD A=3.1 communal knowledge flow graph

Figure 8-32: WTD A=3.6 communal knowledge flow graph
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Figure 8-33: WTD A=3.9 communal knowledge flow graph

The chord diagrams for IPD are in Figure 8-34, Figure 8-35, Figure 8-36 and Figure 8-37. Here
the dominant communities are ‘T’ (Topographic) and ‘D_T’. Both have large self-loops and are also
strongly inter-connected. The next one down is ‘D’ by itself. It is strongly connected to the other
two as well. IPD allocates relatively more resources to Topographic and Domain knowledge with
a bias towards Topographic.
Unlike, WTD, IPD shows some sensitivity to A as the community ordering changes from A=1.0
to A=3.1. The change is detectable towards the tail end of the chord diagram. From A=3.1 and
onward there is no change in ordering.
Note that the chord diagrams are drawn using Microsoft PowerBI tool. The color scheme is
based on the counter-clockwise order of the labels (communities). Charts with the same pattern
will have the same scheme. This is evident upon comparison of IPD A=1 and A={3.1, 3.6, 3.9}
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charts. The color scheme is a quick way of assessing if two charts have the same order of
community dominance.

Figure 8-34: IPD 1.0 communal knowledge flow graph
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Figure 8-35: IPD A=3.1 communal knowledge flow graph

Figure 8-36: IPD A=3.9 communal knowledge flow graph

154

Figure 8-37: IPD A=3.6 communal knowledge flow graph

For SHS, the community-to-community transition charts are given in Figure 8-38, Figure 8-39,
Figure 8-40 and Figure 8-41, for the different A values. The charts show a clear dominance Domain
knowledge paired with Topographic Figure 8-41(‘D_T’). Unlike for WTD and IPD, where a single
letter community is dominant (‘D’ for WTD and ‘T’ for IPD), a paired community is dominant for
SHS.
As with IPD, SHS also shows strong inter-connections between ‘D_T’, ‘T’ and ‘D’ communities.
However, the self-loops are slightly smaller for SHS than IPD, means that there are more
transitions between communities there. Also, for SHS the links from the top 3 communities to the
next level down – ‘D_N_T’ - are also stronger when compared with IPD. These facts indicate that
SHS is mixing the Knowledge Sources at a higher rate than IPD. SHS allocates most resources to
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regional exploration (Topographic) and local exploration (Domain). Considering the ‘social rank’
based knowledge distribution for SHS (section 6.2), the indication is that individuals are moved
over long distances in the search space under Topographic influence and then (if they are
performing relatively well) explore the local landscape under the Domain influence to find the
local peak. This seems to suggest that SHS is balancing exploration and exploitation well.

Figure 8-38: Stag-Hunt A=1 communal knowledge flow graph
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Figure 8-39: Stag-Hunt A=3.1 communal knowledge flow graph

Figure 8-40: Stag-Hunt A=3.6 communal knowledge flow graph
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Figure 8-41: Stag-Hunt A=3.9 communal knowledge flow graph

Figure 8-42: Stackelberg A=1.0 communal knowledge flow graph
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The STK chord diagrams (Figure 8-42, Figure 8-43, Figure 8-44, Figure 8-45) visually are very
distinct from those for WTD, IPD and SHS. Situational is now the dominant knowledge but another
exploitative knowledge, History, is also ranked high. The diagrams show that STK allocates
relatively more resources to exploitation when compared with WTD, IPD and SHS, respectively.
Like WTD and SHS, STK also does not show any differentiation with respect to A values, in the
chord diagrams.
Another aspect for STK is that the allocation of resources is more or less evenly divided between
the top communities – ‘S’, ‘N’, ‘H’, ‘T’ and ‘D’. The allocation among the top communities of other
distribution mechanisms is more varied. For STK, the self-loops and the arcs between communities
are relatively even. This indicates that rates of transitions between top communities are quite
balanced.
While the STK chord charts indicate a more even allocation between Knowledge Sources (with
slight priority for exploitation), this does not translate to better performance in terms of
generations-to-solution. A plausible explanation is that under STK, knowledge distribution is
structured like in a centrally planned system. Thus, the allocation of resources is not based on local
needs and as a result the whole system is relatively inefficient when interacting with a dynamic
environment. IPD and SHS by contrast make adjustments by utilizing local knowledge and are
more akin to market-based systems and therefore provide more efficient utilization of resources.
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Figure 8-43: Stackelberg A=3.1 communal knowledge flow graph

Figure 8-44: Stackelberg A=3.6 communal knowledge flow graph
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Figure 8-45: Stackelberg 3.9 communal knowledge flow graph

The chord diagrams provide a good sense of community dominance and interaction among
communities (arc links). Page Rank, however, provides a more robust answer to community
importance questions. The iterative Page Rank algorithm settles the weight or importance of each
community with convergence and so is more definitive in this regard. Page Rank determined
community weights can be visualized as tree charts – that depict relative mass – and as parallel
chord charts – that, combined with A values, provide a clear view of the changes in community
rank by A. Chord charts capture the dynamics more explicitly; by contrast, Page Rank output is a
static view that implicitly incorporates dynamics.
As explained in section 7.5, the data for Page Rank is derived from the data used by the chord
charts. The chord charts are based on raw transition counts. These are normalized such that the
weighted graph becomes a Markov Chain – i.e. weights of all outgoing edges of a node sum to 1.
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Also as noted earlier (section 7.5) Red hues in the tree charts indicate relatively exploratory
communities and Green relatively exploitative. The boxes in a tree chart are ordered by weight,
left to right.
Comparing the chord charts with Page Rank derived charts, it is evident that Page Rank is a
more sensitive mechanism for ranking communities. As an example, consider the chord charts for
WTD (Figure 8-30, Figure 8-31, Figure 8-32, Figure 8-33) with the corresponding tree charts in
Figure 8-46 and parallel chord chart in Figure 8-47. The Page Rank based charts capture
community rank changes that are not evident in the chord charts. The parallel chord chart shows
the changes in rank only without considering the relative weight or importance of each community
– which is captured by the tree chart. Combined, the two charts provide a useful view of the inner
workings of distribution mechanisms in terms of allocation of compute resources and sensitivity
to A.
For WTD, the tree charts in Figure 8-46, show a strong dominance of Domain (‘D’) knowledge.
Almost 25% of the mass is allocated to ‘D’ alone. Combined with Normative and Topographic,
Domain occupies almost 45%-50% of the total allocation. The color hues show that WTD allocates
about 50%-60% of the resources to explorative communities. Hues Redder than that for ‘D’ are
considered exploratory.
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Figure 8-46: WTD Page-Rank determined community importance by A value

Some A-driven community rank changes are discernable in WTD tree charts (Figure 8-46) but
these are progressively harder to spot moving from left to right. The parallel chord diagram in
Figure 8-47 shows all changes clearly.
WTD shows considerable sensitivity in terms of community rank changes between A=1 and
A=3.1 i.e. transition from linear to non-linear phase. It is relatively inert between A=3.1 and A=3.6
(non-linear → highly-non-linear). And then shows sensitivity between A=3.6 and A=3.9 (highly
non-linear → chaotic) but less than that for the linear → non-linear transition. Since all A value
changes are accompanied by community rank changes, it is surmised that WTD is a mechanism
that is responsive to changes in environmental complexity. Note that even low-weight community
changes are meaningful since the total for all transitions is in the order of a billion.
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Figure 8-47: WTD changes in community rank by A value

IPD and Stag-Hunt are related since Stag-Hunt is an evolutionary game theory variant of IPD
that is from classical game theory. Also, both use ‘social rank’ as a mechanism to distribute
knowledge. IPD is biased toward competitive behavior where Stag-Hunt is more cooperative inf
function. Due to their similarities, the two are considered together for this part of the analysis.
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Figure 8-48: IPD Page-Rank determined community importance by A value

Figure 8-49: Stag-Hunt Page-Rank determined community importance by A value
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The tree charts for IPD and SHS are in Figure 8-48 and Figure 8-49, respectively; the parallel
chords charts are in Figure 8-50 and Figure 8-51. Domain and Topographic knowledge are
dominant in both, with IPD allocating slightly more to Topographic. As noted earlier, SHS provides
more mixing of knowledge due to having smaller self-loops than IPD, noticeable in the
corresponding chord charts (Figure 8-34, Figure 8-38) – even though overall allocation is similar.
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Figure 8-50: IPD changes in community rank by A value
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Figure 8-51: Stag-Hunt changes in community rank by A value

When compared with WTD (Figure 8-46), both IPD (Figure 8-48) and SHS (Figure 8-49) allocate
more resources to exploration. IPD and SHS show 60%-70% allocation to exploratory communities
where WTD is in the 50%-60% range.
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From the community rank perspective, IPD shows greater sensitivity to increases in A (Figure
8-50) than SHS (Figure 8-51). SHS shows changes in community rank for A=1 to A=3.1 (linear →
non-linear) transition but thereafter it is not responsive; no rank changes are present for other A
transitions. How can it be that SHS performs well in terms of generations-to-solution but is
relatively inert to A? The answer is that rank changes are but one view into responsiveness to A.
Another method of gauging responsiveness is through Sankey chart analysis, which is discussed
later in this section. SHS is sensitive to A but not enough to affect community rankings at higher
levels of A.
For both IPD and SHS, the ranks of the top communities remain stable as A increases (Figure
8-50, Figure 8-50). This indicates that IPD and SHS have found stable allocations for top
communities that work well for the tested levels of environmental dynamic complexity.

Figure 8-52: Stackelberg Page-Rank determined community importance by A value
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As seen earlier, STK (Figure 8-52) knowledge allocations are quite different from the rest. Here
the single letter communities are dominant and the allocations are relatively even between them.
The changes in community ranking due to A are quite discernable even with the tree chart view.
By contrast to WTD, IPD and SHS, STK allocates more resources to exploitation. The tree chart
(Figure 8-52) for STK shows a roughly even split between explorative and exploitative
communities. And for all but A=3.9, the exploitative Situational knowledge is the dominant
community.
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Figure 8-53: Stackelberg changes in community rank by A-value

The parallel chord chart (Figure 8-53) shows that STK is very sensitive to A as is evident by the
significant number of rank changes across the board. While STK seems to be responsive to
environmental dynamic complexity, its diminutive generations-to-solutions performance
indicates that STK’s responsiveness is not supporting its performance. The higher performing IPD
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and SHS mechanisms show stable ranks, at least for the top communities. It can thus be concluded
that STK is overly responsive and is not able to find a stable footing to tackle dynamic
environments.
Community rank order changes is one gauge of responsiveness to A increases. However, as was
discovered for SHS, it is not a sensitive enough gauge. SHS seems inert to A at higher levels – as
per the parallel chords diagram for SHS (Figure 8-51). SHS performs the best in terms generationsto-solution and hence a more sensitive mechanism to track responsiveness is required. Going back
to the raw transition counts collected for the chord diagrams, the counts are transformed in the
following ways (see section 7.5 for details):
•

The transitions counts are grouped into Explorative, Neutral and Exploitative ‘categories’
(for each A-KD combination) using the explorative index for each community (see Listing
7-1). Three categories are easier to reason with than 32 communities, for sensitivity
analysis

•

Sample mean and standard deviation (over the 200 samples per A-KD combination) are
calculated to enable statistical significance testing. For each A-KD combination there are 9
means (and associated standard deviations) as follows:
o Explorative → Explorative
▪

I.e. count of transitions from Explorative communities back to Explorative
communities in the next generation

o Explorative → Neutral
o Explorative → Exploitative
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o Neutral → Neutral
o Neutral → Explorative.
o …
•

Statistically significant deltas or change in transition counts are calculated with respect to
each A increment
o Consider the transition Explorative→Neutral, for A=1 → A=3.1
o Are the means for Explorative→Neutral transition significantly different from
under A=1 and A=3.1?
o This is answerable by performing a two-sample t-test (for the difference in means)
o For each A step (e.g. A=1 → A=3.1; A=3.1 → A=3.6; …) measure the changes in
transition counts for each of the 9 transitions where the change is statistically
significant

•

The above transformations yield a series of weighted graphs – one for each A increment
o The nodes are categories: Explorative, Neutral Exploitative
o The arcs represent changes in transition counts (or net change in flow)
o Each arc weight is the actual difference in counts for adjacent A values, if the
change was statistically significant, otherwise its zero

The 3 graphs for the 3 increments (1 → 3.1; 3.1 → 3.6; 3.6 → 3.9) can be viewed in a single
Sankey chart as some of the nodes are shared between the graphs. For example, the “Explorative
3.1” node in 1→3.1 is the same node for 3.1→3.6. The Sankey chart is set of chord diagrams that
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are flattened out. Because the graphs share some nodes, they can be compactly viewed in the
same chart.
The Sankey charts, constructed as described above, are shown in Figure 8-54, Figure 8-55,
Figure 8-56 & Figure 8-57 for WTD, IPD, SHS & STK, respectively. These are all considered together
as they are useful gauges for comparing responsiveness to A changes, for the tested distribution
mechanisms. Statistically significant changes to increased entropy are represented by colored
arcs. Red arcs represent decrease in transition counts and Green increase. For not statistically
significant changes the corresponding arcs are drawn as thin Black lines. The magnitude of the
change (either positive or negative) is represented by an arc’s thickness.

Figure 8-54: WTD - changes in explorative-exploitative balance due to complexity changes
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Figure 8-55: IPD - changes in explorative-exploitative balance due to complexity changes

Figure 8-56: Stag-Hunt - changes in explorative-exploitative balance due to complexity changes
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Figure 8-57: Stackelberg - changes in explorative-exploitative balance due to complexity changes

The title of each chart shows the total number of statistically significant changes made as A
increases. Each Sankey chart is the profile of responsiveness to A for the corresponding
distribution mechanism. The charts show that all tested mechanisms are responsive to changes in
environment dynamic complexity. Somewhat surprisingly WTD is the most responsive with 23
statistically significant changes followed by STK (22), SHS (20) and IPD (15). Sankey chart for SHS
(Figure 8-56) shows that SHS is responsive to all A increments; this is not picked up by community
rank changes in Figure 8-51.
There is a responsiveness story embedded in the deltas of the knowledge flows as depicted by
the Sankey charts but it’s hard to extract that as such. One reason is that the charts are not
comparable with each other as each chart is scaled relative to itself. Squeezing the information
contained in the Sankey diagrams a little further provides additional insights.
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The Sankey charts show changes in transition rates with respect to A increments, between all
combinations of the 3 categories (Explorative, Neutral, Exploitative). Projecting the net changes
(in and out) for each category onto a separate view allows one to compare the responsiveness
behavior of the different mechanisms on an equal footing (see section 7.5 for additional details).
The net flow changes for Explorative, Exploitative and Neutral categories are provided in Figure
8-58, Figure 8-59 and Figure 8-60, respectively. Compare the net change in transition counts for
Explorative communities (Figure 8-58) across the A increments and for the tested distribution
mechanisms. SHS at 1→3.1 exhibits the largest influx. This shows that when environmental
complexity increases from static to linear, SHS responds by diverting the most resources to
exploration. Also, for other increments, (3.1→3.6 and 3.6→3.9) SHS is consistent in further
increasing allocation to exploration. All of the other mechanisms are not consistent in that they
do not consistently increase allocation to exploration with increasing environment dynamic
complexity.
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Figure 8-58: Net flow changes for Explorative communities by KD and A

Figure 8-59: Net flow changes for Exploitative communities for KD and A
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For SHS, the opposite is true in the case of Exploitation (Figure 8-59 Figure 8-58). SHS
consistently diverts resources away from exploitation as A increases, as does IPD. The other
distribution mechanisms do not respond consistently.
The balance of flow changes come from the Neutral category (Figure 8-60). The results are
mixed for all but the chart shows that SHS diverts resources from Neutral communities for
exploration for the 1→3.1 change.

Figure 8-60: Net flow changes for Neutral communities by KD and A

This section focused on the dynamics of knowledge flow grounded on the formation of
knowledge communities and community-to-community transitions of the population individuals,
across generations. The goal was to shed light on the inner workings of the distribution
mechanisms, in relation to their performance and with respect to changes in environmental
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dynamic complexity. Through graph-based analytical methods, insights were derived on the
allocation of compute resources and the responsiveness of the mechanisms to complexity. The
next chapter summarizes the goals and findings of this research and draws conclusions about the
hypotheses posited in Chapter 7.

8.5 Summary and Conclusions
Knowledge distribution is a key determiner of CA performance and is an active area of research
in Cultural Algorithms (Al-Tirawi & Reynolds, 2018) (Reynolds & Kinnaird-Heether, 2013). The
knowledge distribution mechanisms researched thus far have all been competitive mechanisms.
The goal of this research is to investigate mechanisms that also span cooperation. The rich field of
Game theory is used as the source and inspiration for new distribution mechanisms. Three new
game-based distribution mechanisms are devised and tested namely, Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma, Stag-Hunt and Stackelberg.
A new CA software system, CATGame, is constructed for this purpose. The system supports a
generic mechanism to inject and use arbitrary games for knowledge distribution. The game
distribution mechanisms leverage this framework. The new mechanisms are benchmarked against
the default CA mechanism Weighted Majority. CATGame is meant to solve numerical optimization
problems. A separate system, CATNeuro, is also constructed to understand the effectiveness of a
competitive/cooperative distribution mechanism in the domain of neural architecture search.
Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 are dedicated to CATNeuro software system.
Here the performance of the distribution mechanisms in CATGame are tested via a modified
Cones World test benchmark that incorporates the logistic equation (Eq 7-2) to create dynamic
problem landscapes whose complexity is controlled by the A multiplier of the logistic equation.
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The design of experiment and research hypotheses are documented in Chapter 7. Analysis of the
data collected from experimental runs is provided in the prior sections of this chapter.
Briefly, section 8.1 analyzes the base performance of the tested mechanism in terms of
generations-to-solution. Section 8.2 contrasts the Diffusion metric for the distribution
mechanisms. And, 8.3 comprehends the segregation of the population under the different
mechanisms and in response to environmental dynamic complexity. Finally, 8.4 looks at the
dynamics of knowledge flow in the ‘social’ network under the various mechanisms to uncover the
resource allocation patterns in response to the rate of environmental change.
Each of the hypotheses posed in Chapter 7 are now taken up. Each of these are discussed next
and inferences are drawn about whether these holds and what are the caveats, if any.
Hy 7-1

“Cooperative knowledge distribution is effective for problem

{holds with

solving in dynamically complex environments”

exceptions}

The performance characteristics of the distribution mechanisms
(Table 8-1, Table 8-2, Table 8-3 and Table 8-4) clearly indicate that at
least two of the mechanisms – that are inclusive of cooperation –
perform well when compared with the default competitive
mechanism WTD. Stag-Hunt supports the most cooperation and also
performs the best. However, Stackelberg (as interpreted for
knowledge distribution) performs well for static environments but
cannot keep up with others in dynamic environments. Stackelberg
employs a structured model of cooperation that does not
incorporate local knowledge and consequently is less efficient in
resource allocation. Comparatively speaking, Stackelberg allocates
more resources to exploitation (Figure 8-52) than others. By
contrast, knowledge flow analysis shows that the best performer
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allocates progressively more resources to exploration as complexity
increases (Figure 8-58). Thus, the hypothesis holds for the type of
cooperation that incorporates local knowledge into decision making.
If the decision making is centralized or oblivious of local conditions,
it does not seem to hold.
Hy 7-2

“Cooperative knowledge distribution exhibits better robustness

{holds with

than competitive distribution”

exceptions}

Robustness is about how quickly a system adjusts to change. The
basic performance charts (Figure 8-1, Figure 8-2, Figure 8-3, Figure
8-4) show that two of the 3 cooperative mechanisms (IPD and StagHunt) are robust as they settle to a base rate of performance
relatively quickly in the face of periodic environment change. WTD,
the competitive mechanism, take longer to settle as A values
increase. For mild complexity (A=1) WTD is on par with the best
after 10 landscapes. However, as complexity increases, WTD takes
increasing longer to settle. Stackelberg is the contrarian cooperative
mechanism and in fact is not robust at all as its performance
becomes progressively worse, at least for the 50-landscape horizon
used in the experiment. As the Page Rank derived tree charts show
(Figure 8-46, Figure 8-48, Figure 8-49, Figure 8-52) Stackelberg
allocates more resources to exploitation where the better
performing mechanisms devote more to exploration. Once again it
can be surmised that cooperative systems that incorporate local
knowledge are more resilient than ones that are centrally planned.
Also, competitive mechanisms are less resilient in general but still
more than those with oligopolistic cooperation.
Hy 7-3

“Diffusion is higher for more dynamically complex environments”

{does not
hold}
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The Diffusion trend charts for each KD (Figure 8-9, Figure 8-10,
Figure 8-11, Figure 8-12) show that the only mechanisms that shows
some sensitivity to A is WTD. The Diffusion for WTD is distinctly
lower for A=1; for non-linear A values is no discernable distinction.
In general, this hypothesis does not hold but there are exceptions.
Hy 7-4

“Segregation is higher for higher complexity environments”

{holds with
exceptions}

The segregation trend-by-landscape charts for each KD (Figure 8-17,
Figure 8-18, Figure 8-19, Figure 8-21) show that IPD exhibits some
separation in segregation with respect to A whereas SHS, WTD and
STK do not. However, at the aggregate level, Figure 8-29, both IPD
and SHS show a distinct response to increasing A with increasing
segregation levels. It seems that higher performing mechanisms
tend to increase segregation in response to complexity.
Consequently, this hypothesis partially holds. It holds for ‘social
rank’ based distribution mechanisms (IPD, Stag-Hunt) and not for
the oligopolistic one.
Hy 7-5

“Stag-Hunt and IPD distributions will produce higher segregation
than WTD distributions”
This hypotheses holds and clear evidence exists in Segregation trend
charts Figure 8-13, Figure 8-14, Figure 8-15, and Figure 8-16. The
Segregation levels for IPD and Stag-Hunt remain consistently higher
than those for WTD. The reason for this is that in WTD the
Knowledge Sources that are forced out due to the voting
mechanisms, are added back to 20% of the randomly selected
population that lowers overall Segregation. This is done to protect
against the “tyranny of the majority” (Moeckli, 2018). The US
electoral college system of voting is a similar measure. Without this

{holds}
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provision, certain types of knowledge could be lost at some point
and not regained. The cooperative mechanisms on the other hand
are self-adjusting and don’t need a similar provision.
Hy 7-6

“Stackelberg produces lowest segregation among the mechanisms

{does not

tested”

hold}

Given that Stackelberg uses a structured model of cooperation, it
was expected that it would maintain low segregation levels as all
Knowledge Sources get an equal share, albeit in the order of their
relative strength (section 6.3). However, what emerges is a picture
of increasing Segregation over the sequence of 50 landscapes
(Figure 8-26). For all complexity values, Stackelberg does start with
low Segregation levels (at 0.45) but these continue to rise and are
seen to reach 0.8 at the end of the landscape sequence.
Considering, that Stackelberg does not perform well in dynamic
environments (Figure 8-1, Figure 8-2, Figure 8-3, Figure 8-4) its
continually changing Segregation levels suggest that it does not find
an equilibrium state of knowledge levels, at least within the test
limit of 50 landscapes. Thus, it can be concluded that this hypothesis
does not hold.
Hy 7-7

“The community transition weighted graphs for the tested
knowledge distribution mechanisms are visibly distinguishable
from each other”
The community-to-community transitions graphs for the different
distribution mechanisms are: WTD Figure 8-30, Figure 8-31, Figure
8-32, & Figure 8-33; IPD Figure 8-34, Figure 8-35, Figure 8-36 &
Figure 8-37; Stag-Hunt Figure 8-38, Figure 8-39, Figure 8-40 & Figure
8-41; and Stackelberg Figure 8-42, Figure 8-43, Figure 8-44& Figure
8-45. The chord diagrams are a reflection of the inner workings of

{holds}
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the corresponding mechanisms. These diagrams crystalize the
dynamics of the knowledge flow for each KD-A combination into a
single view. The chord diagrams show that each mechanism
operates distinctly. The patterns are very similar within a
mechanism across the different A values but quite distinct between
the mechanisms. Consequently, it is concluded this hypothesis holds
without caveats.
Hy 7-8

“The community transition weighted graphs for a tested

{does not

knowledge distribution mechanism are appreciably different for

hold}

different A values”
Hy 7-8 is related to Hy 7-7 discussed above. Here the supposition
was that the chord charts for the different A values for the same
mechanism are also visibly distinct from each other. As mentioned
in the analysis for Hy 7-7 above, this is not case. There are some
differences between the chord diagrams of the same mechanism
but in general it does not hold. The premise underlying this
hypothesis was that chord diagrams would be sensitive enough to
allow one to also distinguish the responsiveness of the mechanisms
to environmental complexity. Given that this hypothesis does not
hold, additional, more sensitive analytical methods were required to
understand the responsiveness (see Figure 8-54, Figure 8-55, Figure
8-56, and Figure 8-57).
Hy 7-9

“Community importance weights for the tested distribution
mechanisms are different from each other, reflecting their different
operational characteristics”
The page rank derived tree charts (Figure 8-46, Figure 8-48, Figure
8-49 and Figure 8-52) show that this is indeed the case. It is
expected given that Hy 7-7 was found to hold. The Page Rank data is

{holds}
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derived from the underlying data used for the chord diagrams and
so the two support each other.
Hy 7-10

“Community importance rankings for the tested distribution

{holds with

mechanisms vary by environmental complexity”

exceptions}

The parallel coordinates charts (Figure 8-47, Figure 8-50, Figure 8-51
and Figure 8-53) show that this hypothesis mostly holds but not in
all cases. Stag-Hunt’s responsiveness is not surfaced in the
corresponding parallel chords chart. In the strictest sense, this
hypothesis does not hold, however, since it is true for 3 out of the 4
cases, one can state it holds but with some exceptions. In fact, the
lack of sensitivity of the parallel chords analysis also prompted
development of additional methods to measure sensitivity.
Hy 7-11

“The tested distribution mechanisms are responsive to changes in

{holds}

environmental complexity”
This hypothesis is a direct statement relating the mechanisms’
responsiveness to A. As mentioned above, initial analytical methods
were not sensitive enough to uncover the A value relationship.
However, the explorative-exploitation community balance analysis
clearly indicates that all mechanisms show statistically significant
responses to A changes, in terms of compute resource allocations.
See Figure 8-54, Figure 8-55, Figure 8-56 and Figure 8-57. This
hypothesis holds without caveat.
Hy 7-12

“Cooperative distribution mechanisms are more responsive to

{does not

changes in environmental complexity than competitive

hold}

mechanism”
Going by the analysis presented in Figure 8-54, Figure 8-55, Figure
8-56 and Figure 8-57, this hypothesis does not hold. The most
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sensitive mechanism is the competitive mechanism WTD in terms of
the number of statistically significant changes to net flow driven by
changes in A.
Hy 7-13

“Better performing distribution mechanisms will exhibit consistent

{holds}

responses to changes in environmental complexity”
This hypothesis only holds for Stag-Hunt, which is the top
performing mechanism and shows consistent allocation changes in
response to A as seen in Figure 8-58 and Figure 8-59. The changes
are subtle but still statistically significant. While not true for all case,
this hypothesis holds for the best mechanism tested and so is
considered to hold for the purpose of this analysis.

In summary, CA knowledge distribution mechanisms that span cooperation as well as
competition perform better than the default competitive mechanism, Weighted Majority, when
faced with dynamic environments of varying complexity. However, this is not true for all such
mechanisms. The research concludes that ‘social rank’ based cooperation (IPD and Stag-Hunt)
performs significantly better overall complexity levels except non-linear (A=1). Here SHS performs
significantly better but IPD does not. While structured or oligopolistic cooperation, seen in
Stackelberg, does not perform better that WTD for all complexity levels.
The Stackelberg model works well for static environments but is not able to track changes in
dynamic environments. The rigid or centrally planned method of cooperation does not take local
knowledge into account and hence resource allocation is not optimal. Stackelberg
disproportionately allocates more resources to exploitation when compared with others.
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The Weighted Majority ‘wisdom of the crowd’ model is competitive in low complexity
environments (i.e. A=1 / linear) but then is not able to keep up with ‘social rank’ based cooperation
under IPD and Stag-Hunt, the non-linear complexities tested.
The best performing mechanism Stag-Hunt is also the most cooperative. Stag-Hunt is a
variation of IPD. Stag-Hunt is from Evolutionary Game theory while IPD is from classical Game
theory. Stag-Hunt is biased toward cooperation where IPD is biased towards defection.
Once it was clear that cooperation improves CA knowledge distribution, a new challenge was
taken up in order to test cooperative knowledge distribution in a completely different domain
from numerical optimization. The next two chapters describe the CATNeuro system that
evaluates competitive and cooperative mechanisms in relation to optimization of neural network
architectures.
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CHAPTER 9 CATNEURO – A CA-DRIVEN FRAMEWORK FOR DEEP LEARNING
9.0 Introduction
Experimental results with the Cones World show that Stag-Hunt performs well for numeric
optimization problems, especially in dynamic environments (i.e. where the optima may change
over time) as compared to the baseline CA knowledge distribution mechanism, Weighted
Majority. However, to better understand whether game-based, cooperative knowledge
distribution is indeed a robust addition to the CA family, requires additional evidence. Thus, the
CATNeuro system was constructed to test how effective cooperative knowledge distribution can
be in a domain vastly different from numerical optimization. The CATNeuro system optimizes the
structure and parameters of deep learning models using an implementation of Cultural Algorithms
adapted for such a task. CATNeuro can be configured to use either Stag-Hunt or Weighted
Majority distribution mechanism.
Contemporary deep learning models are multi-layered directed graphs (quite different from
traditional multi-layer perceptrons) (Goodfellow, Bengio, & Courville, 2016). Many times, it is not
clear what is the best architecture for a given problem. Researchers often spend many months
trying to find the optimal architecture. CATNeuro can assist researchers in optimizing deep
learning model structures by performing an intelligent search in this space. At the very least
CATNeuro can out point out promising candidate architectures that researchers can investigate
further.
As noted earlier, Cultural Algorithms are better suited to problem solving in complex
environments (Figure 1-1) because the CA stores and uses more information than other
evolutionary optimization methods. CA information overhead can be amortized better when
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working with problems in complex domains. Deep learning model optimization is a very complex
problem. The training time for a single model is in the order of minutes (if not hours) and therefore
any CA information overhead is miniscule by comparison.
This chapter describes the CATNeuro system and the experimental framework used to evaluate
the effectiveness of CATNeuro with Stag-Hunt and WTD for deep learning model optimization.
Stag-Hunt was selected since it was the best performing cooperative mechanism and WTD was to
baseline its performance.
The test bed problem selected is the construction of a deep learning model that can be used
as a controller to play a fighting video game. Section 9.1 provides an overview of the FightingICE
game system used for evaluating CATNeuro. Section 9.2 gives an overview of a neuro-evolution
methodology named NEAT that provides the inspiration for the CATNeuro search mechanism. The
detailed description of the CATNeuro system is provided in 9.3. Section 9.5 details the mechanism
used to train the controller, which relies partly on ideas from the reinforcement learning
literature. They are used to generate the training data for the neural network. The training
regimen is described in 9.6. Section 9.7 describes the experimental framework used to evaluate
the performance of Stag-Hunt and Weighted Majority distribution mechanisms for optimization
in the space of neural network architectures. The experimental results are analyzed in Chapter 10.

9.1 ICE Competition Fighting Game
The FightingICE is a research test bed for AI maintained by Intelligent Computer Entertainment
(ICE) Lab, Ritsumeikan University, Japan. ICE holds an annual competition for competing AI
controllers (Fighting Game AI Competition, 2018). The game is a 2D street fighting game (Figure
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9-1). Each player has 56 actions available that it can play from. The actions are a mix of offense,
defense and positioning moves.

Figure 9-1: ICE competition fighting game screen capture

The game controller must supply one of the 56 actions when requested by the game
framework. The game framework provides access to the game state but its delayed by 15 frames.
States for both players are provided by the game framework. The AI for the controller is a function
that essentially maps the game state (current and historical) to an action.
The game is fast paced so decisions have to be supplied in a timely manner. The rules of the
games are somewhat complex. The hits between players transfer energy from one player to
another. Stored energy can be used to throw projectiles with greater damage potential. It takes a
while for human player to master the game.
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The championship winning AIs are coded by human experts who understand the game well.
They know how to exploit different situations in the game and make moves that are precisely
timed. As per current knowledge no purely machine learned AI has been able to beat a human
developed AI.
The controller framework developed to play the game accepts a deep learning model that
conforms to certain specifications for input and output. The input to the model is 72x1 vector that
represents current and historical game state (Table 9-2). The output is a 56x1 vector that
represents a probability distribution over the 56 actions. At each frame, the controller calls the
configured model with the state vector and samples from the output distribution to select the
action to play.
The CA-driven controller is played against two types of opponents that are described below:
•

Jerry Mizuno AI (JM) – is an AI controller supplied with the FightingICE. It is a AI developed
by academics at Ritsumeikan University (which is the home of FightingICE). JM uses a
combination of K Nearest Neighbors (KNN) and fuzzy logic (Chu & Thawonmas, 2017). It
can be considered a benchmark AI where the fighting decisions are mostly made
algorithmically.

•

2018 champion called “Thunder”. Thunder is a championship level AI that is very advanced
(FightingICE 2018 Championship Results). It was developed by (presumably) an expert
human player and programmer Eita Aoki who seemingly is well aware of the game rules.
Thunder is fast and seems to exhibit high-level strategies (e.g. has offense and defense
modes). It also exploits specific game situations like pinning the opponent in a corner with
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repeated, strikes. It was not expected that the controller would be able to beat this
champion. However, playing against a strong player is good for differentiating between
the performances of the underlying models more precisely. As developed, the
reinforcement learning based CATNeuro AI controller learns from observation. Specific
game rules were not encoded into the controller (i.e. the controller is not model based).
In general, it is difficult for a purely AI-driven approach to infer specific game rules given
limited computed resources.
The CATNeuro system is configured to evolve models that conform to the input/output
requirements of the controller framework. The system is free to structure the model however as
long the input/output constraints are not violated. Also, the graph sizes of the various populations
(Blueprint and Modules) are limited so that overly large models are not produced through the
process of graph evolution.
To evolve the deep learning models, training data is required. The training data should conform
to the input/output specification – i.e. input should be a 72x1 vector and output a 56x1 vector.
The construction of the training data is an involved process that takes a day or two to complete
and is comprised of several steps. The next section provides a brief overview of Reinforcement
Learning that is the basis for the creation of the training data for the controller models. A more
detailed description of the process to acquire the training data in provided in section 9.5.

9.2 Neuro Evolution of Augmented Topologies (NEAT)
The NEAT methodology was developed by Stanley and Miikkulainen and is described in detail
in the NEAT paper (Stanley & Miikkulainen, 2002). NEAT is a population-based methodology
where each individual is a directed graph. The population is evolved via operations on directed
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graphs. These are described later in this section. The core idea of NEAT is to start simple and
progressively ‘complexify’ the graphs by adding nodes and connections.
The CATNeuro adaption of NEAT applies the same operations as defined by NEAT but there are
many differences between the two methodologies. Firstly, NEAT does not have a social network
that binds the population and thus has no notion of knowledge distribution or Belief Space, etc.
Secondly, the graph operations are applied randomly in NEAT where the operations are organized
under the five Knowledge Sources under CA and applied through the workings of the knowledge
distribution mechanism (see Table 2-1). Thirdly, to manage complex graph structures CATNeuro
also relies on the topological sort of the graphs whereas NEAT only uses a simpler mechanism
based on innovation numbers (Stanley, Bryant, & Miikkulainen, 2005). Fourthly, the distance
metric used to gauge similarity of any two graphs is materially different between CATNeuro and
NEAT; CATNeuro defines a graph distance metric that is finer grained than the innovation numberbased method used in NEAT.
9.2.1 Graph Operations under NEAT
The basic graph operations under NEAT are:
•

Toggle Connection

•

Add Connection

•

Add Node

•

Crossover

•

Mutate Parameter
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Each graph connection contains a Boolean switch that can be switched On or Off through
mutation. The Toggle Connection operation is demonstrated in Figure 9-2. When the switch is off,
the connection is dropped when the graph is translated into a deep learning model (described in
the next section).
Figure 9-2 (and other related figures in this section) show before and after-operation views of
graphs. The changes are highlighted in Yellow. The number associated with each connection is the
innovation number (Stanley, Bryant, & Miikkulainen, 2005). A counter is maintained that is
incremented whenever a new connection is added. The innovation number can be used to
determine the order of connections; useful for the crossover operation (described later) among
others.
Another counter is maintained for internal nodes (i.e. not input or output). This counter is
incremented whenever a new node is added. The node numbers are taken from this counter. This
is useful for knowing the order of nodes and is used to prevent cycles in the graph (among other
uses).
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Figure 9-2: Toggle connection operation - connection #1 switched off

The Add Connection operation is shown in Figure 9-3. Under this operation the graph is
mutated by adding a new connection between two previously unconnected nodes. In CATNeuro,
topological sort is performed in order to ensure that cycles are not introduced when adding a new
connection. Connections are only added from nodes earlier in the sort to those that come later.
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Figure 9-3: Add connection operation - connection #12 add between node ‘3’ and node ‘4’

The Add Node operation is demonstrated in Figure 9-4. In the Add Node operation, an existing
connection is split by adding a new node in between. However, the way this is performed is a little
involved. First a connection is chosen and it is disabled. A new node is created. Then a new
connection is added from the source of the disabled connection to the newly created node. Finally,
a connection is added form the newly created node to the target of the disabled connection. For
example, in Figure 9-4, the connection #1 between ‘1’ and ‘out’ is selected. The #1 connection is
disabled and two new connections #8 and #9 are added that connect ‘1’ and ‘out’ via the new
node ‘5’. Connections are referred to with hash followed by number (e.g. #1) and nodes with
number within single quotes (e.g. ‘3’).
Finally, the Crossover operation is demonstrated in Figure 9-5. Here two graphs are merged
into a single graph. The merge operation orders the connections of both graphs by innovation
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numbers. A merge operation is performed that keeps the common connections from both but
adds any differences from either graph. Finally, any cycles that could have been introduced are
removed.

Figure 9-4: Node add operation - node ‘5’ was added between node ‘1’ and node ‘out’ while the existing connection between
‘1’ and ‘out’ was toggled off
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Figure 9-5: Crossover graph operation - merges two graphs

The Mutate Parameter does not modify the structure of the graph but changes some property
of one of the non-input nodes. The properties these nodes can hold are discussed in the next
section. The NEAT inspired graph operations are the basis of the graph evolution under CATNeuro,
however there are many other operational details for CATNeuro that are covered next.

9.3 CATNeuro System
CATNeuro is actually an ensemble of populations. Each individual in every population contains
a directed graph. These are evolved via the graph operations described earlier. A population is a
species unto itself. Speciation is used to protect and nurture individuals so that they are not
eliminated too early from the pool (Howard & Berlocher, 1998). One population is for Blueprint
individuals and the rest for Modules - a concept taken from the “CoDeepNEAT” system
(Miikkulainen, et al., 2017).
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The Blueprint individuals define the macro structure of a deep learning model graph. Each
internal node of the Blueprint individual is replaced with the graph of an individual selected from
one of the Module species – when the Blueprint is ‘assembled’ just prior to evaluation. An example
of such a structure is given in Figure 9-6. The process of assembly is explained later in this section.
Blueprint internal nodes reference Module species – i.e. they contain the id of one of the
available Module species that the CATNeuro is configured to run with. Under the Mutate
Parameter operation, this id is modified to point to one of the available Module species.
The internal nodes of Module graphs refer to deep learning operations, e.g. Dense Layer,
Normalization layer, etc. (Goodfellow, Bengio, & Courville, 2016). Under the Mutate Parameter
operation the parameters of the operation are modified. For example, for the Dense layer, the
number of dimensions are evolved; for the Normalization layer the type of normalization is chosen
from either Batch Normalization (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015) or Layer Normalization (He, Zhang, Ren,
& Sun, 2015); etc.. A randomly selected deep learning operation is assigned to a new node when
it is created for a Module individual. Thereafter only the parameters are evolved.
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Figure 9-6: Two-level graph – ‘Blueprint’ outer graph with embedded ‘module species’ subgraphs – blueprint and species
populations are evolved separately

There is no limit to the number of module species. (For the CATNeuro experiment conducted
in this research, three module species were used).
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The input and output nodes of the Blueprint species individual’s graph are configured to be the
input and output required for the task at hand. For example, if the task is binary classification of
images then the input node would represent the dimensions of the input images, e.g. 224x224x3
for width x height x number of colors. And the output node would be a 2x1 vector (for the two
classes). The system allows for multiple input nodes but is restricted to a single output node.
The input and output nodes for a Module individual’s graph are just connectors. When a
Blueprint is assembled, its each of its internal nodes is replaced by a randomly selected Module
individual’s graph from the Module species that the Blueprint node points to. The input and
output nodes of the selected Module individual’s graph respectively connect to all the incoming
and outgoing connections of the replaced Blueprint node. In Figure 9-6, input nodes are
represented by ellipses with single line borders and output nodes by ellipses with double-lined
borders. The Blueprint node ‘14’ has the incoming connection #17 that is stipulated to connect to
‘1’ input node of the embedded Module individual. Similarly, the ‘3’ output node of the embedded
Module individual is stipulated to connect to #16 – the outgoing connection for Blueprint node
‘14’.
Following CoDeepNEAT (Miikkulainen, et al., 2017), all Blueprint nodes that point to the same
species are replaced with the same randomly selected individual from that Module species. Many
recent advances in deep learning are attributed to cellular or modular structures that are used
repeatedly in the network (Szegedy, et al., 2015) (He, Zhang, Ren, & Sun, 2015). The use of
Modules is there to help find such modular structures. Such structures control the unconstrained
growth of the neural networks. In addition they can be used to grow or shrink the network capacity
by adding or removing such units.
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Before a Blueprint individual can be evaluated, it has to be assembled. A Blueprint individual’s
internal nodes are replaced with selected Module individuals to obtain a structure called Network
Assembly. The Network Assembly is translated into a deep learning model for a particular library
(e.g. Tensorflow, PyTorch, CNTK, etc.). The translation of a Network Assembly to a deep learning
model for a specific library is performed by a configurable component called Evaluator.
When CATNeuro is initialized for a particular task it is configured with an Evaluator. A Network
Assembly is an abstract representation of a deep learning model. The job of the Evaluator is to
convert that into a concrete model; train the model using whatever training data the Evaluator is
configured with; and return the training loss and model size (Figure 9-7).
The CATNeuro system is multi-objective since it trades off performance (training loss) against
the model size (number of parameters in the model). The pareto ranking function is also a
pluggable component. It can be chosen to suite the task at hand. The ‘fitness’ associated with each
individual is a 2x1 vector (for loss and size). By contrast the individual fitness is a single number
CATGame.
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Figure 9-7: Translate Network Assembly to concrete model and train using training data

After all Network Assemblies have been evaluated, the fitness is assigned as follows:
•

Blueprint individuals are assigned fitness values (loss and model size) returned from the
Evaluator

•

Module individuals are assigned the average fitness (loss and model size) of all the
Blueprint individuals where they were used

By using average fitness for Module individuals, the individuals are protected and not
eliminated too early in the process. After evaluation and fitness assignment each population is
evolved following the standard process (Chapter 2):
•

Induct top individuals into the Belief Space via the Acceptance function

•

Update the Belief Space with the Update function

•

Distribute knowledge in the population network and evolve each individual via the
assigned Knowledge Source – in the Influence function
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The Belief Space and any other internal state needed to evolve populations is maintained
separately for each population. In addition, CATNeuro maintains the top n Network Assemblies
discovered thus far. The multi-objective ranking of Network Assemblies is done with the
configured ranking function. Each Network Assembly contains enough information to be
translatable into a deep learning model when required. The output of the CATNeuro systems is
the ranked list of best Network Assemblies when it stops. The procedure for running CATNeuro is
as follows:
1. Construct Network Assemblies
2. Evaluate Network Assemblies
3. Check for termination condition
4. If terminating then stop else
a. evolve populations to obtain new generations
b. go to 1
The termination condition may be a MAX number of generations or it could be an expression
such as “stop when no improvement is found in x generations”.
The Knowledge Sources operate somewhat differently in CATNeuro than in CATGame. Each
Knowledge Source has two associated functions: acceptance for the induction of the knowledge
from the population space; and influence for the impartation of knowledge to the next generation.
Under CATNeuro, the Knowledge Sources conceptually are the same as for CATGame but the
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implementation can be very different, especially for the influence function. The influence and
acceptance functions for CATNeuro Knowledge Sources are discussed next.
9.3.1 Influence Functions
In numeric optimization problems there is generally good locality – i.e. small changes in
parameter values lead to correspondingly small changes in fitness. The exploration-exploitation
balance requires some underlying idea of locality to be meaningful. The cooperative knowledge
distribution of Stag-Hunt is quite reliant on balancing exploration with exploitation. Such locality
is harder to establish for graph evolution since the changes that are discreet. For example, adding
a new connection may potentially make a big difference to the fitness of the model. However, in
general one would expect adding a connection to be more disruptive than say toggling a
connection; adding a node to be more disruptive than adding a connection; and so on.
Using a probabilistic notion of locality, the available graph operations are associated with
Knowledge Sources with weight distributions (see Table 9-1). The Knowledge Sources can thus be
ranked on the explorative-exploitative scale. Exploitative Knowledge Sources (e.g. History) are
biased towards selecting graph operations that will make relatively less disruptive changes. The
Knowledge Source influence function samples from the associated distribution to select an
operation to apply when modifying a population individual. The explorative-exploitative ranking
in CATNeuro however is different from that in CATGame. For example, Normative knowledge is
considered exploitative in CATNeuro – unlike in CATGame – as it does not modify the graph
structure; it only modifies the parameters of the graph nodes or some meta parameters
associated with Blueprint individuals, such as the learning rate used for neural network training.
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Table 9-1: Knowledge Source Mapping to Graph Operations with Associated Weights

KNOWLEDGE SOURCE

MUTATION SELECTION POLICY

HISTORY

SITUATIONAL

DOMAIN

TOPOGRAPHICAL

NORMATIVE

The weights associated with each KS are normalized into true probabilities before sampling for
a graph operation. The unnormalized weights are easier to modify when tuning them by hand.
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The weights were selected with limited empirical testing. Future work will include focus on better
turning of the weights by training networks across a variety of tasks.
The CATNeuro populations can be configured with some restrictions. The number of nodes can
be restricted so the graph does not grow beyond a certain size. For Module species, restricting
graph size is desirable so modular components remain small and reusable and not become too
specialized. When a graph reaches the allowed maximum size, the Add Node operation is removed
from the probability distribution of actions (Table 9-1) so that a different operation is selected
instead. The CATNeuro population also can be restricted to use only a subset of the graph
evolution operations. This is done in the case of small Module populations so resources are
focused on more fruitful regions of the search space.
9.3.2 Acceptance Functions
The induction of knowledge from the population space into the Belief Space is conceptually
similar to that in CATGame. Unlike the influence functions however, the acceptance functions are
generally less affected. Note that since there are multiple populations in CATNeuro the internal
state needed by Knowledge Sources to operate is separate for each population. For example,
Normative knowledge maintains separate parameter densities for each population. The CATNeuro
versions of the acceptance functions for the KS are described next with differences from CATGame
highlighted.
Topographic: In CATGame, Topographic knowledge clusters individuals into promising regions
of the search space using the K-means algorithm and the Euclidean distance metric – inspired by
BSO (Shi, 2011). Topographic does the same in CATNeuro except that the distance metric used is
a specially constructed graph distance metric.
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History: History is very similar in both because it just needs to keep track of the best individuals
over time.
Normative: In CATGame Normative maintains promising ranges of numerical values. In
CATNeuro, Normative is conceptually similar but the implementation is very different. Normative
in CATNeuro needs to handle categorical (non-continuous) values in many cases (e.g. Module
species ids). Since there is no natural ordering for ids, the concept of range does not apply.
Normative knowledge instead maintains probability densities for the parameters it tracks. When
it needs to evolve parameters, Normative samples from spin wheels for categorical parameters
and Kernel Density estimates for continuous parameters (Cosma Shalizi CMU, 2009) (see Figure
9-8).

Figure 9-8: Examples of probability densities maintained by Normative knowledge for two types of parameters

The probability values are calculated by incorporating the fitness (training loss only) of the best
performing individuals across generations. Normative uses this data for the Mutate Parameter
graph operation. However, with some probability, this operation may also be performed by other
KS (History and Situational). Normative thus share’s its internal state with other KS so that they
are able to apply the Mutate Parameter operation as well. The density estimates are maintained
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by the aforementioned innovation numbers. Recall that each connection in the graph is assigned
an innovation number; it is a global, monotonically increasing value. As a graph evolves the added
innovation numbers stay the same and therefore can be used as anchors for pinning density
estimates to. Each estimate applies to the target of the corresponding connection. For example,
if the target is a node that references modules (in Blueprints) then the density estimates are for
module ids. These estimates are only sampled when there are enough samples available. Real
valued parameters (e.g. learning rate) are sampled using the Gaussian kernel with bandwidth
1

equal to 10 𝑡ℎ the configured range of the parameter. For discrete valued parameters, the system
maintains non-zero probabilities for all cases so that there is always some chance of selecting any
available case.
Situational: Situational maintains a list of top n exemplars in both CATNeuro and CATGame.
Domain: In CATNeuro, when Domain modifies an individual under its influence, it can either
mutate the graph of the individual in question or replace its graph with the mutated graph of a
randomly selected top performer. NEAT is greedy so Domain propagates the current generation
top performers with a configured probability. Thus, Domain inducts the current generation top
performers in CATNeuro. In CATGame, Domain does not maintain any state as it uses parameter
slopes for influence that are calculated at the time the influence function is applied.
9.3.3 Knowledge Distribution
Knowledge distribution in CATNeuro is similar to that in CATGame. Weighted Majority uses an
algorithm that for all practical purposes is the same as for CATGame (see 3.2). The Stag-Hunt
distribution is slightly different. Due to a stricter requirement around ranking of Knowledge
Sources from exploitative to explorative. In the CATNeuro adaption of Stag-Hunt there are p
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cooperative generations followed by one evaluative one. In a cooperative generation individual 𝑖
behaves cooperatively. In an evaluative generate 𝑖 behaves individualistically.
Considering the cooperative case, as before (section 3.2) 𝐾 is the set of KS; 𝑖 indexes the
population; and 𝑗 indexes 𝑖′𝑠 neighbors; 𝐹 = {𝑟|𝑟 ∈ ℝ} is set of real numbers and 𝐹𝑖 ⊆ 𝐹 =
{𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖1 , 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖2 , … , 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗 , … } be the fitness of 𝑖 ′ 𝑠 neighbors in the current generation. 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 ∶
ℝ × 𝐹 → ℤ is function that returns ‘social’ rank of 𝑖 based on its and neighbors’ fitness values;
𝑠𝑟𝑖 = 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖 , 𝐹𝑖 ). Let 𝑃: 𝐾 → ℤ be a probability distribution where ∑𝑘∈𝐾 𝑃(𝑘) = 1.
Also, 𝐾𝑆𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 ∶ ℤ → 𝑃 return a probability distribution over K given a rank. In CATNeuro the
Knowledge Source assigned is sampled from the returned probability distribution; defined as
𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒: 𝑃 → 𝐾. The probabilities are constructed so that a low rank will return a probability
distribution that is biased towards explorative Knowledge Sources. And vice-a-versa for a high
rank. Since Knowledge Sources are not deterministically explorative or exploitative due to poor
locality of graph operations, the knowledge assignments are done probabilistically to compensate.
The new KS assigned to 𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒(𝐾𝑆𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 (𝑠𝑟𝑖 )).
In the evaluative case, let 𝑂 = < 𝑘0 , 𝑘1 , … , 𝑘𝑛−1 > be an ordering of KS according to each’s
explorative potential; 𝑜𝑘 is offset of 𝑘 in this ordering and 𝑂[𝑞] returns the 𝑘 at offset 𝑞. Let
𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒2 , . . , 𝑒𝑔 , … index evaluative generations and 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑔 be 𝑖′𝑠 fitness in generation 𝑒𝑔 . Then,
𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑤 = {

𝑂[𝑂𝑘𝑖 − 1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛]
𝑂[𝑂𝑘𝑖 + 1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛]

𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑔 ≥ 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑔−1
.
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

If 𝑖′𝑠 fitness has improved since the previous evaluative generation then it adopts the next
most exploitative KS in the ladder (and wraps around if at bottom) and vice-a-versa. Here 𝑖 acts
alone without considering it’s neighbors. The mechanism thus associates more explorative
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strategies to comparatively underperforming individuals (as compared to its neighbors) and vicea-versa. The exploration-exploitation balance is performed using the local signal of ‘social’ rank.
In summary, the CATNeuro system optimizes in the space of directed graphs where CATGame
searches in a real-valued hyperspace. CATNeuro utilizes speciation through multiple populations.
By contrast CATGame uses a single population. There are many other differences between the
two systems. However, the knowledge distribution mechanisms are largely similar between the
two and operate on the same principles. Stag-Hunt was seen to perform well against a complex,
dynamic environment. Now it is put to test for a hierarchically complex optimization problem. The
performance of Stag-Hunt in a different domain will provide further insights into whether
cooperative mechanisms are indeed beneficial for problem solving in highly complex domains. The
performance of Weighted Majority and Stag-Hunt distribution systems are compared on the
optimization of deep learning model for a controller to play a fighting game. The fighting game
used for the experiment is described in the next section.

9.4 A Brief Overview of Reinforcement Learning
The deep learning model used for the ICE game controller has to be trained to play the game
effectively and for this significant amount of training data is required. The most relevant discipline
for creating data for such a task is the field of Reinforcement Learning (RL). RL is a form of machine
learning that fits between supervised learning and unsupervised learning. In RL an agent interacts
with the world or environment to achieve a goal. The agent:
a. Has a capacity to take actions that affect the environment
b. Can observe or receive feedback from the environment
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c. Is motivated to achieve a high-level goal through a reward structure
For the ICE game, the agent would be the deep learning model (embedded in the controller
application). The model selects an action to take after observing the state of the game at every
time step. The goal is to win each round by trying to land the maximum number of hits on the
opponent while protecting oneself from being hit. Such a setup is labeled a Markov Decision
Process (MDP) (also Markov Reward Process) (Kober, Bagnell, & Peters, 2013) and is commonly
used in the field of robotics, multi-agent systems, games and control applications.
An MDP is a 4-tuple (S, A, R, P) where:
•

𝑆 = 𝑎 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠

•

𝐴 = 𝑎 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠

•

𝑅 ∶ 𝑆 𝐴 𝑥 × 𝑆 → ℝ 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

•

𝑃: 𝑆 × 𝐴 × 𝑆 → [0,1]𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦

A policy Π: S × A → ℝ is the probability of tacking action 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 when in state 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, i.e.
Π(𝑠, 𝑎) = 𝑃(𝑎|𝑠).. In most scenarios, the rewards associated with future time steps is discounted
by a discounted by a discount factor Υ ∈ [0, 1). The value function V is the expected sum of future
rewards given an MDP and policy Π and is defined as:
Value function:

∞
𝝅

𝑽 = 𝑬 [∑ 𝚼𝒕 𝒓𝒕 |𝒔𝟎 = 𝒔]

Eq 9-1

𝒕=𝟎

The goal of Reinforcement Learning is to find the optimal policy 𝜋 ∗ that maximizes the
expected sum of future rewards. There are a wide variety of settings and algorithms that can be
use to achieve the optimum policy (Sutton & Barto, 2018).
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Reinforcement Learning is a vast subject that has a long history (Sutton & Barto, 2018). It has
recently resurged in popularity due to high profile achievements such as beating the world
champion Lee Sedol at the game of Go (Silver, et al., 2017).
Figure 9-9 is a partial taxonomy of RL algorithms. In model-based algorithms the agent is either
given a model or learns a model of the environment and then operates accordingly to interact
with the world. A recent example is the AlphaZero (Schrittwieser, et al., 2019) model from Google
Deep Mind that is a successor to AlphaGo noted earlier. AlphaZero is programmed with explicit
rules of the game Go.

Figure 9-9: A partial taxonomy of Reinforcement Learning algorithms

Model-free algorithms don’t have to construct a model of the world but instead focus on what
action to take in a given state, to progress towards the goal. Model-free can be divided into value-
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based and policy-based. Value-based methods focus on determining the value of states or stateaction pairs from which an optimal policy can be derived as in Eq 9-1. Policy-based methods
instead learn the policy directly from experience obtained in interacting with the environment. In
some situations, the number of states or state-action pairs is prohibitively large and its not feasible
use value-based methods. RL is an active area of research. The seminal policy optimization
approach named VPG for (vanilla) Policy Gradient, was introduced by Sutton et al. in 1999
(Sutton, McAllester, Singh, & Mansour, 1999). Since then many variations and improvements have
been developed such as Trust Region Policy optimization (TRPO) (Schulman, Levine, Moritz,
Jordan, & Abbeel, 2015) and Proximal Policy optimization (PPO) (Schulman, Wolski, Dhariwal,
Radford, & Klimov, 2017).
For completeness, it should be mentioned that the so-called Actor-Critic methods combine
features of policy and value based approaches together for Reinforcement Learning (Konda &
Tsitsiklis, 2002).
One recent breakthrough was in 2015 when Deep Mind published deep Q-network (DQN)
(Mnih, et al., 2015) that achieved human-level performance on Atari games. DQN used a valuebased method called Q-learning (Sutton & Barto, 2018) but with a deep neural network to
approximate the value function. The term Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) is used when a
deep neural network is exploited to approximate the value or policy function. DRL has reenergized the field of Reinforcement Learning. Other recent development in Deep RL algorithms
are Hindsight Experience Replay (HER) (Andrychowicz, et al., 2017) and BEAR (Kumar, Fu, Tucker,
& Levine, 2019).
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The next section describes the Reinforcement Learning based strategy used for creating the
training data for the evolution of FightingICE controllers.

9.5 Training Regime for ICE Game Controller
A policy-based RL approach is followed for training data creation. (As an aside, a value-based
approached based on Q-learning was also tried but it did not work well due to the large state
space involved).

Figure 9-10: Policy table constructed with reinforcement learning provides a mapping from game state to an action policy

Conceptually the process to acquire training data is as follows:
1. Create an empty dictionary structure (Policy Table) that maps a 72x1 vector (key) to a 56x1
vector (value) – see Figure 9-10. This table maps game state to action distribution and will
be populated as described in subsequent steps
2. Play 100 or so games using a controller that makes random moves against Thunder AI and
record raw game frames (non-pixel data only) to obtain a large collection of realistic game
states. Here P1 (player 1) is designated as the ‘controller’ player and P2 as the opponent.
Thunder AI was used as the opponent in all subsequent steps
3. Use the recorded frames to play different scenarios using the ICE provided simulator. (The
ICE game package comes with a simulator that can be used to simulate game play from
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any recorded frame; the starting frame and a sequence of actions for each of the players
is required to make use of the simulator)
4. For each scenario (recorded frame), extract the corresponding 72x1 state vector and save
that into the Policy Table mapped to a uniform 56x1 vector (i.e. any action is equally likely).
5. Play each scenario 10 times with different randomly chosen sequence of actions for P1 and
the actual recorded sequence of actions for P2
6. For each simulated play, note the score and if P1 won, update the Policy Table to increase
the probabilities of the actions taken using methods from Reinforcement Learning (Sutton
& Barto, 2018) and vice versa
7. Iterate over all of the recorded frames repeatedly until the Policy Table converges
8. The Policy Table is the training data for the neural network models
9. Train a neural network model using the previous iteration of the Policy Table. Use this
intermediate model in the controller to play and record new game frames. Now instead of
taking random actions, the actions are chosen from a model trained with the previous
iteration of the Policy Table.
10. Again, use the simulator and the newly recorded frames to update the Policy Table till it
converges. Now, instead of random actions, the actions for P1 are chosen as follows:
a. If a state has been played before, then choose actions from the current policy table
in an epsilon-greedy way. With epsilon probability (e.g. 95%) sample the current
policy associated with the state and with 1 – epsilon probability (e.g. 5% in this
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case) choose a random action. (Epsilon-greedy approach is a way to balance
exploration with exploitation).
b. Otherwise choose a random sequence of actions
11. Repeat the process starting from step #9 an additional n times to get the final Policy Table
that will be used for evaluation of the distribution mechanisms – see Figure 9-11. The
number n is chosen till there is no appreciable improvement in game play. Here it was 3
iterations of the process.
About 1GB worth of raw game frames were recorded that resulted in a Policy Table of about
1M rows – i.e. distinct states. It takes about 24 hours for the Policy Table to converge. The Policy
Table is a discrete mapping from game state to action distribution. The deep learning model
trained on the Policy Table is a continuous mapping - i.e. it can provide an action distribution even
if the input state vector does not exist in the Policy Table. The deep learning model is a highly
compressed representation of the Policy Table – it is usually less than 100KB in size. Thus, the
model is better suited for use in the controller (than the underlying table).
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Figure 9-11: AI controller is trained on saved game frames; the process is boot strapped with a random AI and iteratively
improved with better trained AIs

Table 9-2 provides the layout of the 72x1 input state vector. The information in the input vector
is the current position and speed of the two players (P1 & P2); players’ scores and energies;
whether or any attacks or projectiles are active; P2 action history; and P1 and P2 position history.
Player P1 is being controlled by the CA controller and P2 by “Thunder” AI.
The 72x1 input vector is sliced into 8 ‘semantic’ units labelled by the “Semantic unit” column
in Table 9-2. The 8 semantic units are carved up from the 72x1 vector so as to provide more
context for neural network architecture selection. In deep learning models, one type of learning
is finding the right representations of the input data that help in solving the problem at hand.
Usually the lower layers of the network process raw input and find embeddings (Roweis & Saul,
2000) that capture the semantics of the input in some abstract manner. Dividing up the input into
logical sections should help this process. A minimal neural network architecture structure with the
8 semantic inputs is shown in Figure 9-12.
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Table 9-2: Policy Table Input State Layout Structure

Offset

Description

Semantic unit

0,1

P1 x y position

s1

2,3

P1 speedX speedY

s1

4

P1 energy level

s1

5,6,7,8

P1 state: air | stand | crouch | down

s1

9,10

P1 attack: speedX speedX

prj1

11,12

P1 attack: settingSpeedX settingSpeedY

prj1

13

P1 attack: is_projectile

prj1

14

P1 attack: is_active

prj1

15

P1 attack: is_downProp

prj1

16,17,18,19

P1 attack: 4 attack types (THROW_A, THROW_B,

prj1

THROW_HIT, THROW_SUFFER)
20

P1 action: 1 of 56 actions

a1

21-41

P2 state – repetition of P1 state

s2; prj2; a2

42-47

P2 6 historical actions

a2

48-59

P1 last 6 x,y positions

posH1

60-71

P2 last 6 x,y positions

posH2
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Figure 9-12: Graphical structure of a minimal model – 8 ‘semantic’ inputs, 1 intermediate node and 1 output node

In order to construct the Policy Table, the raw game frames are read in sequence. A sliding
window of 10 frames is used so that an input state vector with the required history of P2 actions
can be constructed Figure 9-13.
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Figure 9-13: Reinforcement learning process to learn policy for discrete states

The simulator can be configured to simulate a given number of frames starting from the
provided frame and a sequence of actions for both players. A sequence of 3 actions for each player
are simulated for 100 frames. The time horizon for a single action is up to 20 frames so 100 frames
are sufficient to complete all 3 actions. The game is fast paced so a sequence of the next 3 actions
is sufficient time-horizon for action planning. The simulator completes one action before choosing
the next action in the given sequence. The action sequence for P2 is taken from the raw game
frames. The action sequence for P1 are either randomly generated or based on the currently
available Policy Table.
The final Policy Table is the data for neural network training. A series of candidate models are
generated with CATNeuro – configured to run with each of the distribution mechanisms – and
tested in the controller. This process is explained next.
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9.6 Neural Architecture Search with CATNeuro
A deep learning model trained from the Policy Table is a compact representation of the Policy
Table. It is faster to use; much more compact; and supports mapping from any game state even if
the state does not exist in the Policy Table. Therefore, using a derived model is better for game
play than using the underlying table directly. If the state space of a game is small or can be
discretized effectively than a Policy Table would be a good choice but here that is not the case.
With most deep learning models, it is not clear what is the right architecture at the outset.
Discovering an architecture is a time-consuming process that involves trial-and-error. A neural
architecture search tool like CATNeuro can assist by shortening the search time or freeing up
human time by substituting it with machine time.
The Evaluator component used for this task (see section 9.3) is configured to train models with
a sample of the Policy Table. This was done to shorten the training time for CATNeuro. A sample
of 130K rows was randomly selected from the full 1M row Policy Table. With the full Policy Table
this would have been very time consuming. Even with the small sample, the time to complete 6
CATNeuro runs was is in the range of 24 to 36 hours on single GPU box. A population size of 36 is
used so each generation (or time-step) requires 36 graph evolutions and subsequent translations
and training. The vast majority of the time is consumed by model training. The models have to be
trained on a Graphical Processing Unit (GPU), which is a limited resource. The current hardware
configuration is limited to a single GPU and therefore it takes 20-30 minutes per generation.
However, the training is parallelizable so each model can be concurrently trained on a separate
GPU; such a configuration, if available, would drastically reduce the time required to evolve each
generation.
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The sample Policy Table is further split 70/30 into training and evaluation sets (Figure 9-14).
This is done to prevent overfitting. The candidate models generated by CATNeuro are trained on
the training set and tested on the evaluation set. The training is done in iterations called epochs.
Each epoch is a full sweep of the training set. Each model is tested on the evaluation set after each
epoch. If the evaluation loss is higher than after a previous epoch, the training is stopped. Training
further would risk overfitting.

Figure 9-14: CATNeuro neural architecture search process

The termination condition expression is “stop if no improvement is seen in 10 generations”.
CATNeuro usually runs for 20 to 60 generations before termination.
CATNeuro is configured to output the 20 best models per run. The top 10% of the models from
each run are trained on the full Policy Table (again with 70/30 split to prevent overfitting). The
fully trained models are then tested in the controller and game statistics are recorded for
assessment and comparison. The next section describes the experimental setup in more detail.
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9.7 Experimental Setup and Evaluation Methodology for Game Controller Models
CATNeuro is run 6 times for each KD mechanism in order to evolve deep learning models using
a sample of the Policy Table for training. This process takes 2 or 3 days and therefore the sample
size was kept quite small. The training is done on an Acer Predator laptop with a mobile version
of the NVidia GTX 1080 GPU. A GPU is required for training models. The experimental parameter
settings are given in Table 9-3.
Top 10% of the models are taken from each run and trained on the full Policy Table and then
run in the controller to play against the Jerry Mizuno AI and the 2018 champion Thunder. Jerry
Mizuno is supplied by Ritsumeikan University, the maintainers of FightingICE. It is considered a
benchmark AI controller where the game decisions are made algorithmically using KNN and fuzzy
logic (Chu & Thawonmas, 2017). Pertinent data from all played games are recorded in log files.
The format of the log files is in Table 9-4. Beyond the scores for P1 (CATNeuro controller) and P2
(Jerry Mizuno and Thunder) and the number of hits to each, the log file data is also used to extract
the action distribution for P1 and P2. There are 56 actions available to the player. A more versatile
or general model will have a wider repertoire of responses and therefore should have relatively
more balanced distribution over actions. A weaker model will tend to overuse certain actions.
Therefore, the breadth of responses is an important basis of comparison for the models produced
under the two distribution mechanisms.
Table 9-3: Parameters Settings for CATNeuro Experiment

Parameter

Value

Comment
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Knowledge

Distribution

Mechanisms
Population size

Stag-Hunt
Weighted Majority (WTD)
36

For all populations
Blueprint and Modules

Network topology

Hexagonal

Number of Module species

3

Blueprint limits

20 total nodes

New nodes are not
added after this limit is
reached

Module 1 limits

3 nodes
Only

This species is meant
Mutate

Parameter to support embedding

operation allowed

functionality (Roweis &
Saul, 2000)

Module 2 and 3 limits

4 nodes

Termination condition

Stop if no improvement seen
in 10 generations

Sample size

6 per KD mechanism

6 runs of CATNeuro
for each KD mechanism
can take 24-36 hours
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Models

evaluated

with

12 per KD mechanism

game controller

The top 10% of the
models produced (i.e. 2
out of 20 * 6) from each
run were trained with
the full Policy Table and
used for testing in the
game controller

Deep learning library

Microsoft CNTK

The current Evaluator
only

supports

CNTK

(Seide & Agarwal, 2016).
Future
planned

versions
to

are

include

Tensorflow and PyTorch
Game character

Zen

For both P1 and P2

Number of games played

10

Each game has 3

per model

rounds

Table 9-4: CATNeuro Log File Format for Game Statistics

Column

Description
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P1 Action

Action taken by player 1. P1 is played by CATNeuro
controller

P1 Last Hit Frame

Frame number of when P1 was last hit

P1 Score

P1 score (also called HP)

P1 Eng

P1 energy level

P2 Action

Action taken by P2. P2 is played by 2018 champion
“Thunder” AI or “Jerry Mizuno”

P2 Last Hit Frame

Frame number of when P2 was last hit

P2 Score

P2 score

P2 Eng

P2 energy level

9.7.1 Basic Performance Analysis
The log file data is aggregated to measure the basic game performance of the models produced
by the two KD mechanisms against each of the two opponents, Jerry Mizuno and Thunder. The
performance comparison is on the basis of:
•

Hits landed on opponent aggregated across all models and by best model by KD

•

Hits received from opponent aggregated across all models and by best model by KD

•

Relative score (player score – opponent score)

Statistical tests for difference in means are performed by calculating the mean standard
deviations of the values on a per round basis. Each round is an independent game segment. The
number of rounds per each KD-opponent combination is 360, sufficient for statistical testing.
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9.7.2 Relative Action Distribution Analysis
Figure 9-15 is an example of a 100% stacked column chart that puts the relative action
distribution of two hypothetical distribution mechanisms head-to-head. In this example, KD1 has
higher penetration in 3 of the 4 actions shown and therefore is the mechanism that produces
more versatile models. The relative action distribution charts provide a view into how different
the strategies of the two players are, on a relative basis.

Relative Action Distribution
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Action 1

Action 2
KD 1

Action 3

Action 4

KD 2

Figure 9-15: Hypothetical relative action distribution between two models of two distribution mechanisms

The relative action distribution analysis is a view into the high-level strategies adopted by the
opposing players. It does not convey the repeated sequence of actions or ‘combos’ that may be
prevalent in the attendant strategies. For this, combo analysis was performed which is now
explained.
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9.7.3 Combo Analysis
The main idea is to find sequences of actions that match the pattern described next. Find
combinations of 3 distinct actions done in a sequence where the number of frames does not
exceed 30 between the 1st and 2nd actions & 2nd and 3rd actions. Such sequences are classified as
combos. The limit of 30 frames is taken from the FightingICE game documentation. Hits landed
with 30 frames of each other are considered together and can boost the score beyond the sum of
the individual hit scores. An example is AIR_A → AIR → AIR_DA. It is two air attacks interspaced
with the AIR action.
The individual combos are then aggregated into higher level patterns to reduce the data
complexity and ease analysis. Each action is either offensive (O), defensive (D) or tactical (T).
(Tactical actions are positioning actions, such as jump, forward walk, etc.). Each combo is binned
into a category defined by the permutation of the letters from the set {‘O’, ‘D’, ‘T’}. Hence the OTD
category will contain all combos that have the [offense] → [defense] → [tactic] pattern.
Permutations where all categories are the same (e.g. OOO) are excluded from consideration.
For each category the counts are determined by round. The data is then aggregated to find
mean and standard deviation for each category and KD mechanism over the 360 rounds. This data
then is used to compare the two KD mechanisms using statistical testing and data visualization.
9.7.4 Model Properties
In addition to the log file data, the properties of the models produced by each of the
mechanism are also analyzed. The CATNeuro system is configured to output the best 20 models
found during a run. Only the best 2 are used in the controller for game play. However, all 20 are
analyzed with respect to structural and other properties to gain further insight into the operation
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of the tested distribution mechanisms. With 6 runs, there are 6*20=120 models available per
mechanism. The aggregated properties of each mechanism’s models are compared and
contrasted. These properties are described in Table 9-5.
Table 9-5: Model Properties Analyzed

Model metric

Comments

Training Loss

The training loss returned by the Evaluator after training
the model. For the task at hand, loss is the mean squared
error between the model output and ground truth from the
training data. It is the 1st value in the fitness vector

Number

of

parameter

weights

The total number of weights in the deep learning model
that are optimized in the training. This a measure of model
size. It is the 2nd value in the fitness vector

Number of nodes

The total number of nodes in the model produced. It
includes the input and output nodes of the Blueprint
individual and all of the embedded Module individuals. It is
another measure of model size.

Maximum path length

The length of the maximum path from the input to the
output. The maximum lengths of the module subgraphs in
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the path are included in the path length. It is another
measure of model size – the depth of the model.
Number of edges

The total number of edges in the graph including those
in embedded Module subgraphs. It is another measure of
model size

Generations to discovery

The number of generations the after which a ‘best’
model was discovered. As noted earlier, a CATNeuro run
stops when no improvement is discovered for 10
generations. A mechanism that is continually able to find
frequent improvements will have ‘best’ models that are
found in later generations as it will tend to run for longer.
This is an metric is an important measure of KD
performance.

Due to the number of samples possible, statistical testing is used to make judgements about
the differences in parameters listed in Table 9-5. However, an alternative approach is to visually
compare the probability densities instead (Cosma Shalizi CMU, 2009).
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Figure 9-16: Sample probability density comparison chart

A hypothetical example of such a chart is shown in Figure 9 14. This chart can be used to
compare the distributions of the same parameter type for two different groups. Each density
curve can be thought of as a smoothed version of a histogram. In the example chart, the KD1
distribution (Blue) is clearly shifted to the right and seems to be flatter. And KD2’s distribution is
peakier and shifted to the left. X-axis has the values of the parameter type that is being compared.
Y-axis is the probability. The area of each curve will sum to 1.0. This chart is a useful way of
understanding how the ‘mass’ of a group of values is distributed.
The parameters listed in Table 9-5 are compared with density charts similar to the example in
Figure 9-16. Conclusions about parameter differences are drawn on the basis of the density curves
associated with Stag-Hunt and WTD mechanisms.
Structural and other numeric properties of the graphical models are another quantitative way
of comparing models produced under Stag-Hunt and WTD. Since the models are directed graphs
that have a certain structure, the models can also be assessed qualitatively. The best 6 models
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associated with each mechanism are drawn with the help of the Microsoft Automated Graph
Layout Library (Microsoft Research). This tool produces graph layouts that are human readable, if
the number of nodes is less than 100 or so. The models produced from the two distribution
mechanisms are compared and assessed with respect to their visual structure.
The experimental framework discussed thus far provides a language or basis for postulating
formal hypotheses about the expected outcomes. These are posited and discussed next.
Experimental results from CATGame show that cooperative distribution allocates compute
resources more efficiently when faced with complex, dynamic environments, than the standard
CA distribution mechanism Weighted Majority. Correspondingly is it expected that cooperative
distribution will perform better in the hierarchically complex domain of neural architecture search
(Hy 9-1).
Cooperative knowledge distribution will yield more versatile models

Hy 9-1

The termination condition used does not the cap the number of generations to a fixed number.
Instead optimization is allowed to run till no improvement is detected in 10 generations. Given
that Stag-Hunt balances resources well between exploration and exploitation, it should be able to
find small improvements more frequently and should sustain search for longer (Hy 9-2).
Cooperative knowledge distribution will sustain longer search runs

Hy 9-2

Since NEAT (section 9.1) is largely an additive process it follows that the longer the search
process continues the larger the models are likely to be in terms of the number of nodes, edges,
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etc. (Hy 9-3). Many of the properties listed in Table 9-5 relate to model size – e.g. number of
nodes; number of edges; number of tunable parameters; etc. All are expected to be consistent
with respect to each other.
Longer search runs produce larger models

Hy 9-3

Given better search performance of Stag-Hunt in CATGame, it is postulated that this
mechanism will find better models in CATNeuro as well. The prima facia performance measure
under CATNeuro is the training loss. Training loss is the error between the ground truth of the
training data the output produced by the model. The game performance is a secondary measure
because the search process cannot directly optimize that. As mentioned earlier, loss is measured
as mean square error. A lower value indicates that the model is more faithfully able to match the
training data (Hy 9-4) and this is a desirable goal. One issue with neural network (and other
machine learning models) is that they can overfit the training data. To prevent overfitting, the
models are trained on the training set and then periodically evaluated on the test set. Initially loss
on the training set and the test set decrease but after a point the training loss continues to
decrease but the test loss (i.e. loss on the test set) may start to rise. Beyond that point the model
is in danger of being overfit. In CATNeuro the training is stopped when test loss starts to increase
and therefore the chance of overfit is low.
The training loss is lower for cooperative distribution mechanism

Hy 9-4
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In CATGame, the performance differential between WTD and cooperative mechanisms
widened with increasing environmental complexity (i.e. higher A-value). In CATNeuro there are
two levels of environmental complexity faced by the models – the mid-level benchmark opponent
Jerry Mizuno and the 2018 champion Thunder. It is postulated (Hy 9-5) that the cooperative
mechanism Stag-Hunt should perform better than the competitive WTD, when faced with the
more challenging opponent than when facing the benchmark AI.
Cooperative distribution performs better than competitive distribution

Hy 9-5

under more complex environmental conditions

9.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter described the CATNeuro system designed to optimize deep learning model
architectures. Partial inspiration for CATNeuro comes from the NEAT methodology for neuroevolution but the two are quite different in many important ways. For example, CATNeuro uses a
population bound with a ‘social’ network where NEAT does not. Also, being a Cultural Algorithms
system CATNeuro has a Belief Space component comprised of Knowledge Sources. The Influence
function distributes knowledge among the population. The population individuals are evolved
under the influence of the associated Knowledge Sources. By contrast, NEAT uses a randomized
greedy evolutionary strategy. The particular operations of the Knowledge Source to perform in
the space of directed graphs are also described in detail.
CATNeuro has multiple populations to support speciation. The Blueprint population is there to
evolve macro structures of the deep learning models. Modules are for the evolution of reusable,
modular or cellular components. Modules are mixed into Blueprints in order to create Network
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Assemblies that are abstract representation of models. These are then translated into concreted
models for a particular deep learning library (e.g. Tensorflow) and trained with the training data
for the optimization task. The training results provide a way of assigning fitness values to all
population individuals. The fitness values are required by CATNeuro to guide the optimization
process.
The implementations of the Stag-Hunt and Weighted Majority distribution mechanisms are
both described here for CATNeuro. In order to evaluate the performance of Stag-Hunt with
respect to WTD, the FightingICE game test bed is employed. A reinforcement learning based
method is used to create the training data required for CATNeuro optimization. The model training
regimen used is also documented. The models produced via CATNeuro runs are then used in a
game controller to play multiple games against a benchmark AI and a top-level AI that was the
2018 ICE champion. Finally, the experimental setup to compare the performances of Stag-Hunt
and WTD based models is presented to support the testing of specific hypotheses. The next
chapter analyzes the results of running CATNeuro as per the experimental framework to evolve
controller models and then using the models to play games against the selected opponent AI. Also
analyzed are the features and properties of the models produced by the two distribution
mechanisms.
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CHAPTER 10 CATNEURO KNOWLEDGE DISTRIBUTION PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
10.0 Introduction
As per the experimental framework defined in the previous chapter, CATNeuro was run 6 times
each for Stag-Hunt and WTD distribution mechanisms. The top 2 (10%) models from each run
were played against the benchmark “Jerry Mizuno” AI and the 2018 champion “Thunder” AI for
10 games each. Section 10.1 compares and analyses the performance of the Stag-Hunt and WTD
models used in game play. The data for the analysis comes from about 100mb of logged data
collected during game play. The aggregate performance over all models is discussed as well that
for best models by different metrics. Section 10.2 compares the action distribution of the Stag
Hunt and WTD players and those of the opponents when playing against the CATNeuro players.
Section 10.4 compares the properties of the models produced under the Stag-Hunt and WTD
mechanisms. Model properties are aggregated from 120 models for each mechanism (see 9.7).
Finally, section 10.5 summarizes the results of the analyses done in the prior sections of this
chapter. It also draws conclusions about the hypotheses postulated in 9.7.
Also, for demonstration purposes, the video samples of game play are available here:
•

Stag-Hunt vs Thunder: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pc4ls8MzOV4

•

Stag-Hunt vs Jerry Mizuno: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ciKTgyMKvG0

10.1 Game Performance Comparison
The aggregate game performance of the models produced by Stag-Hunt and WTD is discussed
first. Followed by performance for best models when playing Jerry Mizuno and then best models
when playing Thunder.
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10.1.1 Aggregate Model Performance Results
Aggregate results for Stag-Hunt and WTD models against Jerry Mizuno are given in Table 10-1
for hits landed on opponent and Table 10-2 for hits received from the opponent. Both Stag-Hunt
and WTD generated models perform well against the benchmark AI, Jerry Mizuno. The hits landed
by CATNeuro models is much higher than hits received. However, the models produced form both
KD mechanisms perform equally well against the opponent. There are no statistically significant
differences between the hits landed and hits received values between Stag-Hunt and WTD when
playing against Jerry Mizuno.
Table 10-1: Performance Summary - CATNeuro vs. Jerry Mizuno - Hits to Opp.

Performance Summary - CATNeuro vs. Jerry Mizuno Opp.
Average hits to opp. per round
Stag-Hunt

WTD

Avg. hits / round

25.63

25.64

Standard Deviation

4.88

4.46

Two-sample t-test p value

0.987 (samples=360)

Table 10-2: Performance Summary - CATNeuro vs. Jerry Mizuno – Hits received from Opp.

Performance Summary - CATNeuro vs. Jerry Mizuno Opp.
Average hits received from opp. per round
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Stag-Hunt

WTD

Avg hits received / round

18.57

18.51

Standard Deviation

3.52

3.56

Two-sample t-test p value

0.809 (samples=360)

The corresponding results against Thunder are given in Table 10-3 (hits-to-opponent) and Table
10-4 (hits received from opponent). Thunder is a much stronger opponent than Jerry Mizuno. Both
Stag-Hunt and WTD produced models cannot compete against Thunder. However, here Stag-Hunt
produced models perform significantly better when than the WTD produced models in terms of
the hits-to-opponent metric. The difference is statistically significant in favor of Stag-Hunt.
Table 10-3: Performance Summary - CATNeuro vs. Thunder - Hits to Opp.

Performance Summary - CATNeuro vs. Thunder Opp.
Average hits to opp. per round
Stag-Hunt

WTD

Avg hits to opp. / round

10.48

9.38

Standard Deviation

4.25

3.91

Two-sample t-test p value

0.0003 (samples=360)
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This is not case for hits received. There is no significant difference between Stag-Hunt and WTD
models for hits received from opponent Thunder.
Thunder was programmed by a human expert. It contains explicit knowledge of game rules and
can exploit specification situations in the game. Conversely, Jerry Mizuno is mostly algorithmically
driven with a combination of Fuzzy Logic and K-nearest neighbors (KNN) methods (Chu &
Thawonmas, 2017). It would be very hard for a purely AI driven approach to master the game
unless much more compute resources are deployed. As a reference, Deep Mind’s, Alpha Go used
40 days of training time to achieve a critical performance breakthrough (Deep Mind, 2017). Even
then, the system was given the rules of Go in the form of code – the AI did not learn the rules by
itself.
Table 10-4: Performance Summary - CATNeuro vs. Thunder - Hits received from Opp.

Performance Summary - CATNeuro vs. Thunder Opp.
Average hits received from opp. per round
Stag-Hunt

WTD

36.74

36.78

Standard Deviation

6.28

7.18

Two-sample t-test p value

0.9384 (samples=360)

Avg hits recv. from opp. /
round
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Each game has three rounds. The hits to/received-from results on a per round basis are given
in Table 10-5 for Jerry Mizuno and Table 10-6 for Thunder.
Table 10-5: Hits by Round – Jerry Mizuno Opp.

Hits by Round – Jerry Mizuno Opp.
Avg (Min, Max)
Type

1

2

3

Stag-Hunt hits to opp.

26 (17,43)

26 (16,36)

25 (14,36)

WTD hits to opp.

26 (14,36)

26 (15,41)

25 (15,36)

Hits t-test p-values

0.7146

0.5241

0.2969

Stag-Hunt hits recv. from

19 (12,28)

18 (9,26)

19 (6,27)

WTD hits recv. from opp.

18 (9,27)

19 (12,29)

19 (9,34)

Hits recv. t-test p-values

0.5474

0.6624

0.8028

opp.

Table 10-6: Hits by Round – Thunder Opp.

Hits by Round – Thunder Opp.
Avg (Min, Max)
Type

1

2

3
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Stag-Hunt hits to opp.

11 (4,25)

11 (2,25)

10 (1,21)

WTD hits to opp.

9 (2,22)

9 (2,19)

9 (2,21)

Hits to opp. t-test p-values

0.0195

0.0157

0.1266

Stag-Hunt hits recv. from

38 (22,53)

36 (23,59)

37 (23,53)

WTD hits recv. from opp.

37 (18,56)

37 (21,56)

37 (23,54)

Hits recv. t-test p-values

0.1948

0.1403

0.9357

opp.

The statistical test results for differences in the means between Stag-Hunt and WTD for each
round are also included in the tables. Here again Stag-Hunt performs statistically better (on a per
round basis) but only for the hits-to-opponent measure.
Another measure is the relative score – it’s the score achieved by the CATNeuro player minus
that achieved by the opponent. The relative-score distributions for Stag-Hunt and WTD are shown
in Figure 10-1 for Jerry Mizuno and Figure 10-2 for Thunder. Y-axis is probability and x-axis is the
relative-score. The distributions represent the relative-scores achieved by the Stag-Hunt and WTD
models, respectively, in the games played. The title of the chart also shows the means and the ttest for the differences between the means. For Thunder, at 17% probability of the means being
the same, it is not as significant as the p-value for hits-to-opponent metric (Table 10-3) but it is
still meaningful. With additional samples, the p-value should indicate better significance. As-is, the
relative-score is additional confirmation that when facing the stronger opponent, the Stag-Hunt
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derived models perform better than WTD derived ones. For reference, equivalent data for Jerry
Mizuno does not show statistical significance (Figure 10-1). Both approaches did well against the
AI model.

Figure 10-1: Relative-score density plot for Stag-Hunt and WTD when playing Jerry Mizuno
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Figure 10-2: Relative-score density plot for Stag-Hunt and WTD when playing Thunder

10.1.2 Best Model Performance Results for Jerry Mizuno
Best models for Stag-Hunt and WTD when playing Jerry Mizuno AI are shown in tables Table
10-7 and Table 10-8. The best models are described in terms of:
a. The number of hits to opponent
b. The relative score (player score – opp. score)
The associated graphical depictions of the neural network models for (a) are given in Figure
10-3 for WTD and Figure 10-4 for Stag-Hunt. And for (b) the corresponding models are in Figure
10-5 for WTD and Figure 10-6 for Stag-Hunt.
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The relative score is the difference between the score achieved by CATNeuro model minus that
for the opponent (Jerry Mizuno in this section). The scores are on a per round basis. As there are
three rounds per game and the ten games are played by each model, the statistics are based on a
sample size of 30.
Table 10-7: Best Model (hits to opp.) - CATNeuro vs. Jerry Mizuno Opp.

Best Model (hits to opp.) - CATNeuro vs. Jerry Mizuno Opp.
Average hits to opp. per round
Stag-Hunt

WTD

Avg hits to opp. / round

26.93

27.4

Standard Deviation

4.71

4.1

Two-sample t-test p value

0.6837 (samples=30)

Table 10-8: Best Model (relative-score) - CATNeuro vs. Jerry Mizuno Opp.

Best Model (relative-score) - CATNeuro vs. Jerry Mizuno Opp.
Relative Score = player score – opp. score
Stag-

WTD

Hunt
Relative score

25.5

10

Standard Deviation

72.57

89.3
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Two-sample t-test p value

0.4636 (samples =30)

The results for the best models, against Jerry Mizuno, do not show significant differences
between Stag-Hunt and WTD. They both do equally well. For the relative-score model, (Table 10-8)
seemingly Stag-Hunt average is quite a bit better than WTD but the difference is not statistically
significant.
In terms of the graphical models that achieve the best score by hits-to-opponent (Figure 10-3
for WTD and Figure 10-4 Stag-Hunt), the WTD model is much larger and deeper whereas the StagHunt is smaller and shallower. This is consistent with the aggregate statistics for model sizes and
depth (discussed later in section 10.4); Stag-Hunt models tend to be smaller.
The case is different for best models in terms of relative-score (Figure 10-5 for WTD and Figure
10-6 for Stag-Hunt). Here the Stag-Hunt model is larger and deeper than the equivalent WTD
model. Hits-to-opponent measures the offensive posture of the models but relative-score
measures the balance between offence and defense. A larger model make sense in that it will
retain more of the information available in the training data – especially if the training loss is also
lower, which is the case here.
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Figure 10-3: WTD vs. Jerry Mizuno best model by hits to opp. [Training Loss:1.86, Tunable Parms:8620, Nodes:24, Conns=34,
Depth=17]
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Figure 10-4: Stag-Hunt vs. Jerry Mizuno best model by hits to opp. [Training Loss:1.88, Tunable Parms:2293, Nodes:14,
Conns=14, Depth=8]
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Figure 10-5: WTD vs. Jerry Mizuno best model by relative-score [Training Loss:1.85, Tunable Parms:7744, Nodes:22,
Conns=29, Depth=11]

250

Figure 10-6: Stag-Hunt vs. Jerry Mizuno best model by relative-score [Training Loss:1.84, Tunable Parms:9636, Nodes:25,
Conns=32, Depth=14]
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10.1.3 Best Model Performance Results for Thunder
The previous section compared the best model performance results and graphical model
structures for Jerry Mizuno a benchmark AI supplied with FightingICE. This section discusses
equivalent results models for Thunder, the 2018 champion.
Results for the best models by hits-to-opponent are given in Table 10-9 and those for relativescore are in Table 10-10.
Table 10-9: Best Model (hits to opp.) - CATNeuro vs. Thunder Opp.

Best Model (hits to opp.) - CATNeuro vs. Thunder Opp.
Average hits to opp. per round
Stag-Hunt

WTD

Avg hits to opp. / round

11.6

11.17

Standard Deviation

3.52

3.49

Two-sample t-test p value

0.6339 (samples=30)

Table 10-10: Best Model (relative-score) - CATNeuro vs. Thunder Opp.

Best Model (relative-score) - CATNeuro vs. Thunder Opp.
Relative Score = player score – opp. score
StagHunt

WTD
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Relative score

-395.07

-394.37

Standard Deviation

126.03

101.87

Two-sample t-test p value

0.9812 (samples=30)

The tables show that for the best models produced by Stag-Hunt and WTD, there are no
significant differences between the equivalent models. The best models perform equally well. This
shows that WTD is able to produce good models but its less consistent than Stat-Hunt as borne
out by the aggregate results discussed earlier (Figure 10-2).
The corresponding graphical models are in Figure 10-7 (WTD for hits to opp.); Figure 10-8 (StagHunt hits to opp.); Figure 10-9 (WTD for relative-score); and Figure 10-10 (Stag-Hunt for relativescore).
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Figure 10-7: WTD vs. Thunder best model by hits to opp. [Training Loss:1.91, Tunable Parms:9619, Nodes:27, Conns=37,
Depth=9]

The equivalent graphical models for Stag-Hunt are smaller in terms of the number of tunable
parameters or weights and deeper than those for WTD. For the hits-to-opponent best models,
WTD has 9619 tunable weights and a depth of 9. By contrast, the Stag-Hunt has 9556 weights and
depth of 16. These patterns hold true for the relative-score best models. This shows that StagHunt is able to produce smaller (but deeper models) than WTD, that perform equally well against
the opponent.
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Figure 10-8: Stag-Hunt vs. Thunder best model by hits to opp. [Training Loss:1.85, Tunable Parms:9556, Nodes:27, Conns=39,
Depth=16]
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Figure 10-9: WTD vs. Thunder best model by relative-score [[Training Loss:1.85, Tunable Parms:7744, Nodes:22, Conns=29,
Depth=11]
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Figure 10-10: Stag-Hunt vs. Thunder best model by relative-score [Training Loss:1.81, Tunable Parms:4925, Nodes:26,
Conns=39, Depth=16]
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This section compared the aggregate and best model performances of the models produced
by the two KD mechanisms. Both the game scores and the graphical model were compared. The
next section compares the action distributions of the Stag-Hunt and WTD models used for game
play.

10.2 Action Distribution Comparison
As described in section 9.1, the controller in the FightingICE game can chose from of one of 56
actions. The actions can be classified as offense, defense or positioning (tactical movement). Not
all actions are necessarily played by all controllers. This section compares the action distributions
in a “head-to-head” manner for the Stag-Hunt and WTD models used in game play. Two
perspectives can be taken a) the action distribution of the CATNeuro players when they are playing
against the same opponent and b) the action distribution of the opponent when playing Stag-Hunt
vs when playing WTD.
For both mechanisms, the distribution over actions is quite uneven (i.e. the frequencies of the
actions vary considerably) and raw counts or histograms are not very informative. The projection
of the same data on a head-to-head basis (see Figure 10-11 for an example) is easier to use for
analysis and insights. The action distributions add to the understanding of players’ skill in the sense
that a more skillful player will display a greater variety of actions. The presentations of the data in
this way is labelled “relative action distribution”. Note that the data is just what side (top or
bottom) plays the action higher number of times. If the corresponding colored bar crosses over
the green line in the middle, it means that the count is higher for that side. The charts are relative,
i.e. they are do not denote absolute counts; an action may only be played a few times by each
player or 100’s of times during the course of a round in the game. This limits the usefulness of the
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charts but even so some insights can be obtained. Such charts make the comparison easier as the
frequency of actions between the two players can be directly compared.
The relative lengths of the colored bars can be used to visually judge the relative difference
between the counts of the corresponding action. However, a simpler metric is the count of bars
of one color that are longer than opposing bars of the other color. Such counts are given in the
title area of each relative action distribution chart. Again, referring to Figure 10-11, the number of
actions where Stag-Hunt dominates is 29. The corresponding value for WTD is 24. This metric will
be referred to several times in the following analysis so its best to give a name. Let it be HAC for
“higher action count” so HAC for Stag-Hunt is 29 and that for WTD is 24 in Figure 10-11. The
relative action distributions for the Jerry Mizuno and Thunder are discussed separately next.
10.2.1 Action Distributions – Jerry Mizuno
This section discusses the relative action distributions for the CATNeuro players vs. Jerry
Mizuno for both a) aggregated across all models; b) for best models for Stag-Hunt and WTD with
respect to hits-to-opponent; and c) for best models with respect to relative-score.

259

Figure 10-11: Jerry Mizuno - Relative Action distribution Stag-Hunt vs. WTD for Player Actions
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Figure 10-12: Jerry Mizuno - Relative Action distribution Stag-Hunt vs. WTD for Opponent Actions
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Figure 10-13: Jerry Mizuno - Relative Action distribution Stag-Hunt vs. WTD for Player Actions [best model hits to opp.]
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Figure 10-14: Jerry Mizuno - Relative Action distribution Stag-Hunt vs. WTD for Opponent Actions [best model hits to opp.]
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Figure 10-15: Jerry Mizuno - Relative Action distribution Stag-Hunt vs. WTD for Player Actions [best model relative-score]
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Figure 10-16: Jerry Mizuno - Relative Action distribution Stag-Hunt vs. WTD for Opponent Actions [best model relative-score]
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Figure 10-17: Thunder - Relative Action distribution Stag-Hunt vs. WTD for Player Actions
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Figure 10-18: Thunder - Relative Action distribution Stag-Hunt vs. WTD for Opponent Actions
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Figure 10-19: Thunder - Relative Action distribution Stag-Hunt vs. WTD for Player Actions [best model hits to opp.]
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Figure 10-20: Thunder - Relative Action distribution Stag-Hunt vs. WTD for Opponent Actions [best model hits to opp.]
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Figure 10-21: Thunder - Relative Action distribution Stag-Hunt vs. WTD for Player Actions [best model relative-score]
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Figure 10-22: Thunder - Relative Action distribution Stag-Hunt vs. WTD for Opponent Actions [best model relative-score]
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Figure 10-11 is relative action distribution of Stag-Hunt players vs WTD players, aggregated
across all models. By contrast Figure 10-12 shows the relative action distribution of Jerry Mizuno
AI when playing Stag-Hunt players vs. when playing WTD players. The titles of the graphs show
the number of actions for which the count of actions is higher by KD mechanism, i.e. the HAC
values, introduced earlier. For example, in Figure 10-11, the Stag-Hunt and WTD HAC values are
29 and 24, respectively. Together, both players used 29 + 24 = 53 actions (out of the available 56)
at least at one point in the games.
It is interesting to note that the opponent, Jerry Mizuno has a HAC (25) that is twice as higher
when playing against WTD players than against Stag-Hunt players (12). This indicates that on
average Jerry Mizuno uses a greater variety of actions against WTD. In other words, on the whole,
WTD forces Jerry Mizuno to be more versatile. Also, the total actions played by Jerry Mizuno is
25+12 = 37. This is quite a bit less than those played by CATNeuro players (53). There are 3 ‘air’
actions that Jerry Mizuno used when playing against WTD that it did not use against Stag-Hunt.
The converse is true for only one action.
Looking at Figure 10-11, there seems to be no major differences between WTD and Stag-Hunt
however Figure 10-12 shows that, from the opponent’s perspective there are discernable
differences. Jerry Mizuno is using different strategies (distribution over actions) when playing
against Stag-Hunt vs WTD. The dynamics are not captured when looking at just the CATNeuro
player distributions but a more complete picture emerges with the combined view of both the
players’ and opponent’s distributions. The overall result for Jerry Mizuno surmises that the models
produced by the two KD mechanism tend to learn different ways of playing the game – i.e. the
mapping from game-state to action distribution is different.
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Figure 10-13 and Figure 10-14 are relative action distributions for the best models in terms of
hits-to-opponent. As before, Figure 10-13 is from the CATNeuro players’ perspective and Figure
10-14 from the opponent’s. The ‘players action distributions clearly show that two models are
using different strategies – defense and positioning actions are higher for Stag-Hunt and the mixes
are different for offense between the two. The HAC for Stag-Hunt (37) is also much higher than
that for WTD (16). If anything, the WTD model is stresses offense over defense as it uses two
attack types that Stag-Hunt never uses. The slightly higher ‘hits score for WTD is maybe an
indication of that. Figure 10-13 is Jerry Mizuno’s actions when playing against the two KD
mechanisms. The most interesting aspect is that the combined HAC is 12+19=21. This means that
the, against the best models, Jerry Mizuno only uses 21 out of the 56 available actions. Since these
are the most aggressive models it is quite likely the models are pinning the opponent down and
therefore the opponent can respond with a limit set of actions.
Figure 10-15 and Figure 10-16 are the corresponding charts for the best models by relativescore. Relative-score is the difference between a CATNeuro player’s and the opponent’s scores.
First off, the score difference between Stag-Hunt and WTD is approaching statistical significance
in favor of Stag-Hunt. The p-value is 17% - with more samples it could be reduced further. Then,
visually, it can be seen in both charts that strategies followed are all different. Stag-Hunt is more
aggressive as the HAC for just the offensive actions is higher. Jerry Mizuno (Figure 10-16) is also
more aggressive against Stag-Hunt as there are 3 offense actions that it uses against Stag-Hunt
but not against WTD (these are “AIR_A”, “AIR_DB”, “STAND_FA”). Also, Jerry Mizuno uses the
“JUMP” action against only Stag-Hunt – most likely to avoid getting hit when on the ground. This
indicates that Stag-Hunt is more engaged with the opponent as compared to WTD.
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Note that “AIR_” prefix (for offense actions) is for attacks done when the character is in the air.
These could be different kinds of kicks, or punches. The exact sequence of moves varies by the
character type; of which there are two - Zen and Garnet. All games were played with Zen on both
sides. Similarly, “STAND_” and “CROUCH_” prefixes related to actions while in the standing and
crouching states, respectively.
10.2.2 Action Distributions – Thunder
This section performs similar analysis for the Thunder opponent as was done for Jerry Mizuno
in the previous section. Figure 10-17 and Figure 10-18 are aggregate-level charts from the players’
and the opponent’s perspectives, respectively. Here Stag-Hunt does statistically better than WTD
but that is not really apparent from the action distributions in Figure 10-17; except that Stag-Hunt
uses more of the “AIR_F_D_DFB”, “STAND_D_DB_BB” and “STAND_F_D_DFA” attacks (the
differences are visually discernable). Form the opponent’s perspective (Figure 10-18), at the
aggregate level, the action distributions of Thunder when playing Stag-Hunt vs. when playing WTD
are about the same except for two actions. Against Stag-Hunt, Thunder uses “THROW_A” attack
much more often and does not seem to use the “AIR_FA” attack. On the whole the HAC value for
Stag-Hunt (30) is higher than for WTD (22). This implies that Thunder is forced to display more
versatility against Stag-Hunt. In contrast, it was noted earlier that Jerry Mizuno (the weaker
opponent) displayed more versatility against WTD (Figure 10-12). Also Thunder uses more types
of actions (30+22=52) than Jerry Mizuno (12+25=37) at the aggregate level. This also shows that
Thunder is the stronger player.
Figure 10-19 and Figure 10-20 are relative distributions from the players’ and the opponent
Thunder’s perspectives, for the best models by hits-to-opponent. The overall performance of Stag-
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Hunt and WTD models (Figure 10-19) is not statistically different but the strategies followed are
quite different. The HAC score for the Stag-Hunt model (31) is much higher than for WTD (19). This
shows that the Stag-Hunt model is relatively more versatile that the WTD one. Comparatively,
Stag-Hunt is more offensive, and WTD is more defensive. The HAC value for the just the offense
actions is 17 for Stag-Hunt vs. 9 for WTD. The defense HAC is 1 for Stag-Hunt and 4 for WTD.
From Thunder’s perspective (Figure 10-20) it is also apparent that Stag-Hunt is the more
aggressive model. The HAC of Thunder’s defense actions is 5 to 0 for Stag-Hunt opponent vs WTD;
i.e. Thunder is forced to be more defensive when playing against the Stag-Hunt model. The offense
HAC for Thunder is about the same against both, overall, although there is a marked difference in
some specific actions. This shows that models from both KDs are engaging well with Thunder but
Stag-Hunt is trying to land more hits, which Thunder is defending well against.
Figure 10-21 and Figure 10-22 are relative distributions for the best model by relative-score.
Here the results are statistically significant in favor of Stag-Hunt. It is somewhat surprising that
WTD is dominates in terms of HAC, across the board. This implies that Stag-Hunt is able to win
with an overreliance on a few specific, well-timed moves or ‘combos’. The aspect of timeliness is
not captured in this view of the data. However, a peek into timeliness can be obtained by
observing what the opponent is doing.
Figure 10-22 shows that Thunder’s HAC against Stag-Hunt (28) is distinctly higher than against
WTD (16). Thus, Thunder needs to be more versatile when playing against Stag-Hunt. This
indicates that Stag-Hunt is making more timely moves (or using combos) that are forcing Thunder
to respond accordingly.
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This section showed the relative action distributions for the CATNeuro players vs. Thunder as
a) aggregated across all models and b) for the best models by hits-to-opponent, and relative-score.
This view of the data covers the overall stance or action strategies of the players and opponents
but not the prevalent sequence of actions used by the different players/opponents. The next
section analyses sequences of actions or combos.

10.3 Combo Analysis
As described in section 9.7.3 the combo sequence patterns are aggregated into categories such
as OTD, OTO, etc. on a per round basis. This data is used to test for statistical differences between
the two KD mechanisms, against each of the two opponents.

Figure 10-23: Hits by combo type - player vs. Jerry Mizuno

The hits landed against opponent Jerry Mizuno by the models from both mechanisms, under the
different combo categories or types, are shown in Figure 10-23. Statistically significant
differences are marked with an ‘*’. Models from both mechanisms land the majority of the hits
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under the TOT (tactic-offence-tactic) combo category however there is no statistical difference
between the hits landed by the two types of CATNeuro players. The TOT category is seen to
represent agility with offense. WTD does statistically better in OTO, TDO and TDT categories but
the differences are very small.

Figure 10-24: Hits by combo type - player vs. Thunder

Similar data against Thunder is shown in Figure 10-24. Against the stronger player, Stag-Hunt
performs statistically more hits under several of the categories namely, DOT, OTO, TDO, TDT, and
TOT. Categories with zero counts are not shown. Although the per round differences are minor,
Stag-Hunt is consistently higher than WTD across all the categories. As with Jerry Mizuno, most
hits are still landed with the TOT type combos. This data also shows that Thunder is the stronger
opponent as the hit rates for both CATNeuro players are much lower than those against Jerry
Mizuno.
From the above analysis it is evident that Stag-Hunt is able to produce more versatile models
than WTD does. This difference is only evident when playing against the stronger player, Thunder.
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Stag-Hunt models are able to land statistically more hits that WTD produced ones across a wide
spectrum of combo categories. The models considered here and in the prior sections of this
chapter are the top 10% models used for game play. The properties of the full set of generated
models are discussed next.

10.4 Model Properties Comparison
This section compares the properties of the models generated by WTD and Stag-Hunt
mechanisms. Out of all the models produced (120), only the top 10% (in terms of lowest training
loss) were used to play the games with Jerry Mizuno and Thunder.
Even though the majority of the models were not used to play games, they can still serve as a
basis of comparison between Stag-Hunt and WTD mechanisms and provide further insight. Each
CATNeuro run returns the top 20 models discovered in the run. As there are 6 runs per
mechanism, there are 6 x 20 = 120 models per mechanism used for comparison in this section.
Note that the models produced are orthogonal with respect to the opponents played against (i.e.
Jerry Mizuno and Thunder); i.e. the same models were played against both opponents.
The model properties analyzed were first given in Table 9-5. Each of these will be discussed
next. The analysis presented for each property includes density plots (as explained earlier in
section 9.7) as well the means and p-values for statistical significance.
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Figure 10-25: Stag-Hunt and WTD distributions for the number of nodes contained in the models produced

Figure 10-25 shows the density and of the number of nodes in the models produced.
Statistically and visually there is not much difference between the two mechanisms. Models with
about 24 nodes are produced on average by both mechanisms. Note the count reflects the lowest
level nodes in each model, including input and output nodes. The count excludes the Blueprint
nodes that are replaced by module species subgraphs at assembly time. The consistency of StagHunt is slightly better in Figure 10-25 as mass is more narrowly distributed. And the mode for StagHunt is higher.
Figure 10-26 show the density for the total number of edges in the models. From the statistical
perspective, Stag-Hunt models have a smaller number of edges on the whole. The difference is
statistically significant. However, looking at the density plots, Stag-Hunt has higher mode and its
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mass is also more compactly distributed. The greater consistency of Stag-Hunt seems to be a
persistent theme.

Figure 10-26: Stag-Hunt and WTD distributions for the number of edges in the models produced

Figure 10-27 is for the maximum path length (or depth) of the models. It is the length of the
longest path from top to bottom. Statistically, there is no significant difference between the
models produced by the two KD mechanisms. However, visually the mode for Stag-Hunt is higher
and as before the probability mass distribution is narrower.
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Figure 10-27: Stag-Hunt and WTD distributions for the maximum path lengths of the models produced

The distributions over the number of tunable weights or parameters are shown in Figure 10-28.
These values are calculated by the deep learning framework used for model training in this
experiment – CNTK (Seide & Agarwal, 2016). CNTK calculates this value after a Blueprint and
selected modules have been assembled into a complete deep learning model. It reflects the realworld size of the model. In general, it is desirable to have smaller models for a variety of reasons,
provided the model accuracy is acceptable. Smaller models are easier to train and faster to use at
runtime. This is particularly important for game play because near real-time response is required
to play the game effectively. Also, smaller models tend to overfit less. The CATNeuro system has
a pluggable ranking mechanism (multi-objective support) that balances model size with training
loss to give preference to smaller models given the similar or same loss (accuracy).
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Here Stag-Hunt is statistically better in that it produces smaller models that have about 1300
less weights to train, on average (7625 – 6291 = 1334). Figure 10-28 shows that there is more to
the story than just the statistics. Unlike the other density plots discussed thus far, the mass for
Stag-Hunt is more widely distributed. It is bi-modal where the higher mode matches that for WTD
at 9K and the other peaks at around 5.5K. All-in-all the chart shows that Stag-Hunt can find smaller
models that are also good performers. The performance aspect – in terms of training loss – will be
discussed next.

Figure 10-28: Stag-Hunt and WTD distributions for the number of parameter weights for the models produced

Figure 10-29 shows the training loss density. It is the mean squared error loss between the
training data and the model output. Here again Stag-Hunt does better with statistical significance.
Moreover, the mass distribution is narrower indicating that Stag-Hunt is more consistently able to
find good solutions.
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Figure 10-29: Stag-Hunt and WTD distributions for training loss

The final chart in this series is the number of generations at which the best model was found,
shown in Figure 10-30. There are no meaningful differences between the number of generations
taken by the two KD mechanisms to find the best model, either statistically or visually. Also, the
range is quite large. The termination condition used was “terminate if no improvement in 10
generations”. In the majority of the cases the best models were found at close to 30 generations
however some were found after 70 generations. As mentioned before the training time is quite
long and a single run can take a day or so on a single GPU machine.
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Figure 10-30: Stag-Hunt and WTD distributions for the generations at which the best models were discovered

10.5 Summary and Conclusions
For the CATNeuro system, 6 samples were taken with each KD mechanisms. A total of 120
models were produced for each and the top 10% played against both Jerry Mizuno and Thunder.
The prior sections discussed the performance of the game models (10.1); the strategic variation
in the models as reflected in the relative action distributions (10.2); and the overall properties of
the models produced (10.4).
For the game performance, Stag-Hunt performs statistically better in:
a. The hits-to-opponent metric, at the aggregate level, against Thunder (Table 10-1)
b. Relative-score aggregated across all models, again when playing Thunder (Figure 10-2)
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c. Best model by relative-score against Jerry Mizuno (Figure 10-16)
d. Best model by relative-score against Thunder (Figure 10-21)
More differences are apparent between two KD mechanism when playing the stronger
opponent Thunder. For the benchmark AI Jerry Mizuno, both mechanisms perform equally well,
except for c) above.
The relative action distributions reveal the strategies followed by each of the players – be it
CATNeuro or opponents. As expected, the weaker opponent Jerry Mizuno uses a considerably
smaller number of actions than Thunder does. At the aggregate level, how the opponents respond
is more informative than the action distributions of the CATNeuro players themselves. This is
apparent in Figure 10-12 for Jerry Mizuno where the HAC for Stag-Hunt is much lower than that
for WTD. These figures are flipped in Figure 10-18 for Thunder where the HAC of Stag-Hunt is
higher than that for WTD. The stronger opponent uses a greater variety of actions against StagHunt models. In general, Stag-Hunt produced models that are more offense oriented that WTD
ones. This is apparent in Figure 10-18 where Thunder uses more defense actions when playing
against Stag-Hunt models.
Considering model properties, it is noted that Stag-Hunt:
a. produces smaller models than WTD does (Figure 10-28)
b. it is consistently better in terms of training performance (Figure 10-29)
c. produces models with a smaller number of edges than WTD does (Figure 10-26)
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However, beyond purely statistical measures, most density plots show that Stag-Hunt is more
consistent (has narrower distributions) than WTD, except for when it comes to model size for the
number of tunable parameter weights.

Figure 10-31: Correlation between generations and model size

10.6 Testing the Hypotheses
After the experimental results, the hypotheses postulated in 9.7 are discussed and conclusions
drawn next.
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Hy 9-1

“Cooperative knowledge distribution will yield more versatile holds
models”
The data to answer this question comes from the game performance
measures, relative action distributions and combo categories. From a
performance perspective, Stag-Hunt performs better when faced with
Thunder for the measures listed earlier. However, against the
benchmark AI Jerry Mizuno there are no significant performance
differences between Stag-Hunt and WTD (except for one case) since
both did well against Jerry Mizuno bot for different reasons. Looking
at the relative action distributions there is also no clear and consistent
pattern. Firstly, the HAC values for the players are not very telling.
There is greater differential between the HAC values of the opponent
when playing CATNeuro. But here again there is lack of consistency as
HAC values for Jerry Mizuno show that WTD is more versatile but those
for Thunder show that Stag-Hunt is more versatile. However, the
definitive evidence that Stag-Hunt produces more versatile models
comes from the combo analysis performed in section 10.3. Stag-Hunt
is able to land significantly more hits than WTD, under a variety of
combo categories, when playing against the stronger player Thunder
and therefore Hy 9-1 is accepted.

Hy 9-2

“Cooperative knowledge in CATNeuro distribution will sustain longer {does
search runs”

not

hold}

This hypothesis is answerable from Figure 10-30 that shows the
density of the number of generations to find the top models for both
mechanisms. Both statistically and visually there is nothing to choose
between Stag-Hunt and WTD and therefore this hypothesis is rejected.
Hy 9-3

“Longer search runs produce larger models”

{holds with
exceptions}
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Here a relationship between the search time and model size is being
postulated. Figure 10-31 shows this relationship graphically along with
the correlation measures for Stag-Hunt and WTD. Stag-Hunt (0.42)
exhibits good correlation between search time and model size
whereas WTD (0.09) does not. Stag-Hunt behaves as postulated; it
seems to be more disciplined. The higher correlation for Stag-Hunt is
also visually apparent (blue dots in the chart). Initially the correlation
is linear but then number of nodes seem to level off as generations
increase. This is primarily due to the limits imposed on the models in
terms of sizes of the population individuals in the CATNeuro
configuration used for the runs. Hy 9-3, thus partially holds. It holds for
Stag-Hunt but not for WTD.
Hy 9-4

“The training loss is lower for cooperative distribution mechanism”

{holds}

Hy 9-4 is relatively easy to determine. Figure 10-29 shows the training
loss distributions for Stag-Hunt and WTD. Average Stag-Hunt loss at
1.862 mean square error is lower than 1.905 for WTD and difference
is statistically significant. Visually, the distribution of loss for Stag-Hunt
is also narrower and peakier. This shows that Stag-Hunt is able to more
consistently produce models with lower training loss and therefore Hy
9-4 holds.
Hy 9-5

“Cooperative distribution performs better than competitive {holds}
distribution under more complex environmental conditions”
As with CATGame, CATNeuro was tested with multiple levels of
environmental complexity. Here complexity is in the form of the
strength of the opponents played against - Jerry Mizuno the
benchmark AI included with FightingICE; and Thunder the 2018
champion. Considering the aggregate performance results for both
opponents, Table 10-1 shows the hits-to-opponent metric for Jerry
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Mizuno and Table 10-3 for Thunder. Against Jerry Mizuno both KD
mechanisms perform equally well are able to beat the opponent.
However, against Thunder (representing higher complexity) Stag-Hunt
performs significantly better. This is somewhat consistent with the
relative-score measures shown in Figure 10-1 for Jerry Mizuno and
Figure 10-2 for Thunder. For Jerry Mizuno there is no statistical
difference between the relative-scores of the two KD mechanisms.
However, against Thunder, Stag-Hunt performs better than WTD and
with a p-value of 17%. All told there is strong evidence that
cooperative

distribution

performs

relatively

better

when

environmental complexity is higher and therefore Hy 9-5 is
established.

The experimental results for the framework developed in section 9.7 were analyzed and
discussed in this section. Also, the hypotheses postulated in 9.7 were discussed in light of the
obtained results and conclusion drawn as to each’s validity. The next chapter summarizes the
research effort and outlines the possible future works emanating from this exploration.
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CHAPTER 11 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
11.0 Introduction
Cultural Algorithms are knowledge-driven stochastic optimization methods meant for problem
solving in complex systems. Inspired by anthropological processes, the CA brings much machinery
to bear on such tasks (Chapter 2). From the Belief Space which is a persistent and responsive store
of knowledge; a socially networked population space; to intelligent knowledge distribution
mechanisms; it is aptly equipped to tackle the behavior of a complex system.
The role of the knowledge distribution mechanisms is germane as they are the key allocators
of computational resources in a CA system; even more so today when CA research focus has
shifted to solve dynamically and hierarchically complex multi-objective problems. CA knowledge
distribution mechanisms have steadily grown in their level of information processing capability
(entropy) to tackle increasingly complex problems (Chapter 3). Earliest system used random
distribution of knowledge then competitive mechanisms were developed, specifically majority
weighted. The focus of this research is on using games for knowledge distribution, particularly
cooperation-inclusive games since all prior mechanisms have been competitive.
Game theory is a deep and vast subject area (Chapter 4) but provides a fertile source of ideas
for knowledge distribution mechanisms. Three distribution mechanisms were studied, inspired by
several games in classical and evolutionary game theory, namely: Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma,
Stag-Hunt and Stackelberg; all of which span both cooperation and competition. IPD and StagHunt are related in that Stag-Hunt is an evolutionary game theory variant of Prisoner’s Dilemma
from classical game theory. Stag-Hunt involves the notion of time in a sense missing from IPD
which is a single-shot game, played repeatedly.
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CATGame, a new software system, was constructed in order to facilitate this research. It
contains a generic mechanism that can be used for injecting arbitrary games into the Influence
function of the CA for knowledge distribution (Chapter 5). This mechanism is used by concrete
adaptions of the aforementioned three games (Chapter 6). In this research, the three
cooperative/competitive mechanisms are contrasted against the default Weighted Majority
mechanism (3.2) which is purely competitive.
IPD and Stag-Hunt are played from the perspective of the players in the population space. Each
individual plays the game with all of its network neighbors. Due to the structure of the population
space, complete symmetry and reciprocity is not possible. Each individual is playing against players
who in turn are playing against a slightly different set of players (their respective neighbors). Thus,
the games cannot be solved in a classical sense of finding the Nash equilibrium – apart from the
fact that it would be computationally infeasible to do so. Instead, the players make
cooperative/competitive decisions based on the best available information. Knowledge
distribution in each is a two-step process where the players first are classified as Cooperator /
Defector and then based on that, the knowledge assignments are performed. As a Cooperator an
individual forgoes egoistic behavior and instead behaves according its rank in society (i.e. social
rank - Listing 6-2, Listing 6-3). A relatively low-ranking individual accepts a relatively explorative
Knowledge Source and high ranker, a relatively exploitative one. As a Defector the individual keeps
its current assignment or accepts the locally dominant KS, depending on factors.
Stackelberg is played from the perspective of the Knowledge Sources that reside in the Belief
Space. In microeconomics Stackelberg players make production and (implicitly pricing) decisions
based on their relative strengths and potential first-mover advantage. Inspired by this, Stackelberg
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KD allocates the best individuals to the strongest KS but in a way that leaves room for the less
strong KS. The decision making in Stackelberg is more centralized and structured, as in a centrally
planned economic system. By contrast IPD and Stag-Hunt are more dynamic and utilize more local
(i.e. neighborhood) information.
The performance of the new KD cooperative/competitive mechanisms is compared with
Weighted Majority, a purely competitive mechanism, with a dynamic landscape generator (7.1);
Cones World. The dynamic complexity is controlled by the setting the A multiplier of the logistic
equation. Values of A=1.0, 3.1, 3.6 and 3.9 are used. A=1.0 induces linear changes; at A > 3.0 the
changes become non-linear; and at 3.9 the chaotic values are produced. The optimization
landscapes are changed after 2500 generations while the optimization run is still underway. A
total of 50 landscapes are generated in sequence for a single run. Each KD-A combination is run
200 times to obtain statistically significant results (7.6).
Resilience is measured by how quickly the system is able to find the new optimum after the
proverbial rug is pulled from under it. The main performance metric is the generations-to-solution
or G2S (7.2). G2S is tracked by landscape change. A new landscape in the sequence is created by
changing the heights of the cones in the previous landscape using the values obtained from the
logistic sequence generator.
CA is a ‘social’ system and hence the behavior of the system can be tracked with several social
metrics. Diffusion (7.3) and Segregation Index (7.4) are social metrics that measure static aspects
of the system. However, the CA is also a dynamical system and so to understand the dynamic
aspects Markovian analysis is performed that involves several approaches strung together (7.5).
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Community formations are detected using the Frequent Pattern Growth algorithm. Communityto-community transitions are analyzed with Google Page Rank and other graph-based approaches.

11.1 The CATGame Results
Experimental data was collected using the Wayne State grid computing facility. Over 1 terabyte
of detailed log data was collected from the 200 sample runs for each KD-A combination. The
experimental results are tabulated and presented in Chapter 8. Inferences about the hypotheses
postulated in section 7.6, are drawn in section 8.5.
CATGame is a numerical optimization system meant for use in static and dynamic
environments. The cooperative, game-based knowledge distribution achieved varied results
under the different levels of complexity. It was found that IPD and Stag-Hunt generally performed
the best from linear to chaotic; both were the most resilient to environmental changes (8.1).
Stackelberg on the other hand was not able to track the changes as well. It performed well initially
(i.e. in the first few landscapes of the sequence) but then its G2S performance became
progressively worse over the progression of the landscapes. Also, Stackelberg performs
progressively worse with increasing non-linear complexity. Weighted Majority shows robust
behavior in the face of complexity. It is quite robust at A=1 but still lags behind IPD and Stag-Hunt
in the earlier landscapes but catches up to them later in the sequence (Figure 8-1). With higher A
values, IPD and Stag-Hunt start to distance themselves from the rest (Figure 8-2, Figure 8-3 &
Figure 8-4). Overall Stag-Hunt is the most resilient of all the mechanisms tested. It quickly adapts
to environment change levels and tracks the changes well over time.
If Weighted Majority is the “wisdom of the crowd” then IPD and Stag-Hunt represent
“cooperation in the context of social rank”. Social rank directed cooperation does indeed seem
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to work well in the face of environmental uncertainty. However, the structured cooperation model
of Stackelberg is not seen as being as effective. One difference between the two types of
cooperation is that Stackelberg does not take into account local information. It is akin to a centrally
planned economic system; i.e. where the resource allocation decisions are centralized. The other
mechanisms (including WTD) have a ‘market’ economy aspect where allocation decisions are
decentralized and take into account local conditions. The collapse of socialism in recent geopolitical history is perhaps a reminder that excessive centralization is not effective when the pace
of change is high.
The static and dynamic social analyses provide further insight into the operations of the
different KD mechanisms. The most telling is Schelling’s Segregation Index. Higher performing
mechanisms have consistent response in terms of exhibiting higher average segregation as
environmental complexity changes from linear to non-linear to chaotic (Figure 8-20). To wit, WTD,
IPD and Stag-Hunt all exhibit an increase in average segregation in the population as complexity
changes form linear to chaotic. Further, IPD and Stag-Hunt show a higher degree of change in
population segregation than WTD. This indicates that IPD and Stag-Hunt are more sensitive to
environmental changes than WTD. Stackelberg on the other hand is not consistent it its responses.
Here the segregation first increases and then decreases as change tends to chaotic. Segregation
index is an emergent phenomenon. It can be seen as response to the degree of stress placed on
the system. More consistent response means that the underlying mechanisms withstand and
don’t break down under varying degree of duress.
The dynamic analysis (8.4) shows that both cooperative mechanisms and the competitive
mechanism work differently. This is quite evident when observing Page Rank derived tree charts

294
(Figure 8-46, Figure 8-48, Figure 8-50 and Figure 8-52). All mechanisms have different ‘signature’
in terms of the community rankings produced by the dynamics. The signatures remain somewhat
consistent even across A-values. When one compares the chart for Stackelberg with those of the
other mechanisms, it can be seen that Stackelberg allocates comparatively more resources to
exploitation. This partly explains the lack of Stackelberg performance in a dynamic environment
that seems to require higher degree of exploration especially as the environment becomes more
chaotic.
The community-to-community transition data is projected into another view. The communities
are categorized as Explorative, Neutral or Exploitative, depending on each’s explorative index.
Then statistically significant changes in net flow are measured and plotted by each A transition
(e.g. 1.0 → 3.1, 3.1 → 3.6, etc.). Net flow here means net change (increase – decrease) into a
particular category. Take the Explorative category and 1.0 → 3.1 (linear → non-linear) transition.
The statistically significant inflow ([Neutral; Exploitative] → Explorative) and outflow (Explorative
→ [Neutral; Exploitative]) are measured and the differences taken. This value is the resource
increase / decrease into the Explorative category due to the change in A 1.0→3.1. This is done for
all transitions and all categories. Figure 8-58 and Figure 8-59 show the net flow for Explorative and
Exploitative categories, respectively. The interesting result is that the best performing mechanism
– Stag-Hunt – is very consistent in allocating progressively more resources to exploration and
progressively less resources to exploitation, with each increment in A. None of the other
mechanisms are completely consistent. This is a strong indication that the underlying mechanism
of resource allocation in Stag-Hunt is very robust in the face of environmental complexity. It also
shows if the environment rate of change is higher, comparatively more resources need to be
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directed to exploration. The observed segregation behavior can also be explained from this result;
increasing exploration (and decreasing exploitation) changes the mix of the communities in the
population and therefore increases segregation as explorative KS will tend to dominate.
Considering that the KD mechanism is the primary factor in the distribution of knowledge (i.e.
allocation of compute resources) in the CA, it can be concluded that Stag-Hunt is the most
consistent in making allocation decisions under varying levels of complexity and therefore shows
as being the most robust in the face of it.
CATGame was meant to test the behavior of cooperative knowledge distribution under
dynamic complexity. Another notion of complexity is hierarchical complexity. How well does
cooperation work to solve hierarchically complex problems?
To answer this question the CATNeuro system was constructed to find optimal model
structures for deep learning models. CATNeuro uses CA for Neural Architecture Search (NAS) – an
emerging field that is currently drawing considerable research interest. The top evolutionary
computation conference “IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence” (WCCI) 2020 has
an entire track dedicated to Neural Architecture Search.
CATNeuro uses speciation with multiple populations to evolve optimal models (inspired by
NEAT and derivative works) (9.1). This is a hierarchical optimization problem (Figure 1-4). Tier one
is the overall graph structure (blueprint); tier two is the selection of module species that are
assembled into a particular blueprint; and tier three is the optimization of parameters such as e.g.
learning rate, dimensions of dense nodes, activation types, etc.
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11.2 CATNeuro Results
CATGame is for numerical optimization in dynamic environments and CATNeuro is finding
optimal graph structures – two very different domains and two different notions of complexity.
The best performing cooperative mechanism from CATGame – Stag-Hunt – is implemented and
its performance compared with the default competitive mechanism – Weighed Majority (9.3).
The test problem is to evolve an optimal model to play the FightingICE game against the two
selected opponents – the benchmark AI Jerry Mizuno and the 2018 champion Thunder (9.1). The
test problem favors small and fast models that can play the game at the required frame rate. The
deep learning model training process requires specialized infrastructure and can take a long time
(e.g. days in some cases). Keeping the test problem manageably small is helpful but even here it
can take about a week to complete the training and test cycles (including playing the games with
the selected opponents). For the particular test case, the train-test cycle time can be minimized if
access is available to a ‘farm’ of 150 GPUs. The sample size for each KD-A mechanism is only 6 vs.
200 for the CATGame experiment. Additionally, each sample run for CATGame was over
2500*50=125000 generations vs. only 30-70 generations for CATNeuro. CATGame produces much
more data. The kind of statistical analysis done for CATGame is not feasible for CATNeuro. Instead
the focus is on comparing the performance of the models generated by the two KD mechanisms
against the two players and the comparison of the structural properties and other aspects of the
generated models (9.7).
Data required to train the models was obtained through the application of Reinforcement
Learning using a policy-based approach (9.4). This process is explained in section 9.5; it takes about
24 hours to complete and results in a large policy table of about 1M rows and 1G size on disk.
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CATNeuro runs are performed with a sample of the training data. Top models are then trained on
the full dataset and played against the opponents. Under the experimental setup (9.7), each
model is played 10 times against each opponent and the game statistic recorded.
The experimental results for CATNeuro are organized by:
a. Game performance (10.1)
b. Action strategies (10.2)
c. Combo analysis (10.3)
d. Model properties (10.4)
The game performance results show that against the benchmark AI, Jerry Mizuno, models from
both KD mechanism performed well and won all the games. Both approaches were able to use
the same basic techniques to defeat the opponent.
Against the 2018 champion Thunder all games are lost by each mechanism (which is more of a
function of the available learnings from RL derive training data). However here, Stag-Hunt derived
models do better than WTD models, with statistical significance, for hits-to-opponent and relativescore metrics. This shows that Stag-Hunt can extract relatively more information from the training
data.
Considering the relative action distributions, no consistent patterns emerge between the two
types of CATNeuro players, in head-to-head comparison (Figure 10-11, Figure 10-17). However,
observing the opponent strategies is more telling - i.e. actions distributions of Jerry Mizuno and
Thunder playing WTD vs. when playing Stag-Hunt, respectively (Figure 10-12, Figure 10-18). One
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can also gauge a player’s performance by looking at how the opponent chooses to respond. Jerry
Mizuno responds with greater versatility when playing WTD models (HAC: WTD = 25, StagHunt=12). Conversely, Thunder shows greater versatility when playing Stag-Hunt (HAC: WTD=22,
Stag-Hunt=30). The results show that opponents respond differently and hence the models learnt
by the two KD mechanism behave differently, at the aggregate level. Greater versatility of the
opponent against a certain player indicates that the player is forcing the opponent to respond
with greater variety, by making more timely moves. From this perspective, Stag-Hunt is making
the stronger player Thunder work harder than WTD does.
The combo analysis provides clear evidence that Stag-Hunt does indeed create more versatile
models than WTD does. This is evidenced by the fact that Stag-Hunt lands significantly more hits
on the stronger opponent Thunder under a variety of combo types.
The model properties comparison shows that Stag-Hunt produces significantly smaller models
with respect to number of edges (Figure 10-26) and number of learnable weights (Figure 10-28).
Also, importantly, Stag-Hunt models have lower training loss on average (Figure 10-29). In general,
smaller (more parsimonious) models are desired, provided accuracy (training loss) is not
compromised. Stag-Hunt seems better able to balance these conflicting goals.
Next, several hypotheses postulated in section 9.7 related to NAS and CATNeuro are analyzed
and addressed in 10.5. The primary question this research set out to answer is whether
cooperative knowledge distribution improves CA performance in complex environments. Drawing
much from Game Theory this proposition is studied with respect to dynamic and hierarchical
notions of complexity. The results show that, for the numerical optimization domain (dynamic
complexity), cooperation in the context of social rank makes the system more robust and performs
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better than the default competitive mechanism WTD. WTD is also robust but less so as complexity
increases. In the neural architecture search domain (hierarchical complexity) the results are mixed
with a slight edge for cooperation. In vivo (training loss), cooperation performs significantly better
but in vitro (game play) it is only marginally better. The signal is weaker in the NAS problems and
therefore “wisdom of the crowd” is about as effective as social rank centered cooperation.

11.3 Future Direction
The CATGame system is configured with a generic game mechanism that can be exploited for
analyzing other cooperative and competitive game mechanisms. Game Theory – both classical and
evolutionary – have deep reserves to draw from. Exploring other games or evolutionary strategies
for knowledge distribution will extend the understand for building robust systems in the face of
complexity.
Deep learning is a prime area for further exploration. Optimal model topology and
hyperparameter tuning is an active research area. Model tuning is a time-consuming task that still
requires much human input and therefore automation to free up human capital is much desired.
This research shows that evolutionary algorithms are effective means of addressing the NAS
challenge. By design CA is well suited to solving problems in this domain.
However, CATNeuro is a new system with many missing features such the ability to construct
models with convolutions and recurrence. It needs to be extended to provide better coverage of
the available functionality in deep learning toolkits. The current translation mechanism is for the
CNTK toolkit only. Translations for other popular toolkits such as Tensorflow, PyTorch and support
for ONNX (open neural network exchange) formats are fruitful avenues of future work.
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Training deep learning models is already a very time consuming. Adding stochastic search on
top greatly extends the time required to find optimal models. If history is an indicator, hardware
to train deep learning models should become, faster, cheaper and more plentiful. CATNeuro is
built with parallel model training support but it needs to be developed further to seamless access
vast arrays of training hardware to reduce search time. Many completing NAS approaches are
being developed and CATNeuro should be benchmarked against the top contenders to derive
additional insights for improvements.
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APPENDIX A CATGAME FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
CATGame is written in a strongly-typed functional programming language F#. The equivalent
to UML diagrams in functional programming is the functional interface; it shows the high-level
structure in terms of the top data structures and function types.
///type definitions for the CA 'interface'
//defined in a functional programming way
module rec CA
///CA structure - instance of CA that can be stepped through for optimization
type CA<'k> =
{
BeliefSpace
: BeliefSpace<'k>
Acceptance
: Acceptance<'k>
Update
: Update<'k>
Influence
: Influence<'k>
Population
: Population<'k>
Network
: Network<'k>
Fitness
: Fitness
Optimization
: OptimizationKind
EnvChngSensitivity
: EnvChngSensitivity
}
///how should we respond to environmental changes
//CA may or may not reset set internal state based on this setting
type EnvChngSensitivity =
///CA does not adjust internal state if environment changes
| Insensintive
///After how many environmental changes to re-adjust.
///A value of 1 means re-adjust to every environment change
| Every of int
///Instructs CA how to respond to environment change
type EnvChngeType =
| NoChange
//environment did not change
| Adjust
//environment changed - adjust internal state accordingly
| Track
//environment changed but only note the changes - do not adjust
internal state
type OptimizationKind = Minimize | Maximize

//minimization or maximization problem

///tree structure of the belief space knowledge source
type BeliefSpace<'k> = KnowledgeSource<'k> Tree
///knowledge source type
type KnowledgeSource<'k> =
{
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///Knowledge type identifier (Domain, Normative, etc.)
Type
: Knowledge
///Acceptance function type of a knowledge source
Accept
: EnvChngeType -> Individual<'k> array -> Individual<'k> array
* KnowledgeSource<'k>
///Influence function type of a knowledge source
Influence
: Population<'k> -> Temperature -> Individual<'k> ->
Individual<'k>
}
type Tree<'a>
list

= Leaf of 'a | Node of 'a * Tree<'a> list | Roots of Tree<'a>

type Knowledge
| Other of string

= Situational | Historical | Normative | Topgraphical | Domain

///CA acceptance function type
type Acceptance<'k> = BeliefSpace<'k> -> Population<'k> -> Individual<'k> array
///CA update function type
type Update<'k>
= EnvChngeType -> BeliefSpace<'k> -> Individual<'k> array ->
BeliefSpace<'k>
///CA influence function type
type Influence<'k>
= Influence of (
EnvChngeType
//environment change signal
-> Population<'k>
-> BeliefSpace<'k>
-> Network<'k>
-> Fitness
-> OptimizationKind
-> (Population<'k>*BeliefSpace<'k>*Influence<'k>))
//returns updated population, beliefSpace and influence function
///Population individual (parameterized by KS type)
type Individual<'k> = {Id:Id; Parms:float array; Fitness:float; KS:'k}
///Population is an array of indviduals
type Population<'k> = Individual<'k> array
///Network function type
type Network<'k>
= Population<'k> -> Id -> Individual<'k> array
///Fitness function type
type Fitness
= (float array -> float) ref
///Id of the population individual (alias to int)
type Id = int
///The level of influence to apply (alias to float)
type Temperature = float
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///Parameters and fitness values extracted from 'best' individuals
type Marker = {MParms:float[]; MFitness:float}
///Structure to hold single step in a CA run
type TimeStep<'k> = {CA:CA<'k> ; Best:Marker list; Progress:float list; Count:int;
EnvChngCount:int}
///function type to specify the termination of a CA run
type TerminationCondition<'k> = TimeStep<'k> -> bool
///Parameter types and ranges for the fitness problem
//TODO: make this part of the CA structure
type Parm =
/// float parameter type
| F of
v:float
* min:float
* max:float
///integer parameter type (stepped through as whole integers by optimiztion
engine)
| I of
v:int
* min:int
* max:int
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APPENDIX B DIFFUSION STATISTICAL TESTS
Statistical tests for diffusion by A value and landscape sequence number

B.1 A=1

305
B.2 A=3.1

306
B.3 A=3.6

307
B.4 A=3.9
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B.5 T-TESTS BY LANDSCAPE AND SUCCESSIVE A VALUES FOR WTD
KD=WTD
Landscape
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

μ A=1
0.684882
0.687477
0.684755
0.700683
0.698064
0.693739
0.709505
0.702985
0.695203
0.712062
0.69707
0.697958
0.716086
0.707458
0.701595
0.715643
0.701386
0.699386
0.710602
0.703459
0.704564
0.719116
0.707719
0.705619
0.721959
0.713581
0.702832
0.719331
0.710846
0.710787
0.722009
0.711615
0.718205
0.721808
0.712471
0.703958
0.728623
0.718543
0.70511
0.728001
0.712711
0.706687
0.73096
0.703552
0.70899
0.708277
0.712029
0.71104
0.719724
0.711279

σ A=1
0.121618
0.119064
0.12406
0.11311
0.111194
0.119736
0.105973
0.104832
0.105259
0.108715
0.103368
0.112889
0.104594
0.104027
0.103989
0.100254
0.10257
0.111457
0.101651
0.107197
0.105387
0.103226
0.102246
0.103606
0.1029
0.092427
0.099305
0.094545
0.097283
0.101626
0.09758
0.093664
0.094413
0.093274
0.106477
0.098777
0.092716
0.090921
0.093918
0.093181
0.09836
0.100932
0.100518
0.097078
0.096284
0.090335
0.091367
0.104562
0.096669
0.097382

μ A=3.1
0.640029
0.685225
0.683283
0.714847
0.711711
0.724081
0.717974
0.730318
0.712636
0.726044
0.721038
0.722351
0.721093
0.7251
0.72498
0.736115
0.723098
0.732422
0.725352
0.731414
0.725409
0.731046
0.721559
0.720577
0.735565
0.727977
0.720186
0.726096
0.730294
0.72804
0.71999
0.73116
0.718915
0.7308
0.723712
0.718211
0.732189
0.710864
0.727764
0.733495
0.720976
0.716796
0.721736
0.725452
0.718843
0.729812
0.718129
0.729141
0.721022
0.724685

σ A=3.1
0.143723
0.13055
0.124613
0.103599
0.096364
0.092492
0.083031
0.080306
0.084233
0.085414
0.092796
0.074053
0.080374
0.072713
0.080153
0.074458
0.076929
0.078128
0.072269
0.074799
0.078614
0.074876
0.07301
0.075168
0.073085
0.078886
0.075493
0.073314
0.074579
0.078514
0.073832
0.075047
0.079285
0.073688
0.073613
0.077439
0.072761
0.081912
0.078916
0.077549
0.083972
0.07727
0.073172
0.073637
0.073004
0.074789
0.0775
0.071806
0.073804
0.077806

μ A=3.6
0.668878
0.69923
0.682715
0.720614
0.716605
0.720026
0.726222
0.722952
0.71899
0.726248
0.719231
0.72905
0.734102
0.733144
0.728979
0.746481
0.729853
0.726967
0.730034
0.720034
0.72309
0.733205
0.726312
0.712519
0.72718
0.736376
0.715576
0.733959
0.721935
0.715585
0.732161
0.733156
0.722094
0.731382
0.728637
0.730155
0.726527
0.717458
0.724391
0.73382
0.722331
0.721915
0.732566
0.719467
0.720397
0.720961
0.71442
0.721363
0.736041
0.723235

σ A=3.6
0.13145
0.109417
0.121451
0.098751
0.100754
0.086444
0.083856
0.077389
0.074593
0.07685
0.082477
0.075827
0.077008
0.078487
0.084105
0.074972
0.075054
0.080003
0.07687
0.079476
0.076538
0.082338
0.080203
0.079068
0.078241
0.074539
0.078802
0.074111
0.077864
0.073342
0.080065
0.070388
0.077498
0.070486
0.083968
0.07743
0.084567
0.077274
0.078745
0.077212
0.080576
0.075704
0.07046
0.074721
0.07695
0.079163
0.07884
0.086555
0.073314
0.080563

μ A=3.9
0.647377
0.692919
0.712467
0.719282
0.709817
0.717085
0.723892
0.723927
0.723587
0.729508
0.719125
0.719902
0.728424
0.716043
0.724507
0.725345
0.723456
0.730167
0.735179
0.720593
0.728283
0.73087
0.715477
0.710512
0.735105
0.713214
0.726492
0.723772
0.72905
0.729755
0.72867
0.720831
0.722202
0.732189
0.72656
0.724838
0.731951
0.728584
0.721464
0.733598
0.725232
0.715111
0.729054
0.72388
0.72605
0.730582
0.730839
0.721349
0.729122
0.719218

σ A=3.9 μ 1!=3.1 μ 3.1!=3.6 μ 3.6!=3.9
0.132309
1
1
-1
0.123214
-1
-1
-1
0.119656
-1
-1
1
0.094679
-1
-1
-1
0.102726
-1
-1
-1
0.088422
1
-1
-1
0.086572
-1
-1
-1
0.088887
1
-1
-1
0.080256
-1
-1
-1
0.089599
-1
-1
-1
0.086582
1
-1
-1
0.088754
1
-1
-1
0.084107
-1
-1
-1
0.081707
-1
-1
1
0.089817
1
-1
-1
0.077977
1
-1
1
0.076541
1
-1
-1
0.077148
1
-1
-1
0.085961
-1
-1
-1
0.072217
1
-1
-1
0.078811
1
-1
-1
0.07268
-1
-1
-1
0.079458
-1
-1
-1
0.089004
-1
-1
-1
0.076479
-1
-1
-1
0.077349
-1
-1
1
0.078083
1
-1
-1
0.07856
-1
-1
-1
0.079058
1
-1
-1
0.069832
-1
-1
1
0.076166
-1
-1
-1
0.081247
1
-1
-1
0.080084
-1
-1
-1
0.073135
-1
-1
-1
0.078442
-1
-1
-1
0.070115
-1
-1
-1
0.082573
-1
-1
-1
0.076383
-1
-1
-1
0.083333
1
-1
-1
0.077429
-1
-1
-1
0.084096
-1
-1
-1
0.081098
-1
-1
-1
0.078401
-1
-1
-1
0.07848
1
-1
-1
0.07691
-1
-1
-1
0.076754
1
-1
-1
0.076673
-1
-1
1
0.084437
1
-1
-1
0.085545
-1
1
-1
0.077729
-1
-1
-1

309

APPENDIX C SEGREGATION STATISTICAL TESTS
C.1 A=1
A=1.0
Landscape
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

WTD MeanWTD Stdv.
0.656009 0.136437
0.638874 0.136619
0.654591 0.141854
0.641322 0.119186
0.636094 0.130697
0.643561 0.138008
0.636459 0.130996
0.626766 0.14422
0.634161 0.131637
0.64476 0.13729
0.619073 0.123088
0.644863 0.135426
0.640202 0.136998
0.636877 0.131576
0.623646 0.138009
0.643199 0.142802
0.635658 0.132495
0.642053 0.152564
0.63136 0.130191
0.633246 0.144173
0.635164 0.123132
0.631354 0.11741
0.633868 0.130251
0.637781 0.147404
0.616026 0.136763
0.636287 0.131389
0.622646 0.126157
0.662067 0.136176
0.622462 0.130645
0.627836 0.122537
0.632123 0.132183
0.626711 0.132731
0.638056 0.139891
0.633088 0.149756
0.634684 0.122919
0.634281 0.131362
0.625813 0.137706
0.62505 0.127227
0.620857 0.12466
0.652333 0.138223
0.641649 0.142385
0.640953 0.13569
0.635482 0.132007
0.62462 0.136778
0.61324 0.118724
0.658114 0.14228
0.613678 0.123653
0.62483 0.120949
0.608591 0.121599
0.64145 0.13814

IPD Mean
0.67567
0.664599
0.667263
0.666199
0.667111
0.675576
0.673673
0.673845
0.676348
0.670632
0.678854
0.674953
0.687193
0.680512
0.668596
0.67024
0.657842
0.676547
0.671497
0.672439
0.685936
0.671132
0.681792
0.692912
0.669064
0.672421
0.690678
0.67398
0.675883
0.68119
0.677959
0.660892
0.686889
0.673804
0.669433
0.68688
0.66081
0.687208
0.674564
0.67017
0.684611
0.668246
0.664997
0.678471
0.667506
0.672371
0.672518
0.675392
0.678851
0.652801

IPD Stdv. TTest IPD != WTD
0.121409
-1
0.126218
-1
0.129044
-1
0.115674
1
0.115109
1
0.125579
1
0.126863
1
0.124654
1
0.125458
1
0.129605
-1
0.134538
1
0.126388
1
0.132185
1
0.131511
1
0.132834
1
0.129318
1
0.120724
-1
0.125693
1
0.139465
1
0.130313
1
0.127308
1
0.119526
1
0.110303
1
0.121459
1
0.12732
1
0.127897
1
0.116903
1
0.122793
-1
0.134923
1
0.131892
1
0.1179
1
0.1254
1
0.125119
1
0.124547
1
0.124572
1
0.133558
1
0.114204
1
0.128933
1
0.134551
1
0.123908
-1
0.127441
1
0.13934
1
0.112136
1
0.11528
1
0.120855
1
0.13285
-1
0.130153
1
0.121676
1
0.121515
1
0.12188
-1

SHS Mean
0.692123
0.66543
0.848041
0.688047
0.679541
0.854851
0.709468
0.66974
0.847058
0.706942
0.687
0.844728
0.672053
0.675766
0.849597
0.708558
0.673573
0.85981
0.700184
0.679161
0.852243
0.692854
0.689757
0.861827
0.679795
0.672871
0.838389
0.686123
0.66095
0.839009
0.707006
0.666231
0.82312
0.674702
0.666196
0.836921
0.688342
0.668503
0.84393
0.681909
0.68538
0.853368
0.691149
0.66793
0.875637
0.702202
0.675667
0.826231
0.688327
0.655389

SHS Stdv. TTest SHS != WTD
0.139062
1
0.125283
1
0.149751
1
0.134422
1
0.130347
1
0.162788
1
0.140292
1
0.124014
1
0.154191
1
0.125864
1
0.125808
1
0.144053
1
0.132856
1
0.136117
1
0.153379
1
0.143448
1
0.130142
1
0.145856
1
0.140617
1
0.140376
1
0.143217
1
0.123002
1
0.1336
1
0.146302
1
0.130855
1
0.136328
1
0.142126
1
0.132086
-1
0.128726
1
0.138432
1
0.139969
1
0.146479
1
0.152193
1
0.139819
1
0.135756
1
0.148813
1
0.139338
1
0.127502
1
0.152479
1
0.136132
1
0.130309
1
0.125599
1
0.136708
1
0.126683
1
0.13579
1
0.135755
1
0.126501
1
0.142186
1
0.127545
1
0.126442
-1

STK Mean
0.44514
0.505266
0.536298
0.562801
0.583421
0.602909
0.610515
0.610553
0.633336
0.639254
0.652594
0.654982
0.670696
0.673243
0.687678
0.685939
0.695564
0.700866
0.706295
0.708866
0.714509
0.722863
0.729939
0.733558
0.742
0.741421
0.741015
0.750892
0.74555
0.748895
0.750947
0.757035
0.760939
0.762737
0.773137
0.769868
0.773219
0.774898
0.779602
0.77795
0.781798
0.789386
0.787637
0.791041
0.789763
0.798298
0.802275
0.798632
0.799459
0.805412

STK Stdv. TTest STK != WTD
0.124905
1
0.11745
1
0.125071
1
0.119929
1
0.123865
1
0.127653
1
0.133936
-1
0.134897
-1
0.139142
-1
0.143766
-1
0.136707
1
0.141537
-1
0.145464
1
0.14964
1
0.145196
1
0.146465
1
0.149432
1
0.146453
1
0.142609
1
0.147154
1
0.141059
1
0.145148
1
0.146401
1
0.13774
1
0.136625
1
0.136547
1
0.136805
1
0.133885
1
0.136237
1
0.131581
1
0.124059
1
0.133546
1
0.130962
1
0.129547
1
0.129876
1
0.12287
1
0.127779
1
0.111673
1
0.115594
1
0.119601
1
0.113262
1
0.111522
1
0.11272
1
0.114233
1
0.101044
1
0.103728
1
0.104072
1
0.106578
1
0.103244
1
0.102423
1

310
C.2 A=3.1
A=3.1
Landscape
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

WTD MeanWTD Stdv.
0.647681 0.140271
0.647789 0.133511
0.646842 0.130996
0.633409 0.135589
0.636512 0.126892
0.627161 0.132222
0.632328 0.129962
0.628863 0.120496
0.634579 0.14501
0.633845 0.141458
0.635184 0.132911
0.639705 0.136362
0.645728 0.134265
0.646991 0.152022
0.631813 0.126376
0.634392 0.124688
0.6305 0.132131
0.62317 0.129693
0.635237
0.1245
0.634383 0.129773
0.625377 0.135309
0.651307 0.150332
0.623915 0.127753
0.644901 0.154638
0.625678 0.118351
0.638102 0.126363
0.651833 0.132312
0.641152 0.14269
0.631728 0.13025
0.627974 0.131852
0.646035 0.131268
0.648845 0.138756
0.628064 0.132513
0.641436 0.140306
0.638924 0.144202
0.629325 0.125598
0.636591 0.123861
0.64169 0.140562
0.641243 0.133088
0.64993 0.133084
0.624184 0.121199
0.643515 0.140682
0.629883 0.138547
0.62957 0.141989
0.634468 0.116721
0.647839 0.13963
0.645126 0.141288
0.633263 0.131451
0.640006 0.125628
0.638044 0.136152

IPD Mean
0.709345
0.684403
0.710637
0.687401
0.716781
0.677591
0.709015
0.683287
0.710573
0.70148
0.726933
0.698646
0.732439
0.707909
0.741436
0.705038
0.733424
0.690509
0.747325
0.721974
0.754348
0.701588
0.760915
0.740681
0.763716
0.696108
0.755789
0.719547
0.785453
0.716474
0.766573
0.734287
0.764699
0.726401
0.750497
0.737553
0.772591
0.723099
0.755266
0.734161
0.758985
0.722064
0.775155
0.724436
0.751956
0.724687
0.773623
0.744102
0.771298
0.727082

IPD Stdv. TTest IPD != WTD
0.125705
1
0.124466
1
0.130471
1
0.133161
1
0.138378
1
0.134418
1
0.133078
1
0.121645
1
0.13421
1
0.127556
1
0.124523
1
0.133305
1
0.12731
1
0.124563
1
0.132434
1
0.128
1
0.124327
1
0.128832
1
0.115171
1
0.125134
1
0.139893
1
0.118489
1
0.128057
1
0.130283
1
0.126283
1
0.130516
1
0.136411
1
0.13093
1
0.132228
1
0.120736
1
0.125808
1
0.128069
1
0.132699
1
0.117542
1
0.131895
1
0.133395
1
0.128425
1
0.128892
1
0.136505
1
0.132626
1
0.130282
1
0.127043
1
0.132903
1
0.122998
1
0.131649
1
0.137709
1
0.138391
1
0.123969
1
0.129474
1
0.130196
1

SHS Mean
0.698588
0.649866
0.858471
0.672713
0.680263
0.818789
0.703
0.670237
0.846871
0.695848
0.697597
0.825909
0.715784
0.674266
0.858851
0.694515
0.694819
0.832465
0.726561
0.674939
0.862594
0.691643
0.720784
0.85764
0.718073
0.691895
0.880772
0.703272
0.726506
0.858942
0.751316
0.683406
0.886047
0.710313
0.728877
0.840187
0.748368
0.67698
0.857751
0.703529
0.734029
0.851506
0.739597
0.679556
0.888965
0.702553
0.73483
0.867848
0.758994
0.698915

SHS Stdv. TTest SHS != WTD
0.15233
1
0.118928
-1
0.142166
1
0.141095
1
0.136461
1
0.144154
1
0.143914
1
0.143362
1
0.135376
1
0.131935
1
0.13421
1
0.149226
1
0.119442
1
0.133293
-1
0.160038
1
0.135595
1
0.136602
1
0.148547
1
0.139552
1
0.142502
1
0.15376
1
0.131773
1
0.133024
1
0.141648
1
0.153763
1
0.139347
1
0.131621
1
0.139935
1
0.139247
1
0.153625
1
0.143964
1
0.126948
1
0.140957
1
0.148594
1
0.142913
1
0.145161
1
0.14915
1
0.140232
1
0.141333
1
0.136925
1
0.145727
1
0.14682
1
0.132863
1
0.131505
1
0.14713
1
0.145569
1
0.150952
1
0.147188
1
0.149068
1
0.139234
1

STK Mean
0.457725
0.50833
0.531228
0.565012
0.578807
0.592023
0.606073
0.631942
0.63376
0.643699
0.648325
0.653851
0.668351
0.667368
0.678442
0.680494
0.694526
0.703424
0.706535
0.7095
0.714635
0.725816
0.73283
0.730673
0.736298
0.739597
0.743032
0.740681
0.753725
0.754895
0.761661
0.765406
0.767956
0.776129
0.777801
0.775079
0.777319
0.781661
0.778643
0.782263
0.779477
0.786608
0.790149
0.788746
0.792047
0.799377
0.798266
0.803114
0.802538
0.805275

STK Stdv. TTest STK != WTD
0.113279
1
0.12283
1
0.114797
1
0.112784
1
0.127397
1
0.129019
1
0.128884
1
0.133339
-1
0.135995
-1
0.139852
-1
0.14501
-1
0.141909
-1
0.146301
-1
0.143413
-1
0.149978
1
0.149213
1
0.151547
1
0.151211
1
0.149343
1
0.152416
1
0.146668
1
0.143536
1
0.141353
1
0.144472
1
0.140041
1
0.141109
1
0.141956
1
0.137979
1
0.134568
1
0.130255
1
0.133414
1
0.126889
1
0.129388
1
0.127813
1
0.113921
1
0.115128
1
0.120177
1
0.119686
1
0.119479
1
0.11707
1
0.117634
1
0.108503
1
0.108879
1
0.110972
1
0.107412
1
0.10886
1
0.094651
1
0.099166
1
0.09877
1
0.086303
1

311
C.3 A=3.6
A=3.6
Landscape
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

WTD MeanWTD Stdv.
0.655667 0.151484
0.645094 0.140195
0.643289 0.140562
0.64152 0.131204
0.647591 0.150035
0.648213 0.12848
0.627158 0.127031
0.641044 0.14239
0.642588 0.130163
0.614988 0.131697
0.648114 0.146554
0.637494 0.142876
0.641348 0.132858
0.628617 0.126544
0.637009 0.127456
0.641503 0.13312
0.633775 0.147505
0.644096 0.14362
0.637713 0.125544
0.636058 0.140047
0.637012 0.127238
0.634716 0.129373
0.656757 0.143165
0.652275 0.134741
0.632632 0.134916
0.651225 0.141297
0.653982 0.135458
0.639784 0.147064
0.638599 0.135714
0.647254 0.139665
0.636865 0.131955
0.630728 0.13319
0.628784 0.128018
0.645433 0.134677
0.636781 0.149681
0.637485 0.140099
0.627097 0.121075
0.631854 0.139699
0.64355 0.131015
0.638942 0.132156
0.61738 0.123165
0.63776 0.128712
0.631497 0.13536
0.651146 0.144302
0.642044 0.127894
0.637538 0.14258
0.639442 0.134631
0.637655 0.118077
0.653307 0.148119
0.631076 0.127168

IPD Mean
0.724535
0.66981
0.727254
0.697301
0.722328
0.694705
0.726096
0.704901
0.716412
0.707579
0.727705
0.713292
0.714368
0.698719
0.726664
0.704942
0.737412
0.714933
0.709643
0.710026
0.726292
0.717678
0.731456
0.727237
0.755064
0.727281
0.74214
0.725228
0.746436
0.728211
0.74424
0.715485
0.746632
0.71883
0.753175
0.723816
0.739263
0.737965
0.755468
0.736289
0.748421
0.729167
0.76305
0.732965
0.735187
0.726313
0.759687
0.724702
0.762737
0.734047

IPD Stdv. TTest IPD != WTD
0.119526
1
0.135624
-1
0.131196
1
0.136779
1
0.126756
1
0.129997
1
0.12711
1
0.124561
1
0.137526
1
0.140312
1
0.128822
1
0.127362
1
0.121898
1
0.132197
1
0.137875
1
0.125013
1
0.125464
1
0.133119
1
0.131004
1
0.117437
1
0.137704
1
0.119314
1
0.128993
1
0.11623
1
0.132013
1
0.130707
1
0.136828
1
0.137462
1
0.136862
1
0.125232
1
0.131292
1
0.131356
1
0.133497
1
0.125946
1
0.127781
1
0.123486
1
0.125049
1
0.139505
1
0.136928
1
0.126969
1
0.123691
1
0.131102
1
0.1296
1
0.122073
1
0.12516
1
0.123242
1
0.124761
1
0.126926
1
0.124956
1
0.133882
1

SHS Mean
0.689953
0.6685
0.861029
0.702295
0.694465
0.860319
0.71648
0.675924
0.839135
0.715734
0.700398
0.837807
0.701529
0.671743
0.853547
0.68336
0.702149
0.844567
0.711503
0.696412
0.867857
0.709977
0.697319
0.828763
0.713415
0.677009
0.865099
0.701594
0.725465
0.858532
0.736243
0.704009
0.868099
0.698526
0.705029
0.858871
0.715172
0.698553
0.873447
0.718137
0.70086
0.850018
0.728561
0.694143
0.878556
0.70338
0.705281
0.837632
0.738561
0.682447

SHS Stdv. TTest SHS != WTD
0.148734
1
0.135904
-1
0.138316
1
0.134713
1
0.149966
1
0.145436
1
0.15058
1
0.136442
1
0.137768
1
0.133236
1
0.142862
1
0.142253
1
0.14895
1
0.133466
1
0.132406
1
0.138514
1
0.145774
1
0.143271
1
0.140899
1
0.132283
1
0.160006
1
0.146148
1
0.141206
1
0.140008
1
0.140779
1
0.135412
-1
0.142261
1
0.133285
1
0.129508
1
0.146698
1
0.138835
1
0.11935
1
0.147668
1
0.142892
1
0.15057
1
0.13946
1
0.144379
1
0.13342
1
0.153665
1
0.14837
1
0.134111
1
0.158043
1
0.139606
1
0.134992
1
0.155636
1
0.143663
1
0.15431
1
0.145927
1
0.145235
1
0.138742
1

STK Mean
0.447368
0.506237
0.541173
0.558994
0.590029
0.590345
0.607895
0.612067
0.628778
0.63583
0.642526
0.650301
0.653494
0.651772
0.664602
0.677646
0.680749
0.687675
0.702634
0.70555
0.713594
0.714702
0.71817
0.721345
0.721079
0.730026
0.74169
0.73717
0.742787
0.745029
0.757234
0.761298
0.759418
0.768947
0.769541
0.76981
0.772994
0.772737
0.772646
0.777409
0.782702
0.784161
0.788763
0.790374
0.789053
0.794219
0.804175
0.80195
0.80131
0.801743

STK Stdv. TTest STK != WTD
0.1173
1
0.110489
1
0.107896
1
0.116876
1
0.121803
1
0.120307
1
0.12719
-1
0.132629
1
0.13936
-1
0.141858
-1
0.143025
-1
0.134095
-1
0.142413
-1
0.146861
-1
0.148796
1
0.145907
1
0.144303
1
0.149486
1
0.145306
1
0.141636
1
0.139561
1
0.142387
1
0.142663
1
0.14548
1
0.142959
1
0.138365
1
0.13581
1
0.13764
1
0.133187
1
0.136325
1
0.129922
1
0.125454
1
0.133276
1
0.122284
1
0.123858
1
0.118423
1
0.130535
1
0.121966
1
0.118566
1
0.133906
1
0.128306
1
0.12143
1
0.1168
1
0.118115
1
0.113427
1
0.109978
1
0.116035
1
0.113346
1
0.109727
1
0.113241
1
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C.4 A=3.9
A=3.9
Landscape
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

WTD MeanWTD Stdv.
0.66036 0.144093
0.650231 0.136214
0.637848 0.136573
0.628164 0.131724
0.638096 0.125167
0.639605 0.138085
0.63783 0.133941
0.633746 0.137585
0.63688 0.127563
0.655854 0.136926
0.62664 0.139273
0.623643 0.129757
0.639105 0.140843
0.653646 0.147537
0.629509 0.126444
0.614193 0.127388
0.621465 0.122097
0.639161 0.136993
0.645661 0.134454
0.628199 0.134644
0.629722 0.121136
0.641316 0.151657
0.630149 0.139877
0.646997 0.145682
0.62036 0.127126
0.629158 0.135415
0.635152 0.124598
0.654939 0.130814
0.639401 0.134815
0.644266 0.121065
0.626956 0.130116
0.629857 0.130235
0.624813 0.136597
0.646673 0.136139
0.631278 0.134846
0.619205 0.128103
0.633123 0.131253
0.626886 0.129688
0.630854 0.131861
0.626436 0.11901
0.648301 0.161078
0.628901 0.135313
0.623857 0.135046
0.622096 0.134688
0.634994 0.131117
0.636471 0.134768
0.636851 0.154412
0.64383 0.129904
0.65293 0.146496
0.643155 0.138792

IPD Mean
0.689222
0.703722
0.705538
0.712225
0.733728
0.717994
0.738687
0.716035
0.736298
0.722459
0.727135
0.74183
0.732085
0.734944
0.736403
0.745439
0.737462
0.733114
0.748597
0.748737
0.735903
0.758345
0.724515
0.75074
0.742345
0.737322
0.752866
0.737009
0.755579
0.756728
0.753681
0.740807
0.731114
0.737056
0.754193
0.76064
0.74083
0.737652
0.741661
0.741471
0.743927
0.768474
0.755751
0.759348
0.755316
0.748556
0.755696
0.750012
0.752687
0.75843

IPD Stdv. TTest IPD != WTD
0.128802
1
0.118223
1
0.138933
1
0.119928
1
0.139951
1
0.121871
1
0.136943
1
0.130804
1
0.132499
1
0.132836
1
0.132636
1
0.127577
1
0.129384
1
0.140172
1
0.125422
1
0.129792
1
0.134359
1
0.131628
1
0.136143
1
0.132605
1
0.125448
1
0.125373
1
0.131749
1
0.13296
1
0.137319
1
0.134123
1
0.151428
1
0.128719
1
0.131193
1
0.136024
1
0.12624
1
0.132637
1
0.13499
1
0.128886
1
0.136364
1
0.130624
1
0.134462
1
0.128404
1
0.12614
1
0.124093
1
0.129685
1
0.127686
1
0.136731
1
0.131621
1
0.12447
1
0.133895
1
0.135818
1
0.135068
1
0.127591
1
0.122282
1

SHS Mean
0.686289
0.692287
0.847433
0.720854
0.712456
0.872012
0.713851
0.710155
0.888497
0.723035
0.740211
0.864292
0.71445
0.705743
0.855307
0.724804
0.697687
0.874249
0.722319
0.710436
0.852801
0.734415
0.709465
0.876225
0.719015
0.706401
0.850781
0.733716
0.723541
0.880629
0.707889
0.705219
0.879749
0.707325
0.702559
0.879202
0.746076
0.725234
0.877058
0.720526
0.691839
0.867526
0.711614
0.716029
0.878918
0.72293
0.707184
0.877383
0.724728
0.716772

SHS Stdv. TTest SHS != WTD
0.146705
-1
0.133915
1
0.139673
1
0.119217
1
0.136809
1
0.140268
1
0.140829
1
0.145369
1
0.144633
1
0.141196
1
0.132577
1
0.148277
1
0.135483
1
0.138985
1
0.133567
1
0.145888
1
0.148715
1
0.152737
1
0.146275
1
0.145848
1
0.145082
1
0.131267
1
0.13344
1
0.157825
1
0.143619
1
0.144472
1
0.138903
1
0.136062
1
0.150423
1
0.135542
1
0.15004
1
0.136395
1
0.148144
1
0.140159
1
0.136785
1
0.150863
1
0.147355
1
0.134035
1
0.150453
1
0.138623
1
0.137332
1
0.148416
1
0.155123
1
0.147172
1
0.129254
1
0.152885
1
0.142987
1
0.144543
1
0.134173
1
0.135188
1

STK Mean
0.459649
0.498444
0.532664
0.550067
0.571687
0.591605
0.594594
0.618766
0.619222
0.620485
0.632851
0.648155
0.653307
0.659588
0.667213
0.674146
0.675883
0.683135
0.695275
0.699114
0.695915
0.702544
0.710822
0.72019
0.713184
0.72698
0.731874
0.744155
0.740307
0.744231
0.74357
0.74114
0.74695
0.753518
0.760246
0.765018
0.768845
0.772632
0.779725
0.779415
0.784699
0.788965
0.792801
0.789333
0.789196
0.796801
0.797006
0.797366
0.803845
0.803588

STK Stdv. TTest STK != WTD
0.11334
1
0.117565
1
0.110527
1
0.114919
1
0.110093
1
0.117615
1
0.120028
1
0.125653
-1
0.135733
-1
0.136108
1
0.136777
-1
0.142604
-1
0.145912
-1
0.144988
-1
0.145253
1
0.142089
1
0.14822
1
0.152513
1
0.146043
1
0.145099
1
0.15112
1
0.144426
1
0.145224
1
0.144962
1
0.144016
1
0.14527
1
0.138742
1
0.142876
1
0.143694
1
0.145263
1
0.14263
1
0.150376
1
0.140229
1
0.144717
1
0.140384
1
0.128682
1
0.130372
1
0.132174
1
0.127346
1
0.126355
1
0.123716
1
0.125869
1
0.125322
1
0.124772
1
0.123433
1
0.11648
1
0.117929
1
0.122332
1
0.117631
1
0.117175
1
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C.5 IPD: T-TESTS BY LANDSCAPE AND SUCCESSIVE A VALUES
KD=IPD
Landscape
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

μ A=1
0.67567
0.664599
0.667263
0.666199
0.667111
0.675576
0.673673
0.673845
0.676348
0.670632
0.678854
0.674953
0.687193
0.680512
0.668596
0.67024
0.657842
0.676547
0.671497
0.672439
0.685936
0.671132
0.681792
0.692912
0.669064
0.672421
0.690678
0.67398
0.675883
0.68119
0.677959
0.660892
0.686889
0.673804
0.669433
0.68688
0.66081
0.687208
0.674564
0.67017
0.684611
0.668246
0.664997
0.678471
0.667506
0.672371
0.672518
0.675392
0.678851
0.652801

σ A=1
0.121409
0.126218
0.129044
0.115674
0.115109
0.125579
0.126863
0.124654
0.125458
0.129605
0.134538
0.126388
0.132185
0.131511
0.132834
0.129318
0.120724
0.125693
0.139465
0.130313
0.127308
0.119526
0.110303
0.121459
0.12732
0.127897
0.116903
0.122793
0.134923
0.131892
0.1179
0.1254
0.125119
0.124547
0.124572
0.133558
0.114204
0.128933
0.134551
0.123908
0.127441
0.13934
0.112136
0.11528
0.120855
0.13285
0.130153
0.121676
0.121515
0.12188

μ A=3.1
0.709345
0.684403
0.710637
0.687401
0.716781
0.677591
0.709015
0.683287
0.710573
0.70148
0.726933
0.698646
0.732439
0.707909
0.741436
0.705038
0.733424
0.690509
0.747325
0.721974
0.754348
0.701588
0.760915
0.740681
0.763716
0.696108
0.755789
0.719547
0.785453
0.716474
0.766573
0.734287
0.764699
0.726401
0.750497
0.737553
0.772591
0.723099
0.755266
0.734161
0.758985
0.722064
0.775155
0.724436
0.751956
0.724687
0.773623
0.744102
0.771298
0.727082

σ A=3.1
0.125705
0.124466
0.130471
0.133161
0.138378
0.134418
0.133078
0.121645
0.13421
0.127556
0.124523
0.133305
0.12731
0.124563
0.132434
0.128
0.124327
0.128832
0.115171
0.125134
0.139893
0.118489
0.128057
0.130283
0.126283
0.130516
0.136411
0.13093
0.132228
0.120736
0.125808
0.128069
0.132699
0.117542
0.131895
0.133395
0.128425
0.128892
0.136505
0.132626
0.130282
0.127043
0.132903
0.122998
0.131649
0.137709
0.138391
0.123969
0.129474
0.130196

μ A=3.6
0.724535
0.66981
0.727254
0.697301
0.722328
0.694705
0.726096
0.704901
0.716412
0.707579
0.727705
0.713292
0.714368
0.698719
0.726664
0.704942
0.737412
0.714933
0.709643
0.710026
0.726292
0.717678
0.731456
0.727237
0.755064
0.727281
0.74214
0.725228
0.746436
0.728211
0.74424
0.715485
0.746632
0.71883
0.753175
0.723816
0.739263
0.737965
0.755468
0.736289
0.748421
0.729167
0.76305
0.732965
0.735187
0.726313
0.759687
0.724702
0.762737
0.734047

σ A=3.6
0.119526
0.135624
0.131196
0.136779
0.126756
0.129997
0.12711
0.124561
0.137526
0.140312
0.128822
0.127362
0.121898
0.132197
0.137875
0.125013
0.125464
0.133119
0.131004
0.117437
0.137704
0.119314
0.128993
0.11623
0.132013
0.130707
0.136828
0.137462
0.136862
0.125232
0.131292
0.131356
0.133497
0.125946
0.127781
0.123486
0.125049
0.139505
0.136928
0.126969
0.123691
0.131102
0.1296
0.122073
0.12516
0.123242
0.124761
0.126926
0.124956
0.133882

μ A=3.9
0.689222
0.703722
0.705538
0.712225
0.733728
0.717994
0.738687
0.716035
0.736298
0.722459
0.727135
0.74183
0.732085
0.734944
0.736403
0.745439
0.737462
0.733114
0.748597
0.748737
0.735903
0.758345
0.724515
0.75074
0.742345
0.737322
0.752866
0.737009
0.755579
0.756728
0.753681
0.740807
0.731114
0.737056
0.754193
0.76064
0.74083
0.737652
0.741661
0.741471
0.743927
0.768474
0.755751
0.759348
0.755316
0.748556
0.755696
0.750012
0.752687
0.75843

σ A=3.9 μ 1!=3.1 μ 3.1!=3.6 μ 3.6!=3.9
0.128802
1
-1
1
0.118223
-1
-1
1
0.138933
1
-1
-1
0.119928
-1
-1
-1
0.139951
1
-1
-1
0.121871
-1
-1
-1
0.136943
1
-1
-1
0.130804
-1
-1
-1
0.132499
1
-1
-1
0.132836
1
-1
-1
0.132636
1
-1
-1
0.127577
-1
-1
1
0.129384
1
-1
-1
0.140172
1
-1
1
0.125422
1
-1
-1
0.129792
1
-1
1
0.134359
1
-1
-1
0.131628
-1
-1
-1
0.136143
1
1
1
0.132605
1
-1
1
0.125448
1
1
-1
0.125373
1
-1
1
0.131749
1
1
-1
0.13296
1
-1
-1
0.137319
1
-1
-1
0.134123
-1
1
-1
0.151428
1
-1
-1
0.128719
1
-1
-1
0.131193
1
1
-1
0.136024
1
-1
1
0.12624
1
-1
-1
0.132637
1
-1
-1
0.13499
1
-1
-1
0.128886
1
-1
-1
0.136364
1
-1
-1
0.130624
1
-1
1
0.134462
1
1
-1
0.128404
1
-1
-1
0.12614
1
-1
-1
0.124093
1
-1
-1
0.129685
1
-1
-1
0.127686
1
-1
1
0.136731
1
-1
-1
0.131621
1
-1
1
0.12447
1
-1
-1
0.133895
1
-1
-1
0.135818
1
-1
-1
0.135068
1
-1
-1
0.127591
1
-1
-1
0.122282
1
-1
-1
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APPENDIX D CATNEURO BEST MODELS
The top 12 models produced from the 6 CATNeuro sample runs are shown below – WTD
followed by Stag-Hunt.

D.1 WEIGHTED MAJORITY MODELS
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D.2 STAG-HUNT MODELS
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Cultural Algorithms (CA) are knowledge-intensive, population-based stochastic optimization
methods that are modeled after human cultures and are suited to solving problems in complex
environments. The CA Belief Space stores knowledge harvested from prior generations and redistributes it to future generations via a knowledge distribution (KD) mechanism. Each of the
population individuals is then guided through the search space via the associated knowledge.
Previously, CA implementations have used only competitive KD mechanisms that have performed
well for problems embedded in static environments. Relatively recently, CA research has evolved
to encompass dynamic problem environments. Given increasing environmental complexity, a
natural question arises about whether KD mechanisms that also incorporate cooperation can
perform better in such environments than purely competitive ones? Borrowing from game theory,
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game-based KD mechanisms are implemented and tested against the default competitive
mechanism – Weighted Majority (WTD).
Two different concepts of complexity are addressed – numerical optimization under dynamic
environments and hierarchal, multi-objective optimization for evolving deep learning models. The
former is addressed with the CATGame software system and the later with CATNeuro.
CATGame implements three types of games that span both cooperation and competition for
knowledge distribution, namely: Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), Stag-Hunt and Stackelberg.
The performance of the three game mechanisms is compared with the aid of a dynamic problem
generator called Cones World. Weighted Majority, aka “wisdom of the crowd”, the default CA
competitive KD mechanism is used as the benchmark. It is shown that games that support both
cooperation and competition do indeed perform better but not in all cases. The results shed light
on what kinds of games are suited to problem solving in complex, dynamic environments.
Specifically, games that balance exploration and exploitation using the local signal of ‘social’ rank
– Stag-Hunt and IPD – perform better. Stag-Hunt which is also the most cooperative of the games
tested, performed the best overall. Dynamic analysis of the ‘social’ aspects of the CA test runs
shows that Stag-Hunt allocates compute resources more consistently than the others in response
to environmental complexity changes. Stackelberg where the allocation decisions are centralized,
like in a centrally planned economic system, is found to be the least adaptive.
CATNeuro is for solving neural architecture search (NAS) problems. Contemporary ‘deep
learning’ neural network models are proven effective. However, the network topologies may be
complex and not immediately obvious for the problem at hand. This has given rise to the
secondary field of neural architecture search. It is still nascent with many frameworks and
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approaches now becoming available. This paper describes a NAS method based on graph
evolution pioneered by NEAT (Neuroevolution of Augmenting Topologies) but driven by the
evolutionary mechanisms under Cultural Algorithms. Here CATNeuro is applied to find optimal
network topologies to play a 2D fighting game called FightingICE (derived from “The Rumble Fish”
video game). A policy-based, reinforcement learning method is used to create the training data
for network optimization. CATNeuro is still evolving. To inform the development of CATNeuro, in
this primary foray into NAS, we contrast the performance of CATNeuro with two different
knowledge distribution mechanisms – the stalwart Weighted Majority and a new one based on
the Stag-Hunt game from evolutionary game theory that performed the best in CATGame. The
research shows that Stag-Hunt has a distinct edge over WTD in terms of game performance, model
accuracy, and model size. It is therefore deemed to be the preferred mechanism for complex,
hierarchical optimization tasks such as NAS and is planned to be used as the default KD mechanism
in CATNeuro going forward.
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